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P R E F A C E 
FOR two years, from 1952 to 1954, I was privileged to hold a research fellowship at the East African Institute of Social Research, Kampala. This sketch of the agricultural history of Uganda represents part of the 
fruits of my labours during that period. I hope later to present a more 
detailed study of agrarian life in the Buganda Province. For the belated 
appearance even of this first study I am solely to blame. 
My indebtedness to others is very great. Dr. Audrey Richards, sometime 
Director of the Institute, was a constant source of inspiration and guidance. 
Many colleagues at the Institute, and at the University College of East 
Africa, among whom I must particularly mention Dr. C. Ehrlich, Dr. W. 
Elkan and Mr. L. Joy, have contributed to the shaping of the ideas expressed 
in the following pages, though none of them is of course responsible for 
any judgments made therein. The Uganda Government allowed me to make 
use of some of its unpublished records, and many of its officers gave valuable 
assistance in various ways. 
In the writing of tribal names I have followed the currently approved 
practice of omitting Bantu and other grammatical prefixes. Thus the people 
more generally known as the Baganda appear here as the Ganda, the Iteso 
as the Teso. An exception is, as usual, made for the prefix bu-, signifying 
"country." Buganda is the country of the Ganda. 
A difficulty of which I have been very conscious is that I am addressing 
(I hope) some readers who are much better acquainted with Uganda than I 
am and some who may not be acquainted with it at all. Those in the first 
category are encouraged to omit the reading of Chapter II. 
C . C . WRIGLEY. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the nineteenth century large tracts of the earth's surface, in 
which production had hitherto been carried on solely or mainly for the direct 
and more or less immediate benefit of a narrow range of consumers, were 
brought, by the provision of more efficient means of transport and the estab-
lishment of wider and more stable systems of law and order, within the 
orbit of the international exchange economy. The inhabitants of these regions 
were thus enabled, even without making any significant alteration in the 
techniques of production, to increase their wealth, to extend their command 
over goods and services, by producing and exporting commodities which, 
though valueless or nearly so at their place of origin, commanded a high 
price on the markets of the world, receiving in exchange the artefacts of 
industrial societies and the skilled services of foreigners. There was nothing 
fundamentally difficult about this process, at least in its early stages. Most 
of the newly opened countries, especially those which lay within the tropics, 
were capable of yielding some product or products, mineral or agricultural 
or both, which possessed a scarcity value in the world at large. Since famine 
and pestilence and war had generally kept the population well below the 
normal carrying capacity of the soil, most of them had land to spare for the 
production of a surplus. Since the provision of food and shelter had rarely 
occupied the whole energies of the people, there was generally labour to spare 
as well, especially as ordered government removed the necessity of protection 
and the temptations of predation, thereby freeing the young males for other 
and more profitable activities. 
This is not to say, however, that the process of grafting specialised 
forms of production on to a subsistence economy could be accomplished 
without much friction and many disappointments, or that its success did not 
bring fresh problems in its train. Though labour was available, it was not 
always available in the right quantity in the right places, nor was it always 
conspicuously willing to work. Though few lands were altogether lacking 
in special, profitably exploitable assets, it was not always obvious what these 
assets were. The most efficient and economical form of organisation, the 
proper role of capital, the correct techniques of exploitation were often not 
arrived at without a great deal of experiment and loss. Moreover, although 
the production of a surplus for exchange meant, almost by definition, an 
economic gain, the effect of the new increment of wealth might be in some 
respects deleterious, destroying or impairing the existing system of social 
relationships and making necessary a perhaps painful effort of reconstruction. 
And even the strictly economic gain was often a limited one. For after a 
certain time, especially as the checks on population growth were generally 
being removed at the same time as per capita cultivation was being increased, 
there ceased to be land to spare: the point was reached at which production 
for export could not be further extended, or perhaps even sustained, without 
encroaching either on the food supply or on the fertility of the soil. Even 
apart from this particular limiting factor, the process of enrichment through 
the simpler forms of specialised primary production could not be continued 
indefinitely. There came a time when economic growth could not be sustained 
without radical improvements in equipment and technique or drastic changes 
in the structure of the economy. 
In these pages I shall attempt to trace the growth of an export-crop 
economy in one small tropical dependency. They are not to be regarded as in 
any sense a comprehensive economic history of Uganda. Some aspects of 
that history have been or are being treated by other hands; and the present 
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study, which concentrates on the actual organisation of agricultural pro-
duction, is intended to be complementary both to the late Mr. P. G. Powes-
land's account of the supply and utilisation of labour1 and to Mr. C. Ehrlich's 
as yet unpublished history of cotton marketing.2 
Lying in the heart of Africa, separated from the ocean by some 500 
miles of mostly arid and unpromising country through which no navigable 
waters run, Uganda was among the last parts of the world to feel the impact 
of international trade. A few products of the outer world appear to have 
reached it by devious routes a little before the end of the eighteenth 
century,3 but until the 1840s it had not been visited by, nor was its existence 
even known to, any member of civilised society. No European set foot in the 
country until 1862, and no European came to live there until 1877. It was 
only in 1890 that the first steps towards the establishment of civilised govern-
ment were taken, and the process can hardly be said to have been completed 
in the outlying areas until 1914. More important still, it was only in 1901 
that the railway, completing its arduous journey from Mombasa to Kisumu, 
on the easternmost gulf of Lake Victoria, spanned the wilderness which lay 
between Uganda and the sea and so brought its peoples into effective contact 
with the markets of the world. 
The development of Uganda is thus a very recent process, to all intents 
and purposes a process of the present century. Within that short period 
economic progress has been steady rather than brilliant. The Protectorate 
has not been the scene of one of the more spectacular economic trans-
formations. It is perhaps best described in negative terms; its special charac-
teristic, among the newly developed countries of the world, is that it has no 
very special characteristic. It does not, for one thing, possess any great 
mineral wealth, so that the quickest of all roads to fortune has not been 
open to it. Nor, although it lies across the equator, is it well suited to the 
growth of those products of the hot and humid tropics, such as cocoa, cloves 
or rubber, the peculiar properties of which bring really large returns to their 
fortunate producers. Nor again has its development been either assisted or 
complicated by an influx of alien colonists. Large-scale irrigation is neither 
necessary nor possible. These negations make the recent economic history 
of Uganda in a sense the more interesting, in that it may be taken almost as an 
abstract type of tropical, non-maritime, newly discovered, politically 
dependent country. 
1 • P?wc,s'an,<J. p- o . Economic Policy and Labour, A Study in Uganda's Economic History. East African Studies 
N o . 10. Kampala , 1957. 
2. Ehrlich, C. The Marketing of Cotton in Uganda, 1903-1939. (unpublished Ph .D. thesis, London , 1958). 
3. Kagwa, A. Basekabaka b'e Bnganda (the Kings of Buganda), 4th edn„ Kampa la , 1953, p. 73. Cf. Thomas 
H.B. and Scott, R . Uganda, London , 1935, p. 6. 
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UGANDA IN RELATION TO SURROUNDING TERRITORIES 
v i 
C H A P T E R I 
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 
Uganda lies almost entirely within the basin of the upper Nile. Part of 
it is contained within the lesser basin of Lake Victoria, but the bulk of the 
country consists of a plateau, 3,000 to 4,500 feet above sea level, tilted slightly 
away from the Lake, from which it is separated by a low, irregular wall of 
hills, breached only by the Nile itself. Close to the Lake, the plateau is 
dissected into countless small, characteristically flat-topped hills, which 
modulate northwards into gentle undulations. Between these uplands the 
waters move imperceptibly through a labyrinth of swamps and meres towards 
the desert and the Mediterranean Sea. The western margin of the plateau is 
marked by the deep trough known as the Western Rift, which contains Lakes 
Edward and Albert and forms in large part the western frontier of the 
Protectorate. Mountainous country is found only on the fringes. In the 
south-west the Mufumbiro cones and the Ruwenzori massif tower over the 
Rift; in the east Mount Elgon rises abruptly out of the plain; and lesser 
ranges mark part of the northern and north-eastern frontier. 
In spite of what has just been said about its lack of peculiar natural 
assets, there can be no doubt but that Uganda is one of the more favoured 
parts of Africa. Altitude, and in the south the moderating influence of Lake 
Victoria, give it a warm, equable climate. Meteorologically, it lies midway 
between the steaming jungles of the Congo basin and the arid wastes of 
eastern Kenya. It is within the equatorial zone of permanent low pressure and 
convectional storms, which, however, are not here at their greatest intensity. 
Mean rainfall varies from twenty-five to sixty inches. The largest falls occur in 
the south centre, along the margins of Lake Victoria; in the east, on and near 
the slopes of Mount Elgon; and in a broad tract of country to the north-
west. Between these areas a belt of lower rainfall runs across the country 
from north-east to south-west. These variations are roughly reflected in the 
characteristic vegetation. True equatorial rain-forest is found only in a small 
area in the extreme west, where the Congo jungles spill over the frontier 
into the country of Bwamba, but a modified form of tropical forest is found 
in south Buganda and Busoga, near the northern and north-western shores 
of the Lake, and again to the north-west, in Bunyoro. Most of these forests, 
however, have been removed by human agency, and the typical vegetation 
is now a rank growth of grasses, notably the towering Napier or elephant-
grass, pennisetum purpureum. On the slopes of Elgon and the other mountains, 
where man has not intervened, there are bamboos and other forms of 
highland forest. The south-west—-western Buganda, Ankole and much of 
Toro and Kigezi—-is for the most part open grassland, with scattered bush 
and trees and some riverine forest. Similar conditions recur in Karamoja in 
the north-east, but here the vegetation is still less luxuriant and the country 
wears an almost desert aspect in the dry season. The central and northern 
parts of Uganda—northern Buganda and Busoga, Lango, Acholi, Teso and 
Bukedi—are occupied by open woodlands merging into low-tree savannah. 
More important, from an agricultural point of view, than the average 
amount of rainfall are its reliability and its seasonal distribution; and here 
again Uganda is reasonably fortunate by African standards. Reference to 
the maps prepared for the recent Royal Commission on Land and Population 
in East Africa1 shows that more than half its total area (compared with less 
than a tenth part of Kenya and Tanganyika) enjoys virtual certainty of a 
1. Cd. 9475, 1955. 
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minimum of thirty inches, and that only two small areas in the north-east 
and the south-west fail to enjoy virtual certainty of at least twenty inches. 
(That is, these minima are reached or exceeded in not less than nineteen 
years out of twenty.) Thus, so far as rainfall is concerned, stock-keeping is 
practicable throughout the territory and in the greater part of it crops can be 
planted with a good prospect of a reasonable yield. 
The seasonal distribution of rainfall in Uganda is affected by the double 
transit of the sun across the zenith, which gives rise to two periods of heavy 
rainfall following the equinoxes. The "spring" rains are generally the heavier 
and more prolonged of the two, though in the west this disproportion is less 
marked and may be reversed. Thus, given the rapid growth and ripening 
which is characteristic of the tropics, it is possible to raise two "annual" 
crops from the same land, and permanent vegetation is not normally sub-
jected to the strain of prolonged drought. This is especially true of the vicinity 
of Lake Victoria, whose influence makes for a still more even spread of rain-
fall, so that even the theoretically dry seasons which follow the solstices are 
hardly ever completely so. Towards the north of the Protectorate, however, 
not only is this influence much weakened, but there is a tendency towards 
convergence of the rainy seasons and a definite winter drought. 
TABLE l 1 
A V E R A G E A N N U A L R A I N F A L L A T S E L E C T E D S T A T I O N S 
Total Percentage falling in 
(inches) April-Sept. Dec.-Feb. 
North-west 
Arua 55.04 66.2 7.8 
Gulu 60.58 71.0 6.5 
Hoima 55.93 58.9 11.6 
North-east 
Moroto 34.83 75.6 6.9 
Soroti 51.39 72.3 7.8 
East 
Tororo 55.16 61.6 13.4 
South-centre : 
17.2 Kampala 45.34 56.0 
Entebbe 59.10 57.2 18.0 
South-west 
18.4 Masaka 42.31 53.2 
Mbarara 35.41 45.5 19.2 
Kabale 38.68 43.5 23.9 
Thus, although the annual precipitation is as high or higher in some of 
the northern areas than in the south, its agricultural effectiveness is greatest 
in the narrowly equatorial regions of Uganda. A recently published map2 
underlines this point by showing that at points on the shore of Lake Victoria 
the probability of obtaining optimum crop water requirements twice a year 
is as high as 74 per cent., whereas at Gulu in the north, where the total 
volume is similar, this probability is only 4 per cent. 
After water, among the preconditions of successful agriculture, comes 
soil, so that we must now take a brief glance at the geological background 
of Uganda. Though there are some recent sediments in the north-east and 
volcanic debris on the slopes of most of the mountains, especially Elgon, the 
greater part of the country, like the greater part of the African table-land, 
rests on rocks of very ancient formation—mainly gneisses, schists and 
granites. Normally, the soils which overlie such rocks in the tropics are 
heavily leached and poor in nutrients, but in much of Uganda topography 
and rainfall distribution have combined to produce a much more favourable 
result. The dissection of the plateau has given rise, not to a single soil type, 
but to a sequence, or catena, which is repeated with minor variations on 
every individual hill. On the summits there is a thin covering of greyish soil, 
T. Derived from figures in U.P. Ann. Report, Dept. of Agriculture for 1956. 
2. U.P. Report of the Agricultural Productivity Committee, 1954, facing p. 94. 
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often almost completely eroded. The valley floors are coated with an acid 
clay, which is virtually uncultivable even where it is not waterlogged. (This 
is commonly known as black cotton soil, apparently because neither cotton 
nor any other crop will grow on it.) On the lower slopes there is an acid, 
sandy soil, full of organic matter but otherwise poorly endowed. But the 
middle and upper slopes, which make up the bulk of the land surface, are 
covered with deep, heavy red and chocolate earths of excellent structure, 
well supplied with plant nutrients. Here again, however, the more southerly 
regions, with their strongly marked relief and even rainfall distribution, are 
better placed than the northern parts of the country, where the soils are in 
general lighter and the lower members of the catena occupy a larger propor-
tion of the total area.1 
In sum, then, there are two relatively small areas, in the far north-east 
and in the south-west, midway between Lake Victoria and the western 
frontier, in which cultivation is a precarious and not very rewarding activity 
and in which the emphasis is necessarily placed on the keeping of stock. 
Everywhere else, except in the hot and arid Rift Valley, agriculture is reason-
ably productive and secure. But certain areas possess outstanding advan-
tages, especially for the raising of perennial crops. Best of all, though of very 
limited extent, are the western spurs of Mount Elgon, with their steady 
precipitation and rich volcanic soils. Next comes a much more extensive 
area to the north of Lake Victoria, comprising the southerly parts of Buganda 
and Busoga; and after that, in order of superiority, come parts of the Toro, 
Bunyoro and West Nile districts in the west and north-west of the Pro-
tectorate. 
The native peoples of Uganda are most commonly classified according 
to the principal language groups, which correspond to some extent with 
minor differences of physical type. The whole south-western half of the 
country is occupied by Bantu-speaking peoples, the north-west by the 
speakers of Nilotic and to a less extent of Sudanic languages, the north-east 
by Nilo-hamites and the south-east by Bantu with substantial Nilotic and 
Nilo-hamite intrusions. According to the 1948 census the tribal distribution 
was as follows: 
T A B L E 22 
T R I B A L D I S T R I B U T I O N A T 1948 C E N S U S 
Numbers Tribe 
BANTU 
Ganda 
Soga 
Nkole 
Kiga 
Gisu 
Nyoro 
Toro 
Ruanda3 
Gwere 
Konjo 
Nyuli 
Others 
SUDANIC 
Lugbara 
Madi 
Others 
836,091 
426,608 
394,806 
271,738 
243,742 
180,610 
162,659 
131,048 
83,223 
73,745 
56,975 
115,182 
2,976,427 
183,111 
63,439 
22,148 
268,698 
Tribe 
NILOTIC 
Lango 
Acholi 
A lu r . . 
Dama 
NILO-HAMITIC 
Teso 
Karamojong 
Kumam 
Others 
IMMIGRANTS 
Ruanda8 
Rundi 
Others 
UNSPECIFIED 
T O T A 
Numbers 
265,296 
209,378 
96,421 
73,037 
644,132 
462,664 
108,282 
55,924 
40,917 
667,787 
158,003 
56,504 
37,039 
251,546 
108,965 
4,917,555 
1. See Thomas and Scott, op. cil., pp. 54-64. Tothili, J. D. (ed.). Agriculture in Uganda, Oxford, 1940, pp. 59-73. 
2. Source: East African Statistical Department, African Population of Uganda Protectorate, Nairobi, 
1950. My classification is not identical at all points with that used in this document. 
3. The homeland of this great tribe is partly in Uganda but mainly in Belgian territory. For the purpose 
of this table I have assumed that those shown as living in the Kigezi and Ankole districts are natives of 
Uganda but that the remainder are immigrants f rom outside the Protectorate. 
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An alternative and perhaps more significant classification is that which 
distinguishes the so-called inter-lacustrine Bantu from the remaining tribes 
of the Protectorate. The inter-lacustrine area, for this purpose, comprises 
the whole of Uganda to the west and south of the Victoria Nile, with an 
extension eastwards in Busoga, and also extends over north-western Tangan-
yika and the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi. The peoples of this 
area, with the exception of the Kiga and Konjo, were characterised by their 
construction, in the era preceding British rule, of centralised administrative 
systems, with specialised political roles and something in the nature of a 
governing class, whereas in the rest of Uganda, and indeed of East Africa, 
authority was much less concentrated and its radius of action was much 
smaller. The contrast should not, perhaps, be drawn too strictly. It has 
been shown, for example, that the Nilotic Alur possessed at least the rudi-
ments of a state system;1 and probably only the Nilo-hamitic tribes, the 
Sudanic Lugbara and the Gisu of Mount Elgon, could properly be described 
as chiefless societies. Nevertheless, it was a contrast which impressed itself 
strongly upon early European visitors, who were uniformly struck by the 
dignity of the ruling chiefs and the order and decorum of social life in the 
inter-lacustrine group of states. 
Typically, indeed, these units of order were quite small in size and 
simple in structure, like the chiefdoms which were incorporated into the 
modern kingdom of Ankole2 or the several "principalities" which made up 
the modern district of Busoga.3 In the nineteenth century, however, there 
were within Uganda two states, namely Bunyoro4 and Buganda,5 which 
represented really substantial agglomerations of power. To the rulers of 
these states explorers and missionaries accorded the title of "king" without 
hesitation or unduly heavy irony. They disposed of subservient courts, 
elaborate hierarchies, subordinate chiefs and well-organised armies. 
Partly by systematic taxation and corvees, partly by the organisation of 
rapine against the surrounding peoples, they brought about impressive 
concentrations of wealth. Europeans were astonished by the orderliness and 
ceremony of their government, even as they were horrified by its barbarous 
cruelties. 
Of the two kingdoms, Buganda, which occupied the country lying round 
the north-western corner of Lake Victoria, though the smaller in area, was the 
more closely knit, and in the mid-nineteenth century the more successful 
both in war and in commerce. Most of the surrounding tribes, even on occa-
sion Bunyoro, paid tribute to the Ganda king. It was to his court that the 
Arab traders who appeared in the land about 1850 mainly gravitated, and it 
was there that ivory, and to a less extent slaves, gathered in from the greater 
part of the modern Protectorate, were collected for export to Zanzibar and 
beyond. 
Hard on the heels of the Arab traders came European explorers, notably 
Speke and Grant in 1862 and Stanley in 1875.6 From the time of Stanley's 
visit onwards the kingdom of Buganda, with its control over trade, its fertile 
soil, its ordered government and its exceptionally enterprising and receptive 
rulers, was the focus of European interest in east central Africa and the 
principal base for European activity in that region. Anglican missionaries 
presented themselves at the court of king Muteesa in 1877 and Roman 
Catholics two years later; and within a short space of time both missions had 
scored evangelical successes without parallel in Africa. So important in the 
minds of the Ganda were these new ideologies that they served as catalysts for 
1. Southall , A. W. Alur Society, Cambridge, 1956. 
2. Oberg, K . , in Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. E. African Political Systems, London, 1940. Morr is , 
H . F. The Making of Ankole. Uganda Journal X X I , 1957. 
3. Failers, L. A. Bantu Bureaucracy, Cambridge, 1956. 
4. Roscoe, J. The Bakitara or Banyoro, Cambridge, 1923. Baker, S. W. Ismailia, London, 1874. Casati, G . 
Ten Years in Equatoria, London, 1891. 
5. Roscoe, J . The Bagunda, London, 1911. 
6. Speke, J . H . Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile, London, 1864. Stanley, H . M . Through 
the Dark Continent, London, 1878. 
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political action. In 1888 the kingdom dissolved into factions warring under 
the standards of Rome, Protestantism, Islam and the traditional religion. In 
1890 the Imperial British East Africa Company, which had been formed under 
royal charter to exploit and administer the British sphere of interest in East 
Africa, seized the opportunity of the resultant turmoil to establish a pre-
carious protectorate, helping the Christian Ganda to defeat the Moslems and 
then enabling the Protestants to gain an ascendancy over their Catholic 
rivals. The cost of governing Buganda, however, was beyond the resources 
of the Company, and in 1894 the country was formally taken over as an 
imperial Protectorate.1 
After a period of hesitation the Ganda, or rather a section of the Ganda 
leadership, had decided to make terms with the advancing civilisation and 
power of Europe. By this decision they gained great benefits. Their kingdom 
remained intact, being administered under British supervision by a native 
government consisting of the leading Christian chiefs. (The king was first 
reduced to impotence by the revolutionary factions and then replaced by an 
infant.) The position of this aristocracy was consolidated by the Uganda 
Agreement of 1900,2 which inter alia made its individual members the legal 
proprietors of the better part of the country. Buganda was not only the 
original nucleus of the Protectorate to which it has given its name (for 
"Uganda" is only the form which "Buganda" necessarily assumes in the 
Swahili language, the medium of intercourse between Europeans and Africans 
at this period), but became for a time, under the British, the preponderant 
power therein. The kingdom of Bunyoro in the west, which by contrast had 
maintained an uncompromising resistance to European penetration, was 
overrun by a joint British-Ganda army in 1894. More than half the country 
was subsequently annexed to Buganda, and individual Ganda took a promi-
nent part in the administration of the residue. On the other hand the small 
states of Busoga, east of the Nile, which had hitherto been subject in varying 
degrees to Ganda domination, were placed directly under British rule, 
probably because they occupied an important section of the line of com-
munication between Buganda and the coast. Meanwhile two new kingdoms 
were consolidated in the south-west: Ankole, which absorbed several other 
states, and Toro, a province of Bunyoro which had enjoyed a precarious 
and intermittent independence during the nineteenth century and was now 
definitively severed from the parent state. 
In 1900, when the signature of the Uganda Agreement marked the 
transition from the period of pacification and extemporary government to 
the era of settled administration, British rule did not extend effectively north 
of the Nile, or east of it except in Busoga. During the next decade or so, 
however, the unorganised peoples of the north and east were gradually, 
and with remarkably little resistance, brought under the control of British 
officers. The final stages in the consolidation of the Protectorate were 
marked by the establishment of administration in Karamoja, in the far 
north-east, in 1911 (though continuous government did not begin until 
1921); in Kigezi, in the far south-west, in 1912, following the delimitation 
of the international frontier; and in the West Nile district in the north-west, 
which had hitherto been purely nominally subject to the government in 
Khartoum, in 1914-15. Again, the Ganda played an active auxiliary role 
both in the subjugation and the subsequent administration of most of these 
outlying territories. Replicas of the Ganda system of government, modified 
to serve the purposes of British rule, were imposed on each tribe, and operated 
in the first instance largely by Ganda personnel. During the inter-war period, 
however, these agents were gradually withdrawn, as members of the indi-
genous tribes were trained for office; and Buganda became again one tribal 
unit among others. It remained, none the less, by far the largest and most 
1. The principal secondary sources, each of which contains an extensive bibliography, for this phase of 
Uganda 's history are : Thomas and Scott, op. cil., Ch. 1; Ingham, K . The Making of Modern Uganda, 
London, 1958; Low, D . A. The British and Uganda, 1862-1900. (unpublished D.Phil , thesis, Oxford, 1957). 
2. Wild, J . V. The Story of the Uganda Agreement, Nairobi, 1950, gives the text of this document . 
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important unit of the Protectorate, enjoying both a larger measure of 
autonomy and a higher status than the rest. It constitutes a province in itself, 
whereas no other tribe has been given more than district rank. 
In order to make the story which follows more readily intelligible, the 
political structure of Uganda, as it exists today, is tabulated hereunder. 
Provincial and district names and boundaries have been altered from time to 
time during the past half century, but not so drastically as to disturb the 
general pattern. 
TABLE 3 
T H E A D M I N I S T R A T I V E U N I T S O F U G A N D A 
Unit Principal Tribe(s) Area1 Population, 1948 
(sq. miles) ('000) 
BUGANDA PROVINCE 
(comprising Mengo, Masaka 
and Mubende Districts) . Ganda 16,597 1,302 
EASTERN PROVINCE 
Busoga District Soga 3,399 506 
Bukedi „ Teso, Gwere, Dama, 
Nyuli, Samia 1,701 333 
Bugisu „ Gisu 1,166 267 
Teso „ Teso 4,533 403 
NORTHERN PROVINCE 
Karamoja District Karamojong 10,336 126 
Lango „ Lango 4,519 266 
Acholi „ Acholi 10,703 216 
West Nile/Madi District Lugbara, Alur, Madi 5,294 336 
WESTERN PROVINCE 
Bunyoro District Nyoro 4,198 108 
Toro „ Toro, Konjo 4,319 259 
Ankole „ Nkole 5,621 401 
Kigezi „ Kiga, Ruanda 1,757 396 
74,143 4,918 
Though the political groupings of Uganda have a certain bearing on the 
theme of the present study, a more relevant classification is that which is 
based on the distinction between the forest peoples and the rest, for this is 
a distinction between two fundamentally different types of subsistence 
economy. For the purposes of this classification the "forest" areas, which for 
the most part contain only residues of their original vegetation, are Mount 
Elgon (Bugisu), south Busoga, south Buganda, most of Bunyoro and western 
Toro. Here the food supply derived essentially from planted crops, principally 
bananas, musa paradisiacal whereas in the remainder of Uganda it derived 
from sown crops, principally finger-millet, eleusine coracana, and from live-
stock. The distinction is not absolute. The planting tribes always grew a 
certain quantity of seed-bearing crops and generally possessed some livestock, 
while bananas and other planted crops, notably sweet potatoes, were to be 
found outside the areas just listed. The difference of emphasis, however, is 
unmistakable. It is impossible to say for certain whether these groups were 
originally a homogeneous people who adjusted their modes of production to 
suit different local environments, or whether they were peoples of entirely 
different origin who were brought into proximity in the course of Africa's 
prehistory, but on the whole the latter hypothesis seems the more probable. 
There are indications, notably the abrupt transition, more abrupt than was 
warranted by the natural conditions, from the millet country of Bukedi to the 
banana country of Busoga, that the distinction is in part a cultural, that is to 
say an historical, and not solely an ecological one. The banana, along with the 
yams and taro with which it is generally associated, is almost certainly native 
1. Excluding open water and reserved forest. 
2. A distinction is sometimes drawn between the plantain, musa paradisiaca, and the sweet banana, musa 
sapientum. The two species (if in fact they are distinct species) are grown concurrently in Uganda, the 
one being used for cooking and the other for brewing. 
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to south-east Asia; and it seems likely that these plants were brought thence 
to tropical Africa at a remote epoch, possibly in company with certain other 
allegedly Indonesian culture traits. The seed-bearing crops, finger-millet, 
sorghum and simsim, had a quite different focus of origin, in north-west 
India or Ethiopia; and the cow, the sheep and the goat likewise belonged to 
North Africa or western Asia. So it is at least possible that seed-farming and 
animal husbandry on the one hand and tropical gardening on the other 
came to Uganda by very different routes and at very different times.1 
Be that as it may, the differences between gardening and agriculture 
are numerous and profound, as may appear from the following sketches of 
agrarian life as it was lived, before the coming of the export crops, in different 
parts of Uganda. In Buganda and Busoga a young man, on reaching 
marriageable age, would clear an acre or two of vacant land and set out 
banana cuttings. On the edge of the grove he built a hut, in which he installed 
his bride, and then, in the ordinary course of events, he was set up for life. 
After a year or a little longer the first bunches of fruit came to maturity. 
The stem was then cut down and the fruit was steamed and eaten as a starchy 
mash or, if it belonged to the sweet variety, was converted into beer. Mean-
while the stem had put forth fresh suckers, so that, when fully developed, the 
grove contained clusters of up to twenty stems in varying stages of maturity 
and, taken as a whole, could normally provide food at every season of the 
year. Some insurance against temporary shortage was, of course, necessary. 
Originally, this was probably provided by plants with starchy roots such 
as colocasias (taro) and various species of yam, but though these plants were 
still to be found here and there, they had been largely superseded within the 
past few centuries by the American sweet potato, which served as the second 
main source of carbohydrate food and played a particularly important role 
during the growing period of the banana grove. It was grown from slips set 
out individually in raised mounds. Subsidiary annual crops, which were 
grown outside the grove in small plots, neatly laid out with grass paths be-
tween them, included beans, which contributed vegetable protein to the diet, 
simsim, a grain rich in soil, sorghum, grown primarily as an ingredient in 
banana beer, a little maize, tobacco, various vegetables and pulses. Within 
the grove there were often cucurbits and clumps of sugar-cane. 
Very similar systems of horticulture prevailed in Bunyoro and much of 
Toro, except that there the roles of the sweet potato and of cereals were 
relatively greater. In Bugisu the banana was again predominant, though 
finger-millet and sorghum were grown in considerable quantities at the foot 
of the mountainside. 
This kind of tropical gardening is in many ways the most satisfactory 
form of subsistence economy that man has evolved. The yield of food 
continues all the year round, so that there are no hungry seasons and no 
problems of storage. The supply is as assured as it can ever be for communities 
which depend entirely on their own local resources; and it is obtained at very 
low labour cost. Less than two acres of bananas, with less than an acre of 
annual crops, suffices to feed a simple family unit of four or five persons. 
The banana grove, nourishing itself from its own debris of fallen leaves and 
stems, with further assistance from the refuse of the homestead, continues 
to bear fruit for an indefinitely long period, certainly for a whole generation, 
perhaps for many lives of men. Thus the initial fairly heavy investment of 
labour in the clearance of the dense natural vegetation and the breaking of 
the heavy soil yields large and long-continuing»returns. For, once the grove 
has been established, all that is necessary is to keep down the growth of 
weeds, which are in any case checked by the shade of the trees, to strip off 
dead leaves and break up fallen stems. None*of this is heavy work and its 
yearly volume is small. The only tool required for cultivation is the hoe— 
not the type familiar to English gardeners but a broad-bladed implement 
1. Cf. Stuhlmann, F. Beitrage 7.ur Kulturgeschlchte von Ostafrika, Berlin, 1909. Sauer, C. O. Agricultural 
Origins and Dispersals, New York , 1952. 
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like a spade set at right-angles to the shaft. For all operations except the 
initial clearing and breaking of land, feminine strength sufficed. Basic food 
production, indeed, could be left entirely to the women of the tribe, who, 
incidentally, were spared the laborious pounding of grain which is so onerous 
a part of the work of most African women. The men were thus set free to 
hunt and to fish, to build neat and substantial homes, to make clothing out of 
skins or bark, to devote time and care to the fashioning of implements and 
pots and canoes, to indulge in politics and war. The form of the economy, 
moreover, made for a fixed habitation and a settled mode of life, with all that 
that implies for cultural development. It is not surprising therefore that the 
Ganda, and to a less extent the Nyoro and Soga, should have been remarkable 
for the elaboration of their material culture and of their political organisation. 
The security and productivity of the planting economy, however, can at 
least arguably have a very different effect from that which has just been 
suggested. In the eyes of a strenuous European observer, "the perennial 
banana" was "a dangerous blessing," which had intensified the natural 
tendency of the Ganda to idleness.1 Certainly, the tropical gardeners in 
general, though they were most probably the originators of food production, 
have not since made any great showing in human history; and it may be that 
this is because their needs were too easily satisfied, because their way of life 
did not demand effort or forethought. Within Uganda they are represented 
not only by the "advanced" Ganda and Nyoro but also by some of the most 
unorganised and culturally meagre tribes, such as the Gisu and the Amba, 
so that no firm connexion can be established here between banana-culture 
and either progress or backwardness. Nor is it true, as has been inferred 
from consideration of Buganda and a few other East African examples,2 
that a planting economy necessitates ordered government. What appears 
to be true is that it necessitates some reasonably stable and orderly form of 
society, and that if, for historical reasons, this happens to take the form of a 
centralised state, the result will be a kingdom of quite exceptional cohesion 
and durability. Buganda and Bunyoro contrasted strongly in these respects 
with the ephemeral military empires of southern Africa. Both these types of 
structure were autocratic and predatory, but Ganda and Nyoro kings and 
armies operated from fixed bases; they were a superstructure erected on the 
foundations of settled and stable societies. 
In one respect the planting economies were perhaps somewhat defective. 
Bananas and sweet potatoes, even when supplemented by beans and other 
sources of vegetable protein, do not provide a properly balanced diet. 
Originally, gardening was most probably complemented by hunting and 
more particularly by fishing. Here, although small game and fish did make 
some contribution to nutrition, this balance was not completely maintained. 
Nor was it fully restored by the inclusion of stock-keeping in the economic 
system. The rank vegetation of the countries in question was by no means 
ideally suited to the pasturing of cattle. On the densely cultivated slopes of 
Elgon pocket-handkerchief greenswards were reserved, which, with the aid 
of stall-feeding, enabled the Gisu to maintain a small number of beasts. 
In Buganda and Bunyoro the position was rather different, for these king-
doms had come to include, besides their forested nuclei, considerable 
stretches of drier and more open country, in which large numbers of cattle 
were herded, not by the Ganda and Nyoro themselves but by a special caste 
known as the Hima or Huma, of whom more anon. Even so, milk was very 
much a luxury, especially in Buganda, and only among the ruling classes 
was beef at all regularly consumed. The ubiquitous goat and fowl did 
something to remedy the deficiency, and so, to a lesser extent, did the grass-
hopper and the termite. Certainly it does not appear that the consequences 
of a predominantly starchy diet were as disastrous as might have been 
supposed. Though not equal in physique to the northern tribes, who today 
T Peters, C . New Light on Dark Africa, London, 1891, p. 407. 
2. Stuhlmann, op. cit., p. 55. 
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contribute the majority of Uganda's soldiers and athletes, the Ganda were 
reasonably hardy and successful warriors and were notable for their speed 
and tirelessness as carriers and runners. 
In the remainder of Uganda the prevailing form of economy followed the 
more typical African pattern, in which the keeping of livestock was carried 
on side by side with the hoe-cultivation of seasonal, seed-bearing crops. 
The general agricultural procedure was roughly as follows. Bush and grass 
having been cleared away and the soil dug, a preliminary crop, usually 
simsim, was sown and harvested. The principal food crop, finger-millet, 
which was believed to do poorly on newly opened land, was sown early in the 
succeeding year and reaped at the end of the first rains. During the latter 
part of this year its place was taken in the vacant fields by a miscellany of 
subsidiary crops, including sorghum, simsim, cowpeas and other pulses. 
The process was repeated in the following year, and on the better lands it 
might continue for one or even two years after that. Then, as yields began to 
decline, the land was abandoned to the slow regenerative influences of bush 
and grass and new fields were carved out of the waste to take their place. 
This type of cultivation of the soil was everywhere combined with the 
herding of cattle, goats and, to a lesser extent, sheep. The two practices, 
however, though combined, were in no sense associated. The cattle of Uganda 
were totally unfamiliar with the yoke; in the properly agricultural, as well as 
in the horticultural areas, the only instrument of cultivation was the hoe. 
Nor was there any deliberate and systematic application of manure. Stock-
keeping and agriculture were discrete activities, the one carried on exclusively 
by the men, the other mainly by the women, though in the more arduous 
operations of cereal-growing men generally played a more active role than 
they did in the cultivation of bananas. Though it would certainly not be true 
to assert that the livestock of these tribes was without economic value in the 
ordinary sense of the term, the greater part of their subsistence was un-
doubtedly derived, in most areas, from the cultivation of the soil. Even of the 
Jie, who live in one of the more arid areas of Uganda and are generally 
described as a pastoral tribe, it has been shown that crops (here mainly 
sorghum) have for a very long time made at least as great a contribution as 
animal products to the diet of the people as a whole.1 Cattle provided milk 
and, with goats, an occasional supply of meat, but their principal function 
was to serve as a medium of exchange and a standard of value, as one of the 
very few means by which wealth could be stored and success displayed. 
In the far north-east, however, among the tribes grouped under the 
general title of the Karamojong, the economic emphasis was necessarily 
placed much more on pastoral activities and less on the precarious and meagre 
yield of the soil.2 Here cultivation was left entirely to the women and old men 
of the community; herding, with the associated fighting, was practically 
the sole occupation of the able-bodied males. This specialisation arose in 
part from the necessity, imposed by the long droughts characteristic of the 
region, of driving the herds far afield in search of grass and water; for a 
large part of the year the herdsmen lived in temporary camps remote from 
the main settlements. 
In the drier parts of the south-west, in Ankole, western Buganda and 
parts of Toro and Bunyoro, there was again a marked emphasis on cattle; and 
here too there was specialisation, but in a different form. In these areas, 
the herdsmen, who were known as Hima or Huma, constituted a curious 
type of occupational caste, living side by side with but separate from the 
more numerous agricultural population, called the Iru or Eru. Neither the 
Hima nor their wives cultivated the soil at 4II, and the men at least lived 
almost exclusively on milk, blood and occasional meat. In so far as vegetable 
products such as beer, tobacco and flour were required, they were obtained 
from the Iru, originally perhaps in exchange for animal products, but latterly 
1. Gulliver, P. H. Jie Agriculture. Uganda Journal XVII I , 1954. 
2. Gulliver, P. H . The Family Herds, London, 1955. 
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to a large extent as a species of tribute. For in a large part of the area the 
caste distinction was a horizontal one. In Ankole the rulers were drawn 
exclusively from among the Hima, and the Iru lived in a state of semi-servile 
subjection. In Bunyoro and Toro this was not the case, but the herdsmen 
there also enjoyed a markedly higher status than the ordinary cultivators. 
In Buganda, on the other hand, the roles were reversed, the Hima living 
there as a kind of outcasts on the fringes of the kingdom, herding cattle 
which were usually the property of Ganda chiefs. 
We do not know for certain whether this caste system is the product of 
differentiation within a single society or whether the Hima and Iru were 
peoples of entirely different origin, but, in spite of the complete identity of 
their present languages, the latter hypothesis seems the more probable, since 
the caste distinction corresponds with rather striking differences of physical 
type. What is more doubtful is the relative antiquity of the two sections of the 
population. It has generally been assumed, on the strength of their political 
dominance and their ethnic affinities, that the Hima were relatively recent 
immigrants from the north, who brought kingship as well as cattle to south-
western Uganda, imposing themselves as a ruling aristocracy in the midst 
of a more primitive people. There are, however, at least equally strong reasons, 
namely that the palaeolithic population of parts of East Africa seems to have 
been of a similarly "caucasoid" type1 and that the Ankole cattle are of the 
primitive long-horned race which has been superseded elsewhere in East 
Africa by the hardier and more productive zebu,2 for believing the Hima to 
have been among the most ancient elements of Uganda's population. 
Something must finally be said about the organisation of agricultural 
production in the period before British rule was established. Little space, 
however, need be wasted over the old question whether agriculture, and 
more particularly the tenure of land, was individual or communal, for it is 
now very generally recognised that the debate was founded in large part on a 
misconception, and that the economy was, in different senses and in different 
contexts, both individual and communal. Everywhere in Uganda the unit of 
food production was the household, a group which was often somewhat 
larger than the conjugal family but never approximated to the clan. In this 
sense agriculture was individualistic. On the other hand, the agricultural 
activities of the households, like all their other activities, were subject to the 
overriding control of the community which afforded them protection. 
The community controlled a territory, of which, vis-a-vis other communities, 
it was the owner. Any member of the community, by virtue of his member-
ship, was entitled to cultivate any vacant land within the territory; the right 
of access to land was necessarily synonymous with the right of residence. 
Since land was not, generally speaking, a scarce factor, and since no one 
could wish to claim rights over more land than was necessary for the sub-
sistence of his family, neither land itself nor its products being marketable 
commodities, conflicts of interest arose but rarely. If allocation did become 
necessary, it was performed by the community, that is to say by the governing 
body of the community, whatever that might be. 
The "community" might in principle be a simple entity, a village settle-
ment or clan group. More often it was complex, that is, the community 
with which the individual dealt was itself part of a wider grouping, so that 
people lived within concentric circles of authority. The authority might be 
extremely loose and diffuse, being vested in a group of elders or family 
heads. But in Uganda it was more commonly concentrated to some degree 
in the hands of a chief, who, again, might be independent or might form part, 
as in the lacustrine kingdoms and especially in Buganda and Bunyoro, of an 
elaborate hierarchy of rights and powers. If the Ganda were asked who 
"owned" the land the answer was usually "the king," because he was the 
undisputed master. But in another sense the owner of a particular piece of 
1. Cole. S. M. The Prehistory of East Africa, Harmondswor th , Middlesex, 1947. 
2. Stuhlmann, op. cit. Adametz, L. Herkunjft unci Wanderungen der Hamiten, Vienna, 1920. 
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land was the subordinate chief within whose administrative domain it lay. 
Between this chief and the cultivator, however, there were normally one or 
more grades of lesser functionaries, and in another sense again the land 
belonged to the village chief with whom the cultivator actually dealt. In 
Buganda, and to a lesser extent in the other kingdoms, the control exercised 
by the chief was very real, and the common people had to pay heavily, in 
service and in kind, for the privilege of occupying part of his domain. Yet it 
was not really land they were paying for, and certainly their payments were 
not rent in our sense of the term. They were acknowledgements of his 
authority, returns for his protection, patronage and hospitality.1 Everywhere, 
whether there were chiefs or not, whether their authority was strong or weak, 
the land belonged in the most practical sense to the family which used it; they 
would not lose possession so long as they retained membership of the com-
munity and so long as they went on using it. How long it could be left unused 
without forfeit of the right of reoccupation was a matter for argument and for 
local differences of custom. The true waste, however, indisputably belonged 
to no one, or, which is saying the same thing, to the community. 
At the basis of the tribal economies of Uganda, then, were the family 
fields, the family banana groves, the family herds, tended by and for the use 
of the family group. Between these units there was often co-operation in the 
protection of the herds, in the critical operations of agriculture, in the 
magical processes which were an essential ingredient of economic life, 
but there was nothing which derogated from the fundamental independence 
of the household as a producing and consuming unit. In the more elaborate 
societies there were, in addition to the ordinary family groups, the larger 
households of the chiefs, with their numerous wives, their slaves, their poor 
relations and other hangers-on, and their right to call at need on the labour 
of the people under their rule. But even the chiefly households were still 
essentially subsistence units. The surplus resources at the disposal of the chief 
enabled him to live better and more securely than the ordinary man, to 
maintain his dignity, to give the feasts which helped to bind the people to 
their allegiance, but not to engage in large-scale exchanges or to live a life 
that was different in kind from that of his followers.2 
This is not to say that the Uganda economy was one of a pure sub-
sistence or household type. In the local communities there were semi-specialist 
workers, such as the potters and more definitely the smiths. There were some 
products which entered into trading relationships that often extended across 
the tribal frontiers—dried fish from the main lakes and rivers, salt from the 
shores of Lakes Albert and George, spear-blades and hoe-blades from the 
notable iron denosits in Bunyoro and northern Acholi, the excellent barkcloth 
of Buganda.3 There was also a considerable redistribution of property, 
chiefly in the form of livestock and women, by way of war and rapine and 
by wav of the tribute paid to the more powerfully organised states. But, 
apart from very minor exceptions such as the dried bananas occasionally 
exported from Buganda and the coffee beans which were produced on the 
shores and islands of Lake Victoria, the products of the soil did not enter 
into trade. This was because everyone was producing much the same things 
by similar techniques and in similar conditions, and because the means of 
transport, which, away from open water, consisted solely of the human head, 
1. As the Ganda patiently explained to European enquirers, " thq^h ie f doesn't rule land, he rules people." 
Mair, L. P. An African People in the Twentieth Century, London, 1934, p. 158. of. Ocheng, D . O. Land 
Tenure in Acholi. Uganda Journal XIX, 1955. "The question of xvho was the owner of the tribal, or for 
that matter the clan lands, could not be easily answered. The obligations which the people had towards 
their rwot had become part of their tribal custom, so that | #op le carried them out . not because they 
were aware that he was the owner of all the land, but because it was their custom. There had been no 
necessity for owning land; therefore people did not even think of doing so. Even the rwodi were not 
sure what 'private ownership of land' meant, apart f rom the fact that by custom and hereditary r ights 
they were 'owners ' of the land. What they wanted from the new government was respect for their 
rights as rwodi, and they were satisfied living together with their people provided these rights were not 
violated." 
2. Cf. Fallers, op. cit. p. 143. 
3. Peters, op. cit. p. 390. Schweinfurth, G. and others, Emin Pasha in Central Africa, London, 1888, 
pp. 118-19, 149, 154,180. F.O. Confidential print 6861/85. Lawrance, J. C. D. The Iteso, London , 1957, 
pp . 13-14. 
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did not permit of the exchange of commodities in bulk. Agriculture was the 
necessary foundation of the economy, but was not an important component 
of the meagre commercial superstructure. 
This situation was not altered by the arrival of Arab merchants in the 
mid-nineteenth century and the consequent construction of a tenuous 
link between Uganda and the international exchange economy. For between 
Uganda and the ocean there lay nearly a thousand miles of Africa (the 
traders did not use the direct route across Kenya, but the less arduous and 
hazardous though longer route across Tanganyika to the ports opposite 
Zanzibar) over which goods had still to be transported on the heads of 
human carriers. Thus, apart from slaves, who transported themselves, the 
only possible export was ivory, which sold in Zanzibar at up to £1,000 a ton. 
This trade brought considerable new wealth to some of the peoples of Uganda, 
more especially the Ganda, but made no appreciable change in the nature of 
the economic system. Nor did the establishment of British rule in Buganda 
in 1890-93 make, in itself, any significant difference. For one thing, the 
immediate result of the British intrusion was not the creation of a larger 
and more stable system of law and order but rather an intensification of 
disorder. Not until 1899 was peace finally established even in the central 
nucleus of the Protectorate. More important, the means of transport were not, 
at first, improved. For the first decade of British rule, therefore, exports con-
tinued to consist of a small and diminishing flow of ivory. 
But the means of transport were in process of being improved. Early in 
1902 the railway from Mombasa to the Lake port of Kisumu was opened to 
public traffic. After the boundary changes which were effected later in the 
year, Kisumu did not actually lie within Uganda, but in conjunction with 
dhows and steamers plying on the Lake the railway brought a substantial 
part of the Protectorate within reasonably easy reach of the ocean and of the 
great markets which lay beyond. For the first time the value at the coast of 
Uganda's agricultural products was greater than the cost of their transport 
thither, and it was clear that in the case of the higher-priced commodities 
transport costs would henceforward be only a small part of their total value. 
A new economic era had been inaugurated. New opportunities and new 
problems presented themselves before the Government and peoples of 
Uganda. 
1 2 
C H A P T E R I I 
THE BEGINNINGS OF DEVELOPMENT, 1902-14 
At first blush, the problems were rather more apparent than the oppor-
tunities. To the Government, the development of an import-export trade 
was mandatory. Up to the end of the financial year 1901-02 the British 
taxpayer had provided nearly £1 \ million for the acquisition and administra-
tion of Uganda and £ 5 | million for the construction of the railway. True, it 
has been demonstrated that the motives behind this investment were in large 
part not of an economic nature; there had been an intense desire to put an 
end to the slave trade and to prevent the Christian kingdom of Buganda from 
falling victim to paganism or Islam.1 But commercial objectives had also been 
in view, and the taxpayers had been led to believe that they would receive 
some return for their money—not perhaps in actual cash but in an important 
addition to Britain's supplies of raw materials and an important extension 
of the market for British manufactures. Moreover, as the Special Com-
missioner, Sir Harry Johnston, commented in 1901, the philanthropic 
enthusiasm of a few years back had notably subsided and the emphasis on a 
material return had grown correspondingly stronger.2 But over and above 
the desire to obtain some kind of profit out of Uganda there was the more 
pressing need to prevent further losses. Expenditure in 1901-02 was still 
£229,000, although the expensive task of military pacification was virtually 
over, and revenue, in spite of the imposition of a hut tax of three rupees on the 
natives of Buganda, was still only £74,000. The balance was made up by the 
Imperial Treasury, which had been protesting for some years past at this 
constant unremunerative drain on its resources. The first object of policy, 
therefore, was that there should be incomes which could be taxed. 
The immediate prospects for the creation of such incomes did not appear 
particularly bright. No minerals had been discovered, and, although John-
ston was still hopeful, there were in fact no minerals to be discovered, apart 
from the copper deposits of Ruwenzori in the remote west, a little tin on the 
south-western border and certain others, such as tungsten and niobium, 
whose economic value lay in the future. Apart from ivory, the only obvious 
existing resources were hides and skins (the automatic, and now marketable, 
by-product of pastoralism), and certain wild or half-wild products of the 
forest, such as raffia and sanseviera fibres, vine rubber, chillies and the 
indigenous robusta coffee. Of these only rubber appeared to have real 
potential importance. But the experience of the Congo Free State was showing 
that wild rubber was an asset which it was difficult to develop without the 
most crude and ruthless exploitation of the native collectors. In any case, the 
forests of Uganda were not particularly rich in this commodity; a large-scale 
attempt to exploit the largest single tract of forest, begun in 1907, proved a 
disastrous failure.3 All the products listed made their appearance in Uganda's 
export statistics during the first years of the century, but their total contribu-
tion to the solution of the economic and financial problem was hardly more 
than negligible. 
On the other hand, most European visitors Srom Stanley onwards had 
sung the praises of Uganda as a rich agricultural country capable of producing 
a wide range of tropical and sub-tropical conjpiodities.4 Nor were they 
1. Low, D . A., British Public Opinion and the Uganda Question, October-December, 1892. Uganda Journal, 
XVII I , 1954. 
2. Report by Her Majesty's Special Commissioner on the Uganda Protectorate. Cd . 671, 1901 
3. See below, p.25. 
4 . Stanley, op. cit. Wilson, C. T. and Fellkin, R . W. Uganda and the Egyptian Sudan, London , 1882, 
pp. vii and 337 ff. Schweinfurth, G. and others. Entin Pasha in Central Africa, pp. 118 ff. Lugard, F, D , 
The Rise of Our East African Empire, London, 1893, I 379 ff. 
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fundamentally in error. Certainly the first expert opinion seemed to confirm 
their view. The question was, reported the horticulturist who accompanied 
Johnston in 1900, "what will not grow and flourish in Uganda?"1 The real 
questions, however, were: what will flourish sufficiently, and command a 
sufficiently high price, to make its production and export profitable; and how 
was its production to be organised? The two questions were related, for 
different crops would call for different methods. 
Among the actual and potential products of the soil a broad distinction 
was drawn between two main categories. On the one hand there was "native 
produce," that is to say the marketable surplus of crops already grown by 
the native population for its own subsistence. None of these, however, were 
valuable enough to be worth exporting, with the exception of the oil-bearing 
plants, simsim and groundnuts; and even these promised no spectacular mar-
gin of profit. On the other hand there were plantation products—exotics 
which, it was assumed, could be produced only with the help of extraneous 
(that is, European, or possibly Indian) initiative, capital and direction. The 
lists of such commodities put forward by Lugard, Johnston and others before 
the coming of the railway were long and varied, including tea, cocoa, sugar, 
vanilla and above all coffee, which in the 1890s was regarded as the most 
lucrative of all tropical products and was already being planted extensively 
in German East Africa and Nyasaland. 
In the event, of course, the foundations of Uganda's modern economy 
were not laid on any of these products but on cotton, which Johnston had 
dismissed as being probably unable to compete with the established products 
of other countries.2 
There had been one or two early experiments in the planting of cotton, 
certain species of which grew wild in parts of the Protectorate, but the first 
serious and successful plantings took place in 1904. In retrospect, the manner 
in which this momentous step was taken seems curiously casual, almost 
accidental. Some years earlier, not without some misgivings on the part of 
those who distrusted any departure from pure evangelism, the Church 
Missionary Society had started near Kampala an "industrial mission," or, 
as it would now be called, a technical school, in which a few Ganda youths 
were trained in useful occupations such as carpentry, bricklaying and print-
ing. In 1903 the enterprising superintendent of the mission, Mr. K. Borup, 
secured support at the Society's headquarters in London for an expansion 
of its activities, and a limited company was formed by a group of its wealthy 
sympathisers to provide the necessary funds. Among the original projects 
of the Uganda Company, as this organisation was called, were sawmilling, 
simple engineering—and the cultivation of cotton.3 In missionary and philan-
thropic circles the idea of cotton-growing in Africa was by no means new. 
It will be recalled that Mrs. Jellyby placed her hopes for the regeneration of 
the dark continent on the establishment of coffee plantations. But on this 
point Dickens appears to have been mistaken; among the people of whom 
she was so unkind a caricature the slogan prevalent in the mid-nineteenth 
century was Christianity, Civilisation, Cotton.4 The revival of the idea at this 
time was due in part to the impetus given by the British Cotton Growing 
Association, which was formed in 1902 with the object of freeing Lancashire 
from what was regarded as a dangerous dependence on the United States 
for its supplies of raw material. The Association supplied Mr. Borup with 
the seed which he brought to Uganda at the end of 1903, and its agent, the 
British East Africa Corporation, was shortly afterwards to become the 
Uganda Company's main competitor. 
Private enterprise, however, was not alone in promoting cotton cultiva-
tion in Uganda. In the embittered twilight which so often encompasses the 
pioneer, Borup later asserted that his scheme met with "nothing but sneers 
1. Johnston, H. H. The Uganda Protectorate, London, 1902, 1 290 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Ehrlich, C . The Uganda Company : The First Fifty Years, Kampala , 1953. 
4 . See Burton, R . F. Zanzibar, London, 1873, I I , 144. 
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and jeers" from the official community, with the single exception of the 
Government botanist, Mr. M. T. Dawe.1 Any such scepticism, however, 
appears to have been of very short duration, for the Government also im-
ported seed about the same time as Borup.2 It appears to be true, none the 
less, that in 1904 and for the next two or three years official interest in the 
crop was very spasmodic and half-hearted, and that the main credit for its 
establishment must remain with the Company.3 
Cotton-growing being a very simple process, and the funds available 
being extremely slender, the procedure adopted, both by the Company and 
by the Government, was not to assemble a body of hired labourers but to 
distribute seed to certain of the Ganda chiefs and leave the rest to them. 
The system worked. Towards the end of 1904, 54 bales of cotton lint, valued 
at £236, were on their way down the railway to the mills of Lancashire. 
From this insignificant beginning there soon arose a thriving export trade, 
whose early growth is best set forth in tabular form. 
TABLE 44 
C O T T O N E X P O R T S , 1 9 0 5 / 6 - 1 9 1 0 / 1 1 
Year Number of Bales Value in £ 
1905/6 . . 241 . . 1,089 
1906/7 . . 980 . . 11,411 
1907/8 . . 3,973 . . 51,594 
1908/9 . . 3,945 . . 41,232 
1909/10 . . 6,209 . . 59,596 
1910/11 . . 13,378 . . 165,412 
By this last date cotton accounted for more than half the total exports of 
the Protectorate. All other exports—ivory, hides and skins, chillies, fibres, 
a little coffee and rubber—increased during the same period only from 
£89,000 to £138,000. It was plainly due primarily to the incomes generated 
by cotton production that the Government's revenue rose from £60,000 in 
1904-05 to £191,000 in 1910-11, by which time it was within sight of financial 
self-sufficiency. 
It is to be noted that cotton cultivation was being tried out at this 
time in many parts of Africa, yet nowhere else (except, later, under very 
special conditions, in the Sudan) did it meet with any comparable 
measure of success. It seems worth while, therefore, to enquire into the 
factors which made this success possible. In the first instance attention 
must be focused on the kingdom of Buganda. For although from 1907 
onwards cotton-growing spread to many other parts of the Protectorate it 
was Buganda that decisively demonstrated the possibilities of the crop and, 
more important, the possibilities of export-crop production by African 
natives on their own fields without direct European supervision or any 
overt coercion. 
One reason was, of course, the exceptional fertility of the land. As a 
matter of fact, the climatic conditions of Buganda are not ideally suited to 
the cotton plant. The rich soil and relatively heavy rainfall tend to produce 
an excess of vegetative growth and the ripening season is not quite hot enough 
and often not dry enough. Cotton grown under expert supervision to the 
south of the Lake in Tanganyika, where the natural conditions are not at 
first sight nearly so propitious, has produced far higher yields than any that 
have been achieved in Buganda. The crux of the matter, however, is that in 
Buganda a total failure of the crop is virtually inconceivable. Even in the 
1. Uganda Herald, 21.V.20. 
2. E.S.A., S.M.P. 1707/3 and 43. U.K. Report on the Introduction and Establishment of the Cotton Industry 
in the Uganda Protectorate, Cd. 4910, 1909. 
3. Uganda Herald, 30.vii.20, letter f rom E. Brown. 
4. Thomas and Scott, op. cit. p. 505. 
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worst of seasons, even with the sketchiest of cultivation (and it was said that 
the methods used in the first years would have been disastrous in any less 
favourable environment) the grower can be sure of a sizable harvest. Thus 
the industry was here safe from the kind of setback which repeatedly befell 
it in the Nyanza Province of Kenya, where, as an official commented sadly, 
the amount and timing of the rainfall seemed to be almost never right.1 
Yet all that has been said so far is that the economic potential of 
Buganda was unusually high. We have not explained why the potential should 
have been converted into actual wealth with such unusual rapidity. For East 
Africa, in the early years of this century, was full of unrealised potentials. 
There was unused land in plenty, some of it extremely fertile, much of it 
perfectly usable. There was also unused labour in plenty. On all sides there 
were young men who, deprived of their former military functions, could 
only with great difficulty be induced to divert their energies to produc-
tive work. Everywhere there arose the exasperating conflict between 
Europeans who, for selfish or unselfish reasons, for the sake of private profit 
or for the sake of public prosperity, were eager to promote development, 
and a native population which, believing itself on the whole to be quite 
well off as it was, offered only a reluctant and irregular collaboration. 
Whether Africans were expected to work for hire on European plantations 
or to cultivate economic crops on their own behalf, the situation was funda-
mentally the same. Labour could be extracted from them only by the dreary 
processes of "encouragement" and "moral suasion," by economic pressure 
in the form of taxation and, not infrequently, by direct coercion. 
Nothing is harder to measure than the element of compulsion in the 
initiation of new forms of production in Africa. There can be no doubt but 
that in Buganda as elsewhere this element did exist. The Ganda were, in 
the first place, under the necessity, from 1900 onwards, of earning money 
by one means or another in order to pay their taxes. (It is clear, however, 
that although officials and missionaries noted and welcomed the access of 
industriousness which followed the imposition of a hut-tax the motive 
behind the imposition was primarily if not solely a fiscal one; the people 
were not taxed in order that they might be made to grow cotton; rather, 
they were urged to grow cotton in order that they might be able to pay 
taxes.) Over and above this, there is no question but that, at the beginning, 
the peasants were called out to grow cotton under the chiefs' orders precisely 
as they were called out to make roads, to carry government stores or to 
build the chiefs' houses. "The chief beat the drum," said one elderly infor-
mant, "and when we had gathered round he told us to dig the plots which 
had been marked out by the roadside and gave us cotton seed to plant." 
In the abstract, so to speak, most Ganda agree that cotton-growing started 
under compulsion—often adding that this was one of the best things that 
the British have ever done for them. On the other hand, there are many 
individuals who assert that they personally began to grow cotton, in the 
years before 1914, of their own will and motion. The truth seems to be 
that the response to economic opportunity, though by no means wholly 
spontaneous, was rather more spontaneous than in other parts of East 
Africa. An initial push was given by European enterprise, both public and 
private, but the process thus started rapidly gained momentum under the 
stimulus of the people's own economic aspirations. 
For the resistances to economic betterment, the inertia of ignorance or 
contentment, which elsewhere were only gradually and partially overcome, 
had in some measure been overcome in Buganda before ever the first cotton 
seed was planted, before the first train reached the Lake shore, before 
European dominion had been established. Half a century of active commerce 
with the outer world, operating on a society which was already inherently 
1. U . K . Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, I I , 393. 
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acquisitive and competitive,1 had raised the conventional level of subsistence 
far above the East African norm. This was perhaps not true of the whole 
population, but it was true of that very substantial section which consisted 
of the chiefs and their households and dependants, the frequenters of the 
king's court and capital. For these, well before the turn of the century, 
cotton cloth was already a necessity and many other commodities had 
become the objects of positive cupidity. Lugard2 noted in 1893 that in contrast 
with the rest of East Africa it was unnecessary here to create wants before 
commerce could begin. The wants were already there: sound, good cloth, 
house utensils, writing paper ("which they really want")—such were the 
needs which British merchants should exert themselves to meet. A little 
earlier, indenting on the Chartered Company for further supplies of trade 
goods, Captain Williams warned them that the usual rubbish would not 
do for Buganda.3 Only the best-quality cloth should be sent, and he added 
a long list of articles which he said were "constantly asked for," including 
scented soap, flannel coats, gilt and silver chains, watches, needles, pens 
and paper, padlocks, kettles, tents. Her Majesty's Commissioner, pausing 
on the bank of the Nile in 1893 to buy bait from a fisherman, found that his 
proffered string of beads, such as had done duty as currency all the way 
from the coast, was quite unacceptable; reading-matter was demanded in 
lieu.4 Much similar testimony has been assembled by Powesland,5 and the 
point needs no further emphasis. 
On the other hand, though the economic standards of the Ganda were 
already high and they were familiar with the notion of a surplus, the idea 
of production, and especially of agricultural production, for exchange was 
less familiar to them and in many ways unwelcome. Their nineteenth-
century wealth had come to them, in the main, directly or indirectly from 
predation. As their own historian remarked, "The people did not learn to 
sell (sc. to produce for sale), because they obtained everything by force of 
arms or by gift from the Kabaka."6 Wealth, however, and wealth very 
largely in European terms, was a widely and clearly recognised objective; 
and the change of method was not so very difficult an adjustment. 
Moreover, in so far as the Ganda had to be pushed into producing 
cotton, it was to a large extent Ganda who did the pushing. Everywhere in 
East Africa the European authorities sought to use African chiefs as the 
levers by which the inert African mass might be moved. But here, and only 
here, the levers were in some degree self-acting; they imparted a thrust 
of their own, additional to that which was imparted to them. Generally, 
East African chiefs abetted the economic endeavours of European officers 
because they were told to do so, or because they knew that the volume 
of local production for the market was one of the criteria by which the 
merits of chiefs were judged. Such motives were certainly not absent in 
Buganda; there is evidence that once the Uganda Company's initiative had 
proved successful official pressure was brought to bear on the less energetic 
chiefs to initiate or intensify production in their areas.7 But to many of the 
Ganda leaders there was more to the question than this; they themselves 
believed that increased production was a good idea. 
Even in the pre-British period the chiefs of Buganda had been an unusual 
type of African governing class, in that they owed their positions to appoint-
ment from above rather than to hereditary right, but those who held sway 
at the turn of the century were still further removed from the normal 
concept of an African chief. Though they bore traditional titles and operated 
what was still recognisably the traditional system, they were essentially 
T Wrigley, C. C. Buganda: An Outline Economic History. Econolliic History Review. 2nd ser. X, N o . 1 
(1957). 
2. Lugard, F. D . The Rise of Our East African Empire, London, 1893, U , 140. 
3. F.O. Confidential Print, 6341/217. 
4. Portal, O. H. The Mission to Uganda, London, 1894, p. 140. 
5. Powesland, P. G. Economic Policy and Labour, op. cit. 
6. Kagwa, A. Basekabaka b'e Buganda ( the Kings of Buganda), 4th edn., Kampala , 1953, p. 277. 
7. Ehrlich, C, Cot ton and the Uganda Economy, 1903-1909 Uganda Journal, X X I 1957. 
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revolutionaries, who had achieved power by violent subversion of the 
established order, and they were inspired by a revolutionary dynamic which 
consisted of eager acceptance of all things European. The relationship 
which existed in the 1890s between Europeans, especially missionaries, and 
this native Christian aristocracy was among the most remarkable in the 
whole history of culture-contact. Missionary descriptions of Buganda in 
this period were irradiated by a strange romantic light, and when due allow-
ance had been made for the sense of high drama inherent in the Evangelical 
view of life and for a certain innocence on the part of the writers (the Ganda 
leaders were clearly tough and ambitious politicians as well as convinced 
believers) there seems no doubt that there did exist a powerful shared enthu-
siasm, a shared sense of the opening of new horizons both spiritual and 
material.1 The Christian Ganda to a large extent adopted the European view 
of the virtue of work and progress and economic development. They sought 
education for themselves and their children and their followers. They 
helped to finance the building of churches and schools, including that 
Industrial Mission which contained the germ of the Uganda Company and 
of the cotton industry.2 And, assisted by the deference towards constituted 
authority that was deeply rooted in the minds of the Ganda masses, they 
saw to it that the experiments in cotton-growing were brought to a successful 
fruition. In one district at least, the experiment was launched by means of a 
written contract between the Company and the county chief, the Company 
undertaking to provide the seed and the chief (Samuel Mukasa of Bulemezi) 
to have it planted and to deliver the proceeds back to the Company for 
processing and export.3 
This simple organisation naturally did not endure for long. For one 
thing, the Uganda Company soon lost its monopoly control over the disposal 
of the crop. In 1907 two rival ginneries were set up in Kampala, one by 
Mr. James Buckley, formerly a mechanic in the Company's service, the other 
by a French trading firm, L. Besson et Cie. In addition, the British East 
Africa Corporation began to buy cotton for processing in the ginnery which 
it had built at Kisumu in Kenya, and several Indian merchants were inter-
posing themselves between the growers and the ginners. For another thing, 
the Government began to play an increasingly active part in the supervision 
and control of all stages of production. The Governor of the day, Sir Hesketh 
Bell, and his principal adviser in the matter, Mr. Dawe, had the vision to 
see, at a time when the output was barely a hundredth part of what it 
ultimately became, that cotton-growing in Uganda, so far from being 
merely an experiment, was already an assured success; and that, so far from 
being a subsidiary venture, it could be made the main instrument of economic 
progress. "No part of our Empire," he told the Colonial Office in December, 
1907, "is more promising for cotton. . . . Within 100 miles of the Lake 
shore we have more than a million landowners (sic) willing and eager to 
grow cotton and at least 20,000 square miles of eminently suitable land." 
Within a year or two, he thought, cotton would be the country's main 
export, and in a few years time "output should be enormous."4 
But this achievement, in Bell's view, would be contingent on the provision 
of governmental help on a scale and of a kind not hitherto contemplated. For 
in spite of the rapid progress made so far all was very far from well with 
Uganda cotton. During 1908 complaints began to come in from Britain 
alleging a falling off in the quality of the lint supplied.5 Part of the trouble 
was that, owing to early experimentation with different varieties of seed, 
the lint lacked the uniformity of staple and fineness that was one of the 
spinners' most essential requirements. It was also asserted that in the new 
1. See, e.g., Tucker, A. R. Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa, London, 1908. Harford-Battersby 
C. F . Pilkington of Uganda, London, 1898. Mullins, J. D. The Wonderful Story of Uganda, London . 
1904. Cf. Oliver, R. The Missionary Factor in East Africa, London, 1952. 
2. Church Missionary Archives, Uganda letter-books, Walker to Baylis, 21.vi.98 and 4.xii.99. 
3. Miti , J. K. History of Buganda (MS. in the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies). 
4. E.S.A. S.M.P. 1707/43. 
5. Ibid., S.M.P. 1707/8, 10, 41. 
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conditions of hot competition buyers were paying little attention to quality, 
even inciting growers to pick the bolls before they were mature. Critics 
pointed to the horrid example of Indian peasant-grown cotton, which 
"sown anyhow, grown anyhow, ginned anyhow," occupied one of the 
lowest positions in the world market. The criticisms appear to have been 
exaggerated (they owed something to the feud between the British Cotton 
Growing Association and the Uganda Company, which hotly disputed them) 
but there was undoubtedly some ground for concern. The Governor decided 
on very drastic intervention: all undesirable kinds of cotton were to be 
eradicated, and in future all seed was to be distributed by Government, if 
possible from breeding stations of its own. His decision took shape in a set 
of stringent Cotton Rules, issued under an enabling Ordinance of March, 
1908, and successfully carried into effect, thanks to the co-operation of the 
Ganda chiefs and to the fullness of the authority which they wielded over 
their people. By the following year the Government was able to claim that 
all varieties of cotton except one, American Upland, had been practically 
eliminated.1 Two Government seed farms were established in 1908. They 
were not, however, at first under really expert supervision, and it was some 
time before they could provide all the seed required for sowing or undertake 
breeding experiments. In addition, the cultivation season was now definitely 
fixed to the second rains, and in order to limit the spread of pests and diseases 
the growers were compelled by law to uproot and burn all their plants 
before a certain, annually promulgated, date, generally in late March or 
April. 
These restrictive measures, however, were not judged to be sufficient. 
It seemed clear that cotton-growing had reached a stage at which it needed 
more attention, and more expert attention, than either the Uganda Company 
or the Government, out of its present resources, could provide. The Company 
does not seem to have done more than circulate instructional leaflets in 
the vernacular. Government guidance had so far been given, if at all, by 
the district officers, who of course knew nothing about cotton, and by the 
small staff of the Botanical Department, who did not know very much. 
There was need on the one hand for research into the types of cotton 
and the methods of cultivation most suitable for local conditions, and on the 
other for skilled and intensive supervision of the native cultivator. After 
discussions with the Colonial Office and the Imperial Institute a specialist 
Cotton Superintendent was appointed in 1908, and two years later a fully 
fledged Department of Agriculture somewhat belatedly came into existence. 
(Kenya had had such a Department since 1903, but it does not seem to have 
occurred to the authorities hitherto that agronomists might be valuable and 
necessary even where there were no settlers.) Even now, and for a long time 
to come, the Department was too small for any intensive or widespread 
supervision of the cultivators to be possible. In 1914 it consisted, apart 
from the veterinary staff and two scientific specialists, of the Director, six 
agricultural officers and one ploughing instructor. Instructional and horta-
tory functions had still to be left very largely to the administration and the 
chiefs, notably assisted in some places by missionaries. 
The quality of Uganda's cotton crop was now reasonably assured, and 
the quantity continued to increase phenomenally. The drastic measures of 
control taken in 1908 opposed only a momentary check. To the further 
expansion of output between 1908 and 1914 Buganda contributed very 
little; progress was maintained by the extension*of cultivation to hitherto 
undeveloped areas of the Protectorate, especially in the Eastern Province. 
Cultivation on a serious scale started in Busoga «n 1907. Since this district 
was a cultural and political appendage of Buganda, its success here called 
for no remark. But in the next two or three years it spread rapidly over the 
whole province. "Enormous strides" were reported in 1909 and in the follow-
1. Cd. 4910. 
ing year, with "thousands of cultivators clamouring for seed," the industry 
was regarded as firmly established—not only or even principally in Busoga 
but in the newly administered districts to the north and east.1 The turbulent 
Gisu, some of whom had only just ceased to shoot poisoned arrows at their 
district officer, came down from their mountain fastnesses to grow cotton 
on the plains, and amongst "the wild Lango" cultivation spread almost 
simultaneously with the establishment of administrative control. The most 
striking success, however, was achieved in the Teso district. The crop was 
first grown experimentally here in 1908, yet by 1913-14 the output had 
reached 7,500 tons of seed-cotton, against 4,000 in Busoga, 3,600 in Bukedi 
and 1,420 in Lango. Much of this success was due to the introduction of 
the ox-drawn plough, well suited to a district in which cattle were abundant 
and the country largely flat and open. 
It is nevertheless somewhat remarkable that such peoples should have 
engaged so largely and so immediately in production for the market. They 
were by custom practically naked, and the taste for cotton cloth and for 
other imported goods, other than steel hoes, was diffused among them very 
much more slowly than among the Ganda. They had no governing aris-
tocracy to serve as channels of European culture and ready-made instruments 
of European authority. On the other hand there was one want which they 
did feel more keenly than the Ganda. Cattle were intensely desired, both 
for their own sake and as opening the way to earlier and more frequent 
marriage, and it is a peculiarity of this type of expenditure that it is largely 
self-defeating; the supply of cattle being highly inelastic and the supply of 
women completely so, the result can only be inflation of the price level, 
creating a constantly increasing demand for cash. Further, the lack of an 
indigenous ruling class was in part made good by the importation of Ganda 
"agents," who appear to have been even less inhibited in their dealings with 
these simple people than with their more sophisticated fellow-tribesmen. It 
can hardly be doubted, however, that strictly economic motives had even 
less to do with the early progress of the cotton industry than they had had 
in Buganda. It is even recorded that growers had to be restrained from leaving 
the market before they had received payment for their cotton.2 Cultivation 
here was clearly very intimately bound up with the poll-tax and with simple 
acquiescence in European orders. The matter is probably well summed up 
in the words of the historian of the Teso district: "The British administration 
. . . introduced . . . poll-tax and, by forcibly encouraging the planting of 
cotton, ensured that there was no excuse for failing to pay it."3 Not that 
encouragement appears ever to have been forcible in any literal sense of the 
term; acceptance of the official wish that they should grow cotton was simply 
one aspect of these people's rapid and ready acceptance of British rule. 
During the last pre-war years the only limits to the expansion of cotton 
production seemed to be those which were imposed by difficulties of trans-
port. Forty miles was about the maximum distance over which the grower 
could be induced to carry his own cotton, and the use of hired porters by 
up-country buyers added seriously to the cost of the product, as well as 
being a very big addition to the rapidly increasing demand for labour. The 
solution was twofold: the improvement of communications and the building 
of ginneries in the country areas, so that only the lint, which represented no 
more than 30 per cent, of the total weight of the seed-cotton, would need to 
be transported to the Lake ports. By 1914 something had been done on 
both fronts. The Busoga railway, completed in 1912, spanned the unnavigable 
section of the Victorian Nile and brought the central regions of Uganda 
within reasonably easy reach of the port of Jinja. Shortly before the war a 
few motor vans made their appearance on one or two of the main roads of 
Buganda and Busoga. At the beginning of 1907 there had been one ginnery 
1. E.S.A. Ann. Rpts., P.C. E.P., 1909/10 and 1910/11. 
2. Ehrl ich, loc. cit. 
3. Lawranco, J. C. D . The Iteso, op. cit. p . 40. 
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in operation, at Kampala; in 1914 there were twenty, of which fourteen were 
situated in the midst of the growers in outlying areas of Buganda and in the 
Eastern Province. These developments, helped by the upward movement 
of the trade cycle, encouraged a further expansion of output, which brought 
cotton exports in the year 1914-15 to over 32,000 bales, valued at £351,000 
—a sum which represented more than 70 per cent, of the value of all exports. 
In the following year Uganda was able to do without an imperial grant-in-
aid. The first great objective of the Government had been attained, and it 
had been attained almost entirely through the agency of a crop grown 
almost exclusively by the native population. True, the direct revenue from 
cotton was so far negligible—a few hundreds of pounds from the fees paid 
for buying permits and the rental of ginnery sites—but the main items of 
revenue, poll-tax and import duties, both depended on the money incomes 
of the people, in which the income from cotton (including the wages of those 
employed in ginning and transporting it) was overwhelmingly the most 
important element. 
That cotton was a purely native activity was a fact which was always 
noted in the early years with an air of faint surprise. "Unlike most other 
cotton-producing countries," Dawe wrote in 1908, "cultivation in Uganda is 
almost entirely in the hands of the peasantry."1 It is doubtful whether the 
first part of the sentence was even then really correct, and it has since become 
clear that, failing slavery, large-scale irrigation or thorough-going mechani-
sation, cotton cannot normally yield a surplus over labour costs sufficient 
to cover the overhead expenses of plantation management. What was 
remarkable was not that cotton was a native crop in Uganda but that any 
native crop should have played so dominant a role in the economy. The 
first years of the twentieth century were in many ways the apogee of the 
tropical plantation system. It was firmly established in Java and Ceylon and 
was beginning to carry Malaya forward towards an unimagined prosperity. 
Nearer home, Nyasaland and German East Africa were being developed as 
a matter of course on similar lines. Nowhere in the tropics were the com-
mercial possibilities of peasant agriculture proven and in few places were they 
even guessed at. Even in West Africa native production of cocoa was in 
its infancy. The palm-oil industry was indeed long established, but that 
could be classified as the collection of forest produce rather than as agri-
culture proper. In 1897 a Royal Commission had adumbrated for the West 
Indies an alternative system of small-scale production under the scientific 
direction of an Imperial Department of Agriculture.2 But the West Indies 
were very different from Africa, and the system was as yet quite untested. 
That Uganda was to be one of its main proving-grounds could hardly have 
occurred to anyone in 1900. It seemed axiomatic that, since Uganda was 
admittedly not a settlers' country (universal malaria and not uncommon 
blackwater, not to mention other diseases, made that seem more self-
evident than it would be today), it must, if it were to be anything at all, 
become a planters' country. 
Yet the planters were slow in coming. Apart from small and transient 
efforts by a few adventurers,3 there was no European agriculture until 1907 
and very little until 1910. For the first decade of the century "native pro-
duction" had the field virtually to itself. It has been asserted (not long ago 
this would have been a boast but in the mouths of many economists it has 
now become an accusation) that the slow development of plantation enter-
prise was the result of a set policy, adopted from the start, of developing 
Uganda as a "black" Protectorate and of upholding indigenous land rights 
against capitalistic instrusion.4 On the other h ^ d , it has also been alleged 
that "Johnston and his immediate successors fostered the view that plantation 
development, primarily under European management, of such products 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P. 1707/43. 
2. C.8656. 
3. Hattersley, C. W „ The Baganda at Home, London, 1908, p . 87. Uganda Herald, 30.vii.20. 
4. Ehrlich, loc. cit. 
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as rubber, coffee and cocoa, offered the most promising economic future."1 
In reality, it is difficult to discern any consistent doctrine in the behaviour 
of the Protectorate authorities at this stage. If any doctrine had been formu-
lated in set terms it would have resembled the common-sense "dual policy" 
that was enunciated in Kenya in 1923, according to which both native 
and non-native agriculture were to be given equal opportunity for develop-
ment according to their respective capabilities. Within this framework there 
was room for differences of emphasis. Some officials were keen champions of 
native rights and looked on capitalistic operations in Africa with a certain 
suspicion and distaste. Others thought that planters' capital was so vital 
to Uganda that native rights would have to be relegated to second place. 
From time to time one or other of these inclinations can be seen to have been 
in the ascendant, but on the whole, before the First World War and for 
some time after it, the administration appears to have taken a neutral 
and empirical attitude to this question. Sir Hesketh Bell, who came to 
Uganda from Dominica, one of the few tropical colonies whose economy 
was already based on peasant agriculture, records that he saw his new charge 
as "a field for a great experiment in the direction of purely African progress" 
and for "the creation of an essentially African state" complementary to and 
contrasting with "the white man's country" on its eastern border;2 and his 
arrival in 1906 was later regarded as marking the commencement of a 
"policy of encouraging native production."3 But the views quoted did not 
prevent him from believing that "large scientific plantations" had an impor-
tant role to play even in the cotton industry,4 nor, as we shall see, from doing 
his utmost to secure land for the use of European entrepreneurs. Of Johnston's 
economic policy only one thing can be said with confidence; he was 
determined that there should not be repeated in Uganda the process which he 
had witnessed in Nyasaland, the acquisition of vast areas of native-occupied 
land by speculative companies. To any such large-scale alienation he was 
"totally opposed . . . at any rate until it has been shown that a mass of 
small traders and 4,000,000 natives cannot between them develop the 
resources of the country in a manner productive of profit and happiness 
to all."5 It is clear, however, that the class of "small traders" was intended 
to include, or at any rate did not firmly exclude, non-African planters owning 
estates of modest size.6 
The truth is that, having once ruled out mass colonisation on the one 
hand and huge land concessions on the other, policy-makers at this time 
did not see any critical significance in the distinction between the remaining 
possible forms of exploitation, between planters who caused crops to be 
grown by paid labourers and merchants who purchased crops from indepen-
dent peasant producers. It was obvious that labour would in any case be 
provided by Africans, and equally obvious that technical knowledge, 
initiative and capital would in any case be provided by people other than 
Africans. The precise method by which these factors should be combined 
appeared to be a matter of simple practical expediency. In the production 
of cotton, the loose and indirect control exercised by the merchant-ginners 
over the African producers proved to be adequate for the purpose and the 
most economical way of doing things. For crops such as coffee and rubber 
it was thought necessary to bring labour under the discipline of plantation 
management. But the distinction was one of method rather than of principle. 
Thus the philanthropists of the Uganda Company set up rubber plantations 
with hired labour in 1907, without, it seems, any idea that their new enter-
prise was fundamentally different in its implications from the original 
venture into cotton production. Certainly the distinction was not between 
1. Thomas & Scott, op. cit. p. 41. 
2. Bell, H. Glimpses of a Governor's Life, London, 1946. 
3. E.S.A. S.M.P. 7725/11, Memorandum on native policy, 1924. 
4. Cd. 4910. 
5. Johnston, H. H. The Uganda Protectorate, London, 1902, T, 296. 
6. Thus he told the Foreign Office that there was "undoubtedly a considerable field for European enter-
prise and capital in the direction of plantation w o r k . " (Cd. 671.) 
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capitalistic and non-capitalistic forms of production, but only between 
different modes of employing capital. The cotton industry required a very 
considerable capital outlay, not indeed on the actual cultivation of the crop 
but in its processing and merchanting, quite apart from the public expenditure 
on research, instruction and communications. "Peasant production" was 
possible only because the peasant was surrounded by a network of supervi-
sory, manufacturing and distributive agencies. 
In its inception, indeed, cotton production was regarded as very much 
a Uganda Company enterprise. The chiefs acted as the Company's managers, 
the peasants were its employees, so to speak, at one remove. The appearance 
of competitive buyers and the intervention of Government gave the growers 
a somewhat more genuinely independent position in the industry. Even so, 
the industry continued to be considered as, in many respects, non-native 
property. Planters of coffee and rubber, complaining of the special interest 
taken by the Government in the cotton crop, did not so much allege that 
native production was being given preference over non-native as that 
certain European enterprises, the firms engaged in ginning and exporting 
cotton, were being favoured at the expense of others. 
The one crucial point of difference between the two systems was, of 
course, that one did and the other did not presuppose an at least temporary 
transfer of land to non-African ownership. Now on this point, so far as the 
kingdom of Buganda, the most fertile and the most settled part of Uganda, 
was concerned, an unexpected twist had been given to the situation by the ^ 
terms of the concordat negotiated by Sir Harry Johnston with the Ganda 
chiefs in 1900. 
The principles governing the land settlement in Buganda were not 
essentially different from those which guided British administrators else-
where in East Africa.1 The general idea was that the natives would be 
confirmed in possession of the lands which they "occupied," whereas the 
"waste and uncultivated" portions would be at the disposal of the Crown 
and available for sale or lease to immigrant farmers and planters. The 
crux lay in the interpretation of the term "native occupation." This could 
be, and sometimes was, construed so as to cover little more than the land 
actually under cultivation, even small interstices between settlements being 
liable to appropriation. More generally it was accepted that each tribal 
group had a defined territory which should remain inviolate. Now there 
could be no doubt that the whole of Buganda was tribal territory. Equally, 
there could be no doubt that the kingdom contained far more land than the 
natives were then using or would be able to use in the foreseeable future. 
The problem, therefore, was to find some means of dividing up the land so 
as to establish the Crown's right of ownership of the surplus waste. The-'' 
problem was complicated by the intricacy of native land tenure, or rather 
by the intricacy of Buganda's political and social structure. Now that land 
was about to acquire a marketable value, it was necessary to cut through 
the hierarchy of rights and powers and establish a clear-cut system of 
ownership. Johnston was aware from the first that from political necessity 
he would have to allot some land to the king and chiefs, who, from one 
point of view, were the existing owners of the soil. He was anxious, however, 
to keep such allocations small, for the recent history of Nyasaland had 
persuaded him that rights of ownership granted to African chiefs would 
be transferred immediately to European purchasers, to the detriment of the 
rights of the peasant cultivators. He, therefore, proposed a threefold division 
of Buganda: estates would be granted to the magnates of the realm; the 
remainder of the cultivated land would be resei^ed for the use of the native 
population as a whole by being placed under the control of a mixed board 
of trustees; the waste and uncultivated areas would become the property 
1. See Thomas, H. B., and Spencer, A. E. Uganda Land and Surveys, Entebbe, 1938; Ingham, op. cit.', 
Wild, op. cit. ; Oliver, R. Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa, London, 1957. The fullest 
account, however, is in Low, D . A. and Pratt , R. C. Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955 (in the 
press). I am grateful to Dr . Low for allowing me to see the draf t of par t of this work. 
C 23 
of the Crown. In the course of the negotiations, however, this scheme was 
greatly modified. For political reasons, it was found necessary to recognise 
the rights of a much larger number of chiefs than had been intended, to 
grant individual estates to the lesser gentry as well as to the magnates, and 
to include in these estates a certain amount of waste as well as cultivated 
land. Thus there emerged as the aggregate of land in this category a figure 
of 9,003 square miles—nearly half the supposed total area of Buganda and 
rather more than half the actual area. This came to be regarded as the natives' 
share, and legislation was subsequently enacted (the Land Transfer Ordinance 
of 1906, supported by the Buganda Land Law of 1908) to ensure that it 
should remain substantially in native hands. Neither lease nor sale to 
non-natives was forbidden, but to any such transaction the consent both 
of the Governor and of the Lukiiko, the governing body of Buganda, was 
required. This being so, it was not deemed necessary to make any further 
reservation of native rights; the idea of trusteeship disappeared from view, 
and the remainder of the land was placed at the unrestricted disposal of 
the Government. Johnston himself, in reporting to his masters in the Foreign 
Office, laid stress on the real property which the Agreement had secured 
for the Government;1 and to at least one later official it seemed that "the 
underlying motive of all native land administration (was) to redeem John-
ston's promise of valuable Crown land."2 
It was not at first apparent that redemption would present any difficulty. 
Great stretches of waste and uncultivated but exuberantly fertile land were 
now, in theory, available for sale to planters, with promise not only of an 
immediate revenue in cash but also of the larger economic benefits that 
would acrue through European agricultural enterprise. In practice, however, 
this was not the case. Johnston's immediate successors took the view that 
alienation must wait until the demarcation envisaged by the Agreement 
had actually been carried out, and two further decisions ensured that this 
would mean a long delay. First, since the allocation was both individual 
and arithmetical, each of the chiefs having been awarded a certain number 
of square miles, or fractions of a square mile, according to his rank, the 
demarcation had to take the form of a full-scale cadastral survey, which 
proved to be a difficult and protracted undertaking. Secondly, it was ruled 
that the Ganda must have first choice and that the actual allotment of lands 
must be left in the hands of the Lukiiko.3 Now after a decade of chaos 
in the state it was virtually impossible to determine which chiefs were in 
rightful possession of what land, even if the term "possession" had carried 
any clear meaning; and certainly the Lukiiko made little attempt at any 
such determination. In practice, the more powerful chiefs marked out their 
"miles" where they chose, which was naturally in the more fertile and 
populous regions near the Lake, and the smaller fry followed suit as far as 
they were able. 
The upshot was that the distribution, redistribution and survey of the 
chiefly estates dragged on for years. Several attempts were made to secure 
finality but without success. By 1907 the Land Office had registered 6,600 
claims (compared with the 1,000 estates originally envisaged) and there was 
nothing to prevent further claims being lodged for another twenty years or 
more.4 And at the same time the Government saw all the more desirable 
areas of Buganda disappearing into native ownership. It seemed that the 
Crown would have to wait a generation for its share, which would then be 
located entirely in the remoter and less fertile parts of the country. The 
authorities were in the somewhat absurd position that, though in theory 
they had some 8,000 square miles at their disposal there was hardly 
any that they could actually offer to planters. 
Yet it is easy to overrate the influence of law and policy upon the 
1. Cd . 671. 
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course of economic development. Certainly it would be quite wrong to 
suppose that there was, in the first years of the century, a flood of capital 
and enterprise seeking to enter Uganda but dammed off by legal obstacles 
and by a sentimental or doctrinaire official dislike of interference with the 
native way of life. If there had been, we may be fairly sure that the obstacles 
would have been surmounted and official resistances overborne. In fact, a 
few enquiries were received from Afrikaners and others1 whose interest was 
clearly not in Buganda but in the Kenya highlands, the greater part of which 
had until 1902 been included in the Uganda Protectorate. These were quite 
properly redirected to Nairobi; and that was all, or nearly all. The most 
that can be said is that if the authorities at this time had made the attraction 
of planters the first object of policy they could probably have acquired a few. 
The real reason for the slow development of a plantation sector of the 
economy is probably to be sought not in institutions and policies but in the 
state of the market. The product which had taken first place in Lugard's and 
Johnston's prospectuses, as we have seen, was coffee. But by 1900 coffee-
planting was not by a long way the attractive proposition that it had seemed 
a few years earlier. The price of coffee follows a cycle of its own, to a large 
extent independent of the general short-period and long-period trade cycles, 
and in the period in question the trend was sharply downward. The value 
of Rio No. 7 in New York had fallen from 17.9 cents per lb. in 1890 to 
15.9 cents in 1895 and 8.2 cents in 1900. A nadir of 5.6 cents was reached 
in 1903, but the subsequent upward movement was very slow, and the 
10-cent mark was not exceeded until 1911, when a new boom set in.2 During 
the first decade of the century the plantations which had been enthusiastically 
established earlier on in German East Africa had to live through very evil 
days and in Kenya only small and hesitant experiments were conducted. 
The other staple of later plantation enterprise in Uganda was rubber, but 
in 1900 rubber-planting, as distinct from the tapping of forest trees and 
vines, was nowhere beyond its infancy. It was not until 1907 that plantations 
began to contribute an appreciable quantity to the world supplies of this 
commodity. 
It was in 1907, and in connexion with rubber, that European capitalists, 
both large and small, began to take a definite interest in the agricultural 
possibilities of Uganda, though it was not until 1910-11, with the revival 
of the prospects of profit out of coffee-planting, that the interest became 
keen or widespread. In 1907 the Uganda Company started a rubber planta-
tion. In the same year a group of London financiers received a lease of no 
less than a hundred square miles of forest in Uganda and shortly afterwards 
floated the Mabira Forest (Uganda) Rubber Company, with an authorised 
capital of £120,000, to exploit the same.3 The original idea was to collect wild 
rubber, but as this proved to be uneconomic the company was obliged to 
turn to plantation enterprise. 
There was nothing cool about the welcome which the planters, who 
now began to appear on the scene in increasing numbers, received from the 
Administration. A common official view was that stated by the Land Officer 
in 1911: "The crying needs of this country are European population and 
capital, and agricultural development, together with increased transport 
facilities."4 By "agricultural development" was meant, notwithstanding the 
success of cotton, mainly the planting of permanent crops. "These develop-
ments," wrote the Chief Secretary in the same ye^r, "can never be carried 
out by the native population."5 A pencilled comment on this by the new 
Governor, Sir Frederick Jackson, "I don't agree at all"—represented 
almost the first sign of opposition to the prevailing view of things. And 
even Jackson, although he was undoubtedly the most "pro-native" of all 
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the early governors of Uganda, was in no way opposed to a moderate and 
regulated influx of European population and capital. 
But even a moderate influx could, it was thought, be made possible 
only by a settlement of the "native land question," around which the 
greater part of the discussion turned. The concession to the Mabira Forest 
Company had been possible because the Agreement had specifically reserved 
forest lands to the Crown. Alienation of all other land in Buganda, however, 
was still obstructed by the difficulties described above. By 1908 the Govern-
ment was becoming desperate. "The Agreement," wrote the Chief Secretary, 
"is rapidly becoming a nightmare." The Ganda had taken unreasonable 
advantage of a favourable interpretation and tension was at breaking-
point. He found it hard to believe that the intention had been to "throw all 
the more accessible land to the natives without consideration for Government 
interests." Sir Hesketh Bell concurred: the Agreement had proved "a 
truly disastrous bargain."1 
There did, however, appear to be ways in which the evils of the situation 
could be mitigated. The estates which the chiefs marked out for themselves 
rarely coincided with and often did not approximate to the number of acres 
to which their certificates entitled them. The Buganda Government claimed 
that it should be permissible to balance excesses against shortages. That is, 
where a man's estate was found on survey to be less than his allotment, 
he should be allowed to mark out the balance elsewhere on land of his own 
choosing; and where it exceeded his allotment the excess should be re-
allotted by the Lukiiko to another claimant. The Land Officer argued that 
to concede this would be to lose the last chance of getting any good land 
within the near future, "until Buganda has been picked over and over 
again by the natives." In the first place, therefore, an administrative ruling 
was made that shortages were not to be taken up within the eight central 
counties of Buganda. Secondly, the Lukiiko was somehow persuaded to 
enact the Land Law (Survey) of 1909, the effect of which was to settle 
the question of excesses and shortages in such a way that the Government 
would be able to locate some Crown land immediately. It was laid down that 
shortages were to be made good, not immediately and at the pleasure of the 
allottee or the Lukiiko, but afterwards and at the pleasure of the Govern-
ment. Furthermore, any allotment which was not claimed at the time of 
the survey was to be treated as having lapsed, and the land in question would 
fall to the Crown.2 
Given its premises, the Government's action was not unreasonable. It 
could fairly be argued that the Protecting Power was entitled, by reason of 
its services to the country and by the terms of the Agreement, to some 
valuable land. The chiefs themselves had little reason for complaint; they 
had already done very well out of the land settlement. The significance of 
the episode lies in the underlying assumptions, that the interests of the 
Government and the interests of the native population were in direct conflict, 
and that economic progress could be achieved only by diverting large areas 
of land into non-native ownership. 
It was indeed little more than an episode. Jackson, who arrived early 
in 1911 after an interregnum of nearly two years, did not deny that it was 
desirable to secure land for the Crown, but he did doubt whether the 
expedients adopted to that end were "dignified and in keeping with the 
traditions of the Government of a Native Protectorate."3 Believing that 
even a bad bargain should be kept, he rescinded the ruling about the taking 
up of shortages in the central counties and proceeded to negotiate with the 
Ganda chiefs a supplementary Agreement which was signed in April, 1913, 
and which completely annulled the situation created by the Law of 1909. 
As a result, by 1919 only about 60,000 acres of Crown land, apart from 
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swamp and forest, had been definitely located; most of this was in the distant 
county of Bugerere, and most of it was poor land. 
To would-be planters who could not secure a grant of Crown land in 
Buganda there was open the alternative of buying or leasing it from its 
native owners. They did not find it difficult to locate willing sellers, though 
as time went on the price demanded rose enormously; in 1911 it was normally 
about Rs. 4 an acre, by 1914 it was ranging between Rs. 30 and Rs. 45. 
Such transactions, as has been explained, needed the consent of the Governor 
and of the Lukiiko. Bell had declared in 1908 that in general he was very 
much averse to giving his consent to the sale of native land.1 But as the 
demand became keener, and the prospects of securing Crown land for 
alienation faded, the official attitude changed. By 1910 the Acting Governor 
was urging in a despatch that it was "very desirable to encourage some of 
the native chiefs, who have far more land than they can ever hope to 
develop, to sell part of it to desirable Europeans."2 Nor did Jackson dissent 
from this, though he ruled that landowners should not normally be allowed 
to part with more than half their total holding.3 Lord Cranworth, a Kenya 
settler who was extending his interests to Uganda about this time, was 
surprised by the liberality of land policy; he had no difficulty in purchasing 
three estates from native chiefs—which, he said, "would have been regarded 
in B.E.A. (sc. Kenya) as a crime against God and man."4 The consent of 
the Lukiiko might be a little more difficult to obtain. There was a conflict of 
interest here between chiefs who were eager to sell in the best market and 
their more far-sighted colleagues, who were busily amassing landed property 
themselves and wished to keep the market restricted. But although there 
was often obstruction and delay it does not appear that consent to sale was 
ever actually withheld. By 1916 non-natives had secured the usufruct of a 
little over 50,000 acres of land that had been the property of Ganda chiefs, 
and in most cases the owner had parted with the freehold title. 
Buganda was not the only part of the Protectorate in which European 
enterprise was possible and, as the boom in coffee and rubber developed, 
there was steadily increasing interest in the economic potential of other 
districts, more especially Busoga, Bunyoro and Toro. In these three districts 
and also in Ankole, which was hardly plantation country but was thought 
to be suitable for European cattle-ranching, a settlement of the land question 
was particularly urgent. Here, but not elsewhere in the Protectorate, the 
political structure was in some respects similar to that of Buganda, and the 
ruling aristocracy naturally hoped for freehold estates on the Buganda 
model. With the rulers and chiefs of Toro and Ankole, indeed, Johnston 
had concluded Agreements which envisaged the granting of such estates, 
though on a much smaller scale than in Buganda. There had been no formal 
agreement with Bunyoro, which was conquered territory, or with the com-
paratively petty states which made up Busoga, but in these districts too the 
chiefs had been given some reason to believe that their claims to landowner-
ship would receive official recognition. 
In 1911 the Government set up a committee, consisting of the Principal 
Judge, Sir William Morris Carter (as he afterwards became), the Attorney-
General and the Land Officer, to make recommendations for a land settle-
ment in these four districts. The Committee defined its objects, in its first 
report,6 as being to guarantee to the natives the possession of adequate 
areas of land, to define individual native rights and to ascertain what land 
was available for development by Europeans a ltd others. It is clear that the 
last object was the dominant one: the idea was to clear the whole question 
of native rights and needs out of the way so tha4 development could proceed. 
Owing to the sparseness of native population and cultivation, there did not 
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seem to be any great difficulty about this. It seemed possible to deal fairly 
and even generously with the natives, to leave them in possession of the 
land which they then cultivated, with an ample margin for the future, and 
still have plenty of scope for alienation to Europeans. The Committee's 
solution was based on the Buganda precedent, but with important modifi-
cations. Land grants were no longer regarded as an award to the native 
aristocracy but as the endowment of the tribe as a whole. Therefore, although 
the grants were to be made to individual chiefs, they were mostly to take the 
the form of "official" estates, which would not be private property but 
would be held by the chief only so long as he held his office. Collectively, 
these grants would constitute the native reserve in each district. Their 
aggregate area was arrived at by means of a simple formula: allow four 
acres for each family, multiply by the number of families, multiply again 
by three to provide for future needs. This calculation left over 80 per 
cent, of the total land area of the four districts available for alienation, and 
not less than 2,000 square miles in any one district. 
This scheme, formulated in January, 1912, and submitted to the Secretary 
of State, after minor modifications, in 1915, was never implemented, for 
reasons which will appear later. Its interest lies in the light which it throws 
on the assumptions current in official thinking at this time: the rights of 
natives were rights to the land which they occupied; the needs of natives 
were sufficient land for subsistence agriculture; development would be a 
wholly European process. 
Such restrictions as were imposed on the acquisition of land by Europeans 
at this period were the product of interventions by the Colonial Office rather 
than of the policy of the local authorities. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 
1903 had provided for both freehold and leasehold grants, but required the 
special sanction of the Secretary of State for any freehold grant exceeding 
1,000 acres. In 1907 the Secretary of State ruled that no non-native was to 
be allowed to acquire even the leasehold of more than 10,000 acres;1 and in 
1909 the 1,000-acre maximum was made to apply to the purchase of native-
owned as well as Crown land.2 Moreover the Governor was repeatedly 
instructed that the grant of freehold was to be kept within the narrowest 
possible limits.3 In all this, however, the home authorities were not animated, 
or at any rate not primarily animated, by considerations of native policy but 
by the current Liberal doctrine concerning the proper relationship between 
the State and the land. The objects were to check speculation and to secure 
for the Crown, by a system of revisable rents, a share in the probable future 
increase of land values. 
What effect these limitations had upon the development of plantation 
enterprise in Uganda is difficult to say. Except for the Mabira Forest venture, 
there was certainly no investment in Uganda by large financial interests, 
but these may have been deterred as much by the poor success of that 
venture as by the conditions of land tenure. On the other hand smaller 
enterprises proliferated rapidly between 1910 and 1914. There was no mass 
influx of colonists, but a considerable number of people who had originally 
come to Uganda for other reasons began to devote their attention to agricul-
ture. One of the prime movers of this form of development was Mr. Michael 
Moses, who arrived in Uganda before 1900 as a clerk in Government 
service but shortly afterwards resigned in order to engage in a wide 
variety of business enterprises, among which, in the years immediately 
before the First World War, coffee- and rubber-planting were predominant. 
In partnership with Dr. H. H. Hunter, one of the first two lawyers in private 
practice in Uganda, he had formed five separate syndicates by the end of 
1913, each of which was busily engaged in the flotation of plantation com-
panies. Another leading entrepreneur of this period was Mr. C. W. Hattersley, 
a former missionary and first headmaster of Mengo High School, who 
1. E.S.A. S .M.P. 4915/1. 
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combined planting with the sale of agricultural equipment and was thus 
able to secure financial backing in Sheffield. Other planters were recruited 
from among Government officials, especially land surveyors, from former 
employees of the Uganda Company (including Borup himself), from East 
Africa's floating population of South African and other adventurers. A few 
refugees from the depressed plantation industries of India also came to try 
their luck in the new country. Indians themselves were not yet prominent 
in agricultural enterprise, but the great merchant Alidina Visram had already 
added planting to his multifarious interests in Uganda. 
In these early years the prospects of the planters seemed extremely 
bright. The sun of official favour shone brightly upon them. Their crops 
promised well. In the rich soils of Buganda and Busoga the coffee trees 
grew fast and the initial yields were heavy; an outbreak of the dreaded 
leaf disease, hemileia vastatrix, which had laid waste the plantations of 
Ceylon and south India a few decades earlier, passed off in 1913 without 
disaster. Rubber was a rather more doubtful proposition. Two different 
species were tried out. The Ceara tree, manihot glazovii, which was believed 
to be suitable to regions of moderate heat and humidity such as this, proved 
a total failure; the Para species, hevea brasiliensis, grew rather more slowly 
than in its Brazilian homeland or in Malaya. But it was nevertheless growing 
and showing every sign of future profit. There was also considerable faith 
in cocoa, which had shown promise in the botanical gardens at Entebbe 
and was being planted commercially in several parts of the country.1 
Prices ruled high. Uganda plantation coffee was selling in London at 
around £80 a ton in 1913. By this time the best of the rubber boom was already 
over, the value of the plantation product having fallen from the fantastic 
figure of 12s. a lb. early in 1910 to a little over 2s. late in 1913. But even 
at this level there could be no question of loss; on a well-run estate in 1914 
production costs were reckoned at 8£d. a lb., and freight and London 
charges added 3fd. to the total cost.2 Labour was still extremely cheap. The 
standard wage for unskilled plantation labour at this time was Rs. 3 or 
Rs. 3/50 per month, or rather for thirty working days, whereas it had risen 
to Rs. 5 in the highlands of Kenya and to Rs. 10-12 on the coast. Largely 
for this reason Lord Cranworth had been able to get 1,000 acres under 
coffee in Uganda at a time when very few planters in Kenya had as many 
as a hundred.3 
The financing of plantation enterprise presented little difficulty. In 
this period speculative capital was readily forthcoming in London for 
rubber-planting anywhere in the tropics, and there was also a rich source 
nearer at hand. Many of the wealthier Kenya settlers, like Cranworth, 
sought to combine the pleasures of residence in the Highlands with the 
profits of investment in Uganda. In 1913 the shares of one Uganda plantation 
company were selling in Nairobi for £3.4 In aggregate the capital sunk in 
these enterprises was by no means inconsiderable; by the beginning of 1919 
it was estimated that half a million pounds had been invested in rubber 
alone.5 
Nor was land really hard to come by. The absence of a formal definition 
of native rights in land outside Buganda did not prevent the Government 
from making a considerable number of grants to non-natives, for except in 
Buganda the whole of the country was in law the property of the Crown. 
For a time the district of Busoga, with its fertile soil, and its proximity to 
the Lake port of Jinja, was especially popular. But in 1913-14 a dozen 
plantations sprang up in Bunyoro, along the newly constructed highway 
from Butiaba on Lake Albert to Masindi Pojt on Lake Kioga, and about 
1. U . P . A n n . R p t s . D / A , 1912/13, 1913/14. Brown, E „ a n d H u n t e r , H . H . Planting in Uganda, L o n d o n , 
1913. 
2. See Uganda^Herald, 24 . i . l9 . 
3. C r a n w o r t h , loc. cit. 
4 . Uganda Herald, 13.X.13. 
5 . Ibid., 2 4 . U 9 . 
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the same time a few bold spirits began to plant coffee in the highlands of 
Toro, notwithstanding that their only link with a Lake port consisted of 
nearly 200 miles of execrable road. Buganda, however, remained the 
principal theatre of plantation enterprise, partly because of its natural 
advantages, partly because the purchase of chiefs' estates was a simpler, 
though a more expensive, method of acquiring land than the negotiation 
with district officers that was necessary in other areas. 
Early in 1911 there were reported to be about a score of non-native 
estates in Uganda, with a total of a little over 2,000 acres under permanent 
crops, among which rubber easily predominated. Four years later the 
position was as follows:1 
Buganda 
Busoga 
Bunyoro 
Toro 
Total 
TABLE 5 
N O N - N A T I V E E S T A T E S , M A R C H , 1915 
Acres under Crops 
Number Total Acres Coffee Rubber Rubber and Cocoa Total 
Coffee 
104 — 7,378 2,253 4,635 1,639 15,905 
10 1,531 57 100 181 2,220 
11 422 — 100 38 940 
10 — 585 — — — 740 
135 58,000 9,918 2,310 4,835 1,868 21,675 
Since coffee trees do not yield even a small crop until the third year after 
planting and rubber trees cannot be tapped effectively until the seventh 
year, the plantations had not begun to make an appreciable contribution 
to the economy when the First World War broke out. Nevertheless few people 
doubted that this form of agriculture had a very great part to play in the 
future development of the country. Uganda, it was agreed, would remain a 
"native" country, in the sense that its white population would never become 
numerically significant. Nor could it be denied that "native production," in 
the form of cotton cultivation, was firmly established as one of the pillars 
of the economy. But it was not intended or expected that it would continue 
to be the sole pillar. Uganda was to all appearance moving towards a mixed 
economy, in which Africans would provide labour-power partly as indepen-
dent peasant cultivators and partly as wage-earners, while non-Africans 
would contribute capital and managerial skills, in some cases merely to the 
processing and merchanting of crops, in others to their cultivation. 
t. U.P. Ann, Rpts. D/A, 1910/11 and 1914/15. 
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C H A P T E R I I I 
PLANTERS AND PEASANTS, 1914-30 
We have said that in 1914 the sun of official favour was shining on the 
planters. But although this was generally true there were already clouds in 
sight. In certain quarters opposition was beginning to develop, not to the 
existence of planters but to the assumption that they could and should play 
a dominant role in the future evolution of the economy. One centre of 
such opposition was the Department of Agriculture. The Department, as 
we have seen, had come into existence as an auxiliary of the native cotton 
industry, and although plantation agriculture was by no means excluded 
from its purview (in 1913, for example, it acquired a mycologist to advise 
on measures against coffee leaf disease) it continued to look on assistance 
to, and control of, the cotton-growers as its primary function. Having 
constantly before its eyes an example of the successful cultivation of an 
economic crop by African peasants it tended to prefer the further develop-
ment of a proven crop and a proven system of production to the still specu-
lative activities of the planters. This tendency was reinforced by a personal 
factor. Mr. S. Simpson, who was in charge of the Department from 1911 to 
1928, happened to be a man of radical outlook, such as is to be found here 
and there among members of the specialist branches of the Colonial Service, 
with a strong antipathy towards capitalistic enterprise. His views may well 
have been strengthened by previous experience in Nyasaland, where there 
had been land-grabbing on a large scale, and where, moreover, European 
agriculture had enjoyed only a very moderate measure of success. His 
coolness towards the planters became so notorious that he was publicly 
rebuked by the Development Commission of 1920, a body which included 
some of his own colleagues as well as business-men and planters.1 
More important resistance to the growth of plantation agriculture came 
from certain of the provincial administrators, and notably from Francis 
Spire, that remarkable man who entered Uganda in 1893 as the personal 
servant of the first Commissioner2 and left it in 1918 after eight years as 
Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern Province. In 1911 Spire had looked 
on the advent of the first planters in Busoga with cautious approval,3 but 
by 1913 the caution was very much more marked than the approbation. 
From that time onwards he displayed an increasingly intransigent opposition 
to the scheme put foward by the Land Settlement Committee and to its 
underlying assumptions. In direct opposition to the prevailing view of 
economic development, he urged that the aggregate output of a mass of 
smallholders was likely to be far greater than that of European estates.4 
"Every development," he wrote in 1915, "must be carried out by the natives." 
And the natives were in fact carrying out development quite satisfactorily 
under Government guidance before the planters had even appeared on the 
scene. His plan for Busoga, like that of the Committee, envisaged the reserva-
tion of some part of the land for the natives and the alienation of the 
remainder. The differences were, first, that Spine argued against the grant 
of estates to individual chiefs and for the creation of communal reserves, 
within which the peasants would gradually b^,led along the road to full 
individual proprietorship, and secondly, that he would have permitted 
only the alienation of such land as the natives quite clearly could not use, 
1. U.P. Report of the Development Commission, 1920. 
2. Colvile, H. The Land of the Nile Springs, London, 1895. Oliver, R . Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble 
for Africa, London, 1957. 
3. U .P . Ann. Rpt . P.C. E.P., 1910/11. 
4. U.P. Ann. Rpts . P.C. E.P., 1912/13, 1916/17. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2686/30, 2198/50, 51, 76, 78, 89. 
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after allowance had been made for grazing, fallow, population increase and 
the extension of economic crops. In hard figures, the Committee had intended 
to place 913 square miles of Busoga under native ownership, whereas 
Spire wished to reserve 2,232 square miles for native use, or about two-
thirds of the total area of the district. The Director of Agriculture, who was 
consulted on the matter for the first time in 1915, went further. Undiplomatic 
as always, he recommended that no land whatever should be alienated in 
any part of the Eastern Province, at any rate for the next ten years.1 
Spire's proposals did not meet with the approval of the Committee, 
who urged that it was most undesirable to prevent the alienation of such 
large areas, since much of the best land would thus remain undeveloped. 
The Governor, too, felt that his scheme would be subversive of all progress.2 
But when the Committee's report (after further revisions of detail) was sub-
mitted, together with Spire's critique, to the Colonial Office in the summer 
of 1915, it met with an unexpected rebuff: the Secretary of State replied 
curtly that he was "not satisfied that the Committee's scheme (was) in the 
best interests either of the peasants or of development."3 In any case the 
matter was to be left in abeyance until the end of the war. 
Meanwhile support for Spire and hostility to the intrusion of alien 
interests in land were steadily crystallising among the provincial administra-
tors. The influx of planters into Bunyoro met with determined opposition 
on the part of the Provincial Commissioner, which was withdrawn only on 
direct orders from the Governor.4 In 1919 the Provincial Commissioners 
met in Council and unanimously agreed that adequate land should be 
reserved for native occupation with an absolute guarantee against alienation.5 
"Adequate land" they defined as six acres per head of the population in 
Busoga and Toro and eight acres per head in Bunyoro and Ankole. On this 
basis the area available for alienation in the four districts would be 1,078 
square miles, against the 16,392 square miles envisaged by the Committee. 
The motives of the administrators were somewhat mixed. At the highest 
level there was genuine concern for the rights and the welfare of the people 
in their charge, and genuine faith in their ability and willingness to exploit 
the resources of the soil on their own account, without being placed under 
the control of alien landlords and employers. At the lowest level, the planters 
were objected to because they were rival employers of labour; their advent 
tended to make road construction and other public works more difficult 
and more costly. Somewhere in between there was the feeling that the planters 
were a novel and disturbing influence, an alien body which could not be 
assimilated into the ideal hierarchical structure that consisted of the district 
officer, the chiefs and the people. Some were alleged to obstruct the collection 
of poll-tax; most sought to secure for their employees exemption from 
customary labour obligations. In general, their presence tended to the 
corruption of tribal morality and the weakening of tribal disciplines. The 
administrators' attitude, in short, was not, in any proper sense of the term, 
a liberal one; it was conservative, and segregationist. They did not attempt, 
and could not have attempted at this stage, to exclude European enterprise 
altogether or to preserve native ownership of the whole of Uganda. But they 
sought to conserve, side by side with the European sector of the economy, 
a substantial sector in which the native peoples, protected both against 
exploitation and against undue contamination by European influences, 
could develop, as the later formula had it, "along their own lines." 
But the provincial administrators, though increasingly influential, did not 
determine policy, and at a higher level the current was flowing strongly 
in the opposite direction during the later war years and for some time 
thereafter. This was the period in which the doctrine that the tropical 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2198/83. 
2. Ibid., 2198/53, 70. 
3. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2198/85. 
4. Ibid., S .M.P. 2382. 
5. Ibid., S .M.P. 2198/160. 
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dependencies existed in order to supply the metropolis with cheap raw 
materials was most frequently and most crudely propounded.1 It was also 
the period in which faith in white settlement and plantation agriculture 
reached its apogee. In Uganda, the planters were more numerous and more 
confident. The Uganda Herald, which at this time was their mouthpiece, 
not only prophesied unlimited expansion of the plantation sector but did its 
best to belittle the performance and prospects of the cotton industry.2 
And in Sir Robert Coryndon, who succeeded Jackson as Governor in 1917, 
and who had been one of the Rhodesian pioneers, they had a convinced 
supporter. 
In the land controversy the real issue was no longer how much land in 
total, outside Buganda, the planters were to be allowed to occupy, but how 
completely they were to be excluded from certain areas. The Land Officer, the 
lawyers and the Governor agreed in regarding the whole idea of guaranteed 
reserves, propounded by the Provincial Commissioners, as "a capital error." 
The most that the Governor would concede was the rough demarcation of 
areas in which "native interests would definitely predominate."3 The Pro-
vincial Commissioners at first protested that this would do nothing to allay 
the people's growing anxiety about the security of their land, but by 1920 
their opposition was weakening. In September of that year two of them 
joined with the Committee in signing yet another report,4 which was des-
cribed as a compromise but which in fact represented a very big retreat from 
the positions previously held. It was now accepted that it was impracticable 
to reserve definite areas for the native population and unwise to exclude non-
natives from any large blocks of land. Estimated native requirements were 
reduced from 6-8 to 4-5 acres per head. Part of the land conditionally 
reserved for native use, would, after all, be awarded to individual chiefs, but 
even this the Governor reserved the right to alienate, not only for public 
purposes in the ordinary sense of the term, but for any purpose "which the 
Governor deems to be for the benefit of the Protectorate and people." 
New efforts were also made to secure the transfer of more land from 
the chiefs of Buganda to European entrepreneurs. In 1916, having at last 
secured the enactment by the Kenya legislature of a land ordinance which 
definitely excluded freehold tenure, the Colonial Office had ruled that Uganda 
must keep in step. The Governor had been instructed to make no more 
freehold grants of Crown land and, in conformity with this, to withhold his 
consent from any outright sale of native-owned land.5 This ruling had been 
accepted with great reluctance, and in April 1920, Judge Carter, as Acting 
Governor, pressed the Secretary of State to rescind it. He urged that consent 
should not normally be refused to the alienation of land in Buganda, so 
long as the Ganda retained as much as they actually needed for their own 
use, and this, he thought, was less than half the area allotted to the chiefs in 
1900. The legal argument that, since the chiefs' estates were supposed to be 
freehold property, they could not properly be forbidden to dispose of them 
as they chose, moved Lord Milner to give a reluctant assent.6 
Thus in the summer of 1920 the tide seemed to be flowing strongly in 
the direction of large-scale land alienations and large-scale development 
of plantation agriculture. There had indeed already been considerable 
expansion. Between 1915 and 1920 the number of estates in being had risen 
from 135 to 220 and their total area from 58,000 to 126,000 acres, or 197 
square miles.7 This appears a trivial extent in comparison with the 3,000 
square miles which was already in European accupation in Kenya.8 But, 
of course, in Uganda there was none of the extensive pastoral and arable 
1. See H a n c o c k , W . K . Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol . I I , P a r t I , Oxfo rd , 1940, pp . 106 ff. 
2. Uganda Herald, I l . iv.19, 27.V.21. 
3. E .S .A. S .M.P . 2198/158, 159. 
4. Ibid., S .M.P . 2198/189. 
5. E.S.A. S .M.P . 4915/1. 
6. Ibid., S .M.P . 27/55, 71. 
7. U . P . A n n . R p t . D / A , 1919/20. 
8. K e n y a Co lony . Agr icu l tura l Census , 1920. 
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farming that was characteristic of Kenya. In the area under crops the gap 
between the two countries was much narrower (38,000 against 176,000 acres), 
and in the areas under the more intensively cultivated and valuable crops it 
was narrower still. Indeed, Uganda could boast of 27,000 acres of plantation 
coffee (some of it planted under the shade of rubber trees), whereas Kenya 
had only 20,000 acres at this stage. And although coffee and rubber were still 
the principal plantation crops in Uganda, with cocoa a poor third, the hori-
zons were beginning to broaden. Despite vehement opposition from the 
Director of Agriculture, plans were maturing in 1920 for the leasing of 
10,000 acres in the densely populated Eastern Province to a large company 
for the cultivation of sugar, and also for the large-scale cultivation of cotton 
on the plantation system.1 
Yet all was not really well with the plantation sector of the Uganda 
economy. By this time it had become apparent that the land question, which 
was still exercising the minds of Government officials, was essentially 
academic. The crux of the matter was the labour question. For there was 
little point in discussing whether non-native entrepreneurs should be allowed 
to acquire one or two or sixteen thousand square miles of land when they 
were already having great difficulty in finding sufficient labour to develop and 
maintain the two hundred square miles which were already in their hands. 
This aspect of the matter has been treated at length by Powesland and will be 
dealt with only briefly here. The essence of the problem, here as elsewhere in 
East Africa at this time, was that there was no ready-made proletariat such as 
European employers were accustomed to have at their disposal. Nor was 
there any prospect or intention that such a proletariat would be formed. 
No one had suggested that the alienation of land should go so far that the 
existing native population would be deprived of the means of subsistence. 
Thus the attraction of wage-labourers depended on the demand for goods and 
services not available within the subsistence economy. Now it was shown 
above that in Buganda at least this demand was already quite highly de-
veloped in comparison with other parts of East Africa. But this was not 
saying very much. Even in Buganda the money income considered necessary 
by the bulk of the population was still small, and, notwithstanding the low 
level of wages, could be obtained by very brief spells of employment. Outside 
Buganda, and perhaps Busoga, it hardly exceeded the Rs. 5 which represented 
the Government's demand for tax. The money income considered to be 
desirable was, of course, substantially larger, but the strength of most people's 
desire was generally not equal to the strength of their aversion from the 
hard and tedious manual labour that the planters mainly offered. 
Nevertheless the supply would no doubt have been adequate for the 
planters' needs if plantation employment had been the sole source of money 
incomes. But this, of course, was not the case. More especially in Buganda, a 
variety of other opportunities presented themselves to the people: road-
making, public and private construction, domestic service, craftsmanship, 
commerce, crime, and above all the cultivation and transport of cotton. 
Here arose the difficulty inherent in the construction of a "dual economy," 
of an economic system consisting of two juxtaposed compartments, one of 
which contained capitalistic agriculture and the other subsistence agriculture 
plus the cultivation of certain economic crops: labour was a factor common 
to both compartments, and the effective supply was not sufficient for the 
full development of both. Theoretically, a natural equilibrium would be 
attained; the progress of each compartment would be determined by its 
relative economic capacity, that is, by the relative remuneration which it 
could offer to those who worked in it. In practice, however, the situation 
produced stresses which were bound to seek a political outlet. 
One obvious solution would have been the suppression or discourage-
ment of the cultivation of economic crops outside the plantation sector. This, 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P. 4086/18, 24. S.M.P. 5790. 
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however, was a demand that the planters of Uganda were not in a position 
to make effective; the cotton industry was far too valuable to the country 
and the Government for any attack on it to have a chance of success. The 
only instance of such an attack appears to have been a protest made by the 
local planters in 1914 against active official support for the development of 
cotton-growing in Bunyoro, where it was almost as much a novelty as 
plantation agriculture. The District Commissioner's reply was sharp: "It is 
neither the wish nor the intention of His Majesty's Government to exploit 
this country's many advantages for the sole benefit, financial or other, of a 
white population, numerically small, at the expense of native interests, or at 
the expense of improving native conditions of livelihood."1 
The other main line of attack was to secure an increase in the supply 
of wage-labour by the use of coercion. This attack was consistently and 
vehemently pressed by the planters,2 and with a large measure of success. 
Even before their arrival the Government had found it necessary to adopt 
a system of compulsory recruitment of paid labour for the making of 
roads, the carriage of official stores and other public services, or rather to 
regularise the practice which had existed informally since the beginning of the 
Protectorate, whereby the chiefs had placed labour at the disposal of their 
European overlords. During the second decade of the century and especially 
during the war years, administrators often slipped into "supplying" the 
planters with part of the labour recruited for their own use.3 Even when this 
was not done, as Powesland has shown, the mere fact that compulsion was 
applied at all worked to the benefit of the planters, since it kept wages 
below the level which would have been fixed by the interplay of supply and 
demand, and probably produced a larger supply than would have been 
forthcoming voluntarily at any possible level of wages.4 To this extent 
coercion distorted the economic growth of the country, giving it a bias 
towards wage-earning types of activity and so assisting plantation agri-
culture to develop further than it could have done had economic forces 
alone been allowed to operate. 
It must be added, however, that the balance was in part redressed by 
a distortion in the opposite direction. For coercion was applied not only 
in the recruitment of wage-labour but also in the development of native 
agriculture. The Bunyoro planters' complaint was not that the local Africans 
were growing cotton, but that the District Commissioner was "insisting" 
on their doing so. And was he not begging a rather large question when he 
implied that it was in the interests of the natives to grow cotton for sale to 
European merchants but not in their interests to grow coffee in return for 
wages from European planters ? Such calculations as could be made suggested 
the contrary. Thus on the basis of the average prices and yields over the period 
1910-18 it was reckoned that half an acre of cotton brought the grower a 
return of Rs. 12, but that the cost of the labour expended on it amounted to 
Rs. 19—that is, the same labour could have earned Rs. 19 from wage employ-
ment.6 The calculation was in itself somewhat insecure, and it left a great 
deal out of account—the uprooting from village life, the separation from the 
family (not that these things were necessarily regarded as disadvantages), 
the irksomeness of plantation discipline, the very bad living conditions that 
had often to be endured by estate labour. It also left out of account the larger 
consideration which, though not yet clearly formulated, lay behind the 
preference of most administrators for peasant agriculture, namely the 
consideration that it was better for the social and1 political health of Uganda 
1. E.S.A. S .M.P. 4624.-
2. Yearbook of the Uganda Planters ' Association, 1916/17. E.SfA. S.M.P. 1371/69a. Uganda Herald, 
17.1.19, 25.iv.19. 
3. E.S.A. S.M.P. 1371/71a. Ann. Rpts . P.C. E.P. 1912/13, 1919/20. 
4. As the Acting Governor explained to the Planters ' Association in 1920, "a t the present stage of develop-
ment of the natives it is essential that , if the country is to be properly administered, the Government 
must, in the absence of economic pressure, insist on work of a public nature being done. . . . If it does 
insist, and distributes its demands in a suitable manner, the labour supply to the planter will be increased." 
(Uganda Herald. 23.i.20.) 
5. E.S.A. S .M.P . 5790/14. 
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that the great majority of its people should be peasants rather than prole-
tarians in the service of alien employers. But from a strictly economic 
point of view it seems that the question of the relative advantage to the 
African population of the two forms of production was at least an open one. 
On the face of it, coercion in any form was not in the interests of the natives, 
since they were thereby deprived of the right to make their own choice 
between leisure and goods—though it could be argued that until they had 
acquired a wider knowledge of the benefits that could accrue from a money 
income they were incapable of making a rational choice in this matter. But 
if they were not to be allowed to choose idleness it was clearly in their 
interest that the range of possible employments should be as wide as possible, 
that their labour should be demanded by private employers as well as by the 
Public Works Department, the district officers and their own chiefs. Com-
pulsion, applied in the mild and not very effective forms open to a British 
Government, could modify but not annul the advantage which accrued to the 
mass of the people from the excess demand for labour. As far as Buganda is 
concerned, there is abundant evidence, not only that the people prospered 
in the immediate post-war years, but that they were prospering without 
undue exertion, either on the coffee plantations or in their own cotton-fields. 
Yet, despite the vociferousness of the planters' complaints, it was not 
labour shortage that lay at the root of their difficulties. It is true that by 1920 
the planters of Buganda and Busoga were virtually unable to secure any 
unskilled labour from the local tribes. But they had to a large extent sur-
mounted this difficulty by recruiting among the remoter peoples, especially 
those in the west and north-west who, for want of means of transport, were 
unable to earn money by growing cotton but had to provide themselves at 
least with the money for poll-tax. And beyond the frontiers of Uganda there 
were other sources to be tapped. Considerable numbers of labourers came 
from the densely populated areas of western Kenya to work in Uganda, and 
above all there were the crowded and poverty-stricken peoples of Ruanda-
Urundi. These outlying peoples, and especially the Ruanda, were soon to 
solve the labour problems of African farmers in central Uganda,1 and there 
was no reason why they should not eventually have done the same for 
European planters if these had been in a position to employ them. 
The crux of the matter was that the costs of agricultural production 
under direct European management were inevitably high, and that the 
value of the output had to be correspondingly high if the plantations were 
to pay their way. If this was true of any plantation enterprise it was especially 
true of plantations situated in the heart of Africa, separated from their 
main markets by several thousand miles of ocean, nearly 700 miles 
of single-track railway and a complicated system of internal road and water 
transport. 
Now although Uganda is a fertile country which is capable of yielding 
almost any tropical or subtropical product the planters had not succeeded 
in discovering any product to which the local conditions were specially and 
uniquely suited. They had no equivalent for the rubber of Malaya or the 
high-grade coffee of Kenya. The early promise of cocoa was soon found to 
have been delusive, though not before much capital had been sunk into its 
planting. Most of the trees grew and yielded fruit, but not enough fruit to 
make their cultivation profitable. Much the same was true of para rubber. 
The most expert of the planters admitted in 1919 that according to the text-
books Uganda was too high for the successful cultivation of this tree.2 
He still thought he could prove them wrong, but in fact they were substan-
tially correct. Rubber can be produced in Uganda but it cannot compete with 
the produce of Indonesia and Malaya. There seemed at first to be little doubt 
about the technical and economic success of coffee, which grew wild in the 
1. See below, p. 56. 
2. Uganda Herald, 24.1.19. 
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forests of southern Uganda. Yet here too there was disappointment. The 
indigenous coffee belonged to the commercially inferior robusta species, 
and the planters, as a matter of course, preferred to cultivate the high-value 
arabica, the coffee of the London market. But for this tree most of Uganda is 
not quite high enough. Initial yields were often heavy, but the trees were very 
susceptible to the condition of debility known as die-back, caused partly 
by careless cultivation, partly by unsuitable climatic conditions. Moreover, 
the quality of the product was far from high, in no way comparable to that 
which was attained from the start in Kenya. 
The basic economic weakness of the Uganda planters was obscured for a 
time by the boom conditions which prevailed for a couple of years after the 
end of the war. As is usual in such conditions, quality was of relatively little 
account; and with their coffee fetching up to £160 a ton in the early part of 
1920 (about double the pre-war maximum) planters could register a reason-
able profit on their operations. Yet even in these years by no means every-
thing was in their favour. Almost alone among commodity prices, the price of 
rubber scarcely moved above its immediate pre-war level, and was now a 
mere fraction of the price current when most of the Uganda plantations had 
been started. And even the price of coffee did not rise nearly as far as the 
price of Uganda cotton, which, fortuitously aided by the activities of boll-
worms in the United States, reached the fantastic figure of 52d. per lb. in 
Liverpool in March 1920, about four times its highest pre-war value. Thus 
the balance of economic advantage tilted sharply away from plantation 
agriculture towards the industry that was based on peasant production. 
Another factor which adversely affected all East African producers, but 
especially those who had to make interest payments, was the disastrous rise 
in the value of the silver rupee, followed early in 1920 by the introduction of a 
sterling-based currency at a rate 50 per cent, above the old exchange 
value of the rupee. 
Then in the summer of 1920 came the culminating blow, the world-wide 
collapse of the commodity markets. By September the value of the best 
Uganda coffee had fallen below £100 a ton, and by March of the following 
year it was below £80, whereas the inferior marks had become virtually 
unsaleable. Rubber by this time had slumped to less than a shilling a pound. 
These figures were well below the cost of production, and the planters were 
crying ruin.1 For to most of them the crisis came at the crucial point of their 
career, when the original capital had been exhausted and profits had only 
just begun to accrue. Their only hope lay in some form of governmental 
intervention; and here their real political as well as economic weakness 
disclosed itself. They were few in numbers, and with the exception of the 
Mabira Forest Company they had no very influential support in London. 
Nor were they in a position to claim, like the farmers of Kenya, that their 
fortunes were indissolubly linked with those of the European community 
at large. For the merchants were at least as numerous and influential as the 
planters, and their interests were not only not identical but at some points 
antagonistic. As importers, they welcomed the high exchange rate that was so 
hurtful to the producers; as exporters they were far more concerned with the 
fortunes of the cotton industry than with those of the plantations. One of 
their leading spokesmen said bluntly that "parasitic industries were not 
wanted," and another that "the real producer in this country was the native 
grower."2 The banks, too, passed judgment on the economic prospects 
of the planters by withholding further credit. * 
There was another factor which made it certain that such help as the 
Government could give to anyone in this crisis«would not be extended to 
the planters: cotton production was regarded as being in a special sense an 
imperial interest. The Parliamentary Commission of 1924 rightly dismissed the 
1. Uganda Herald, 17.xii.20, 7.1.21, 4.ii.21. 
2. Ibid., l l . i i .21. 
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allegation that the people of Uganda had been made to grow cotton for the 
benefit of Lancashire.1 The production of exportable crops had been pressed 
on the people for the sake of the country's prosperity, or more specifically 
for the sake of an increasing revenue. Cotton had received special attention 
because it was better suited than any other crop to the soil and climate of 
Uganda and the capabilities of its cultivators. As has been demonstrated 
in many parts of the tropics and subtropics, there are very few products 
which can add as much and as quickly to the wealth of a society which is 
destitute of capital and skill. On the other hand, the British Cotton Growing 
Association, founded in 1902, had had something to do with the inauguration 
of the cotton industry in Uganda. It had provided some of the original seed 
and it had created an atmosphere in which cotton would be the first thought 
of public and private entrepreneurs in such a country. And in this period the 
circumstances which had given rise to the formation of the Association had 
recurred in an acuter form. The Governor reported in July 1920 that on a 
recent visit to Britain not only the manufacturers but "members of the 
House of Commons and responsible officials, including the Secretary of 
State himself" had impressed upon him the "urgent need on Empire grounds 
of increasing the production of high-class Uganda cotton as rapidly as 
possible." "The position," he reported, "was one of definite anxiety."2 
Thus, despite the hopes which it had reposed in plantation agriculture and its 
strong sympathy with the planters, the Government was not allowed by the 
Colonial Office to respond to their plea for financial assistance,3 but it did 
step in to purchase native cotton in 1921 which would otherwise have 
remained unsold, fearing lest the growers should become altogether dis-
heartened.4 
So the planters were left to weather the storm as best they could. Their 
ruin was by no means total. Some disappeared; others were able to transfer 
their remaining capital to other enterprises, such as cotton-ginning; but the 
majority had no option but to hang on in hope of better times. And for some 
of them better times did come. Rubber, indeed, was virtually finished; the 
trees were never tapped again, except briefly in the middle 1920s and in the 
Second World War; many of them still stand as sombre memorials of 
misinvestment. But the more efficient and more prudent of the coffee-planters 
not only survived but enjoyed a modest prosperity when the market revived. 
During the later 1920s there was even a small influx of fresh settlers to the 
highland areas of Toro, mostly men who had come from Kenya in search of 
cheaper labour. 
Where Europeans failed, Asian planters occasionally succeeded. In 
1924 a successful merchant, Mr. Nanji Kalidas Mehta, having bought up 
several derelict estates in the eastern part of Buganda, planted large areas 
with sugar. A few years later a still larger enterprise of the same kind was 
created by Mr. Muljibhai Madvani out of the wreckage of the coffee planta-
tions in Busoga. Like the tea industry, which registered a more modest 
success a little later on, the sugar industry was distinguished from the older 
kinds of plantation enterprise by two special features. In the first place it did 
not depend wholly upon the vagaries of the export market; there was an 
internal demand which was capable of almost indefinite expansion along 
with the rising living standards of the people. Secondly, both tea and sugar 
are crops in the cultivation of which the advantages of scale are much more 
decisive than they are in the production of coffee, chiefly because the pro-
cessing cannot readily be separated, geographically or organisationally, from 
the cultivation. 
None of this altered the fact that the slump of 1920-22 had dealt planta-
tion agriculture a very heavy blow, and that the subsequent recovery was 
1. U . K . Report of the East Africa Commission, Cd. 2387. 
2. Uganda Herald, 16.vii.20. 
3. E.S.A. S.M.P. 3911. U.P. Leg. Co. 1st session, 23.iii.21. 
4. U .P . Ann. Rp t . D / A , 1921. 
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only partial. The following figures, though not wholly reliable, show the 
general trend. 
TABLE 61 
C U L T I V A T E D A R E A O N N O N - N A T I V E E S T A T E S 
(Acres '000) 
1920 1922 1925 1929 
Coffee 27.4 20.8 18.9 19.7 
Rubber 18.8 14.4 14.0 12.5 
Cocoa 4.3 0.9 1.0 — 
Tea 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Sugar 0.3 3.1 2.9 5.0 
Total2: 
European 35.2 24.2 24.4 26.8 
Asian 2.6 6.8 6.3 7.8 
37.8 31.0 30.7 34.6 
The impact of the slump on the prosperity of the cotton industry was 
equally severe, and the reaction of the producers was, at first, not dissimilar. 
The very low prices offered for the crop harvested at the beginning of 1921 
were reflected in greatly reduced output in the following season. But here the 
resemblance ended. The cotton-growers could not leave the country or 
divert their energies to other forms of production. Indeed, the people of 
Uganda were forced back on cotton-growing as the only remaining way in 
which they could earn the money for tax payments and for the satisfaction 
of their other wants, which had been greatly stimulated by the high incomes 
received in previous years. Partly for this reason and partly because of 
an intensification of official pressures, the pre-slump level of output was 
regained in 1923, and in the next two years was far surpassed. 
TABLE 7s 
E X P O R T S O F C O T T O N , 1 9 1 9 / 2 0 - 1 9 2 5 
Bales Thousand £ 
1919/20 36,530 1,210 
1920 (April-December) . . 47,695 3,779 
1921 81,336 1,281 
1922 48,290 878 
1923 88,046 2,027 
1924 128,604 3,487 
1925 196,038 4,686 
These contrasting sets of figures were evidence of a decisive turning-
point in the history of Uganda. The economy had always in fact been based 
on native production, but now it became apparent that it always would be, 
since the hopes that had been reposed in plantation agriculture were not 
going to be fulfilled. A proportion of the existing planters might make a 
tolerable living, but they were not going to achieve the kind of success that 
would attract large additional drafts of European population and capital 
to the country. Plantations would remain a valuable ingredient in Uganda's 
economy but they could not become its principal substance. If there were to 
be further agricultural development it would have to be undertaken on a 
system in which the overhead costs were much fower and the expectations 
much more modest. This was quickly recognised in official circles. In October 
1921 the Chief Secretary, who less than a year easier had declared it to be the 
policy of the Government "to encourage European settlement and the 
1. U.P. Ann. Rpts. D /A . 
2. The total acreage is less than the sum of the acreages of individual crops, because of the practice of 
interplanting. 
3. Thomas and Scott, op. cit. 
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investment of capital in every possible way"1 set forth his revised views as 
follows: "As regards crops in Uganda, I consider the best policy is for the 
natives to grow these and for the Europeans to purchase and market them. 
This is, I believe, the Director of Agriculture's view, and it has proved to be 
the correct one."2 
One immediate consequence of this abrupt change of front was a 
decision to add coffee to the list of "native" crops. This was not an entirely 
new departure. A robusta coffee tree or two had always formed part of 
the normal appurtenances of a Ganda homestead; and in 1907, before 
the arrival of European planters, and again in 1911, the Government had 
distributed seeds of the arabica species and instructional leaflets to the 
Ganda chiefs, not altogether without result.3 During the next few years 
many chiefs and others in Buganda, in deference to official exhortations and, 
later, in imitation of their European neighbours, did plant small areas of 
coffee (and rubber); and in 1912 a few were even reported to be the owners 
of "fair-sized plantations."4 In this year a beginning was made in another 
area. An enterprising district officer, Mr. P. W. Perryman, realising that 
cotton could not be grown on the slopes of Mount Elgon but that coffee 
could (this is in fact the one part of Uganda which is capable of yielding 
really high-quality coffee), caused one or two small plots to be planted by 
people of the newly tamed Gisu tribe.5 
But meanwhile European planters were arriving and were not slow to 
voice a protest.6 Like their counterparts in Kenya and Tanganyika at a 
later stage, they asserted that ill-tended native coffee plots would be breeding-
grounds of pests and diseases; that the export of ill-prepared native coffee 
would damage the reputation of the plantation product; and that the 
possession of a few trees would provide natives with a perfect cover for 
theft from their European neighbours. They did not demand the prohibition 
of native cultivation, but they sought to insist on its strict supervision and 
on such measures as registration fees and the submission of returns, which 
would have effectively debarred all but a few literate and well-to-do Africans 
from participating in the industry. The Director of Agriculture, arguing 
that it would be "absurd to refrain from the rational development of the 
Protectorate's resources because of a small influx of planters," successfully 
fended off these demands. A "Produce Protection Ordinance" enacted in 
1918 was allowed to remain a dead letter, and more drastic restrictions, 
approved in principle in 1920, were delayed in application until, with the 
collapse of the plantation industry, the demand for them had disappeared. 
Nevertheless, between 1914 and 1922 native coffee planting made very 
little, if any, progress. The efforts of the Government and of the growers 
were concentrated almost exclusively on cotton, which, besides being less 
politically controversial, yielded much quicker returns, required less skill 
and attention, and in this period was probably more lucrative. The trees 
which had been planted in Bugisu grew and flourished (except for some which 
the Gisu surreptitiously killed because they had seen them holding sinister 
dances in the moonlight)7 but the planted area remained negligible. A rough 
count taken in eight counties of Buganda in 1922 showed a total of 350,000 
trees in native gardens, or the equivalent of about 450 acres. 
Yet there was no real reason why coffee—arabica in Bugisu, robusta 
elsewhere—should not prosper under African management. The amount of 
skill and care necessary to its survival was really very small, and in the case 
of robusta practically nil. The argument that Africans could not or would 
not wait for a crop which took three years to mature had little force in 
Buganda. They were able to wait, because their subsistence was assured 
1. E.S.A. S .M.P. 4806/26. 
2. Ibid., S .M.P. 5790/6. 
3. Ibid., S .M.P. 2118 and 2384. 
4. Ibid., Ann . Rp t . P.C. Buganda, 1912/13. 
5. U.P. Ann. Rpt . D / A , 1912/13. 
6. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2118, 4624, 5255. 
7. Perryman, P. W. Native Witchcraft , Uganda Journal IV, 1936. 
4 0 
and their need for cash was not pressing; and as for their willingness, were 
they not accustomed, for the sake of bark-cloth, to plant trees with a much 
longer period of growth? The argument that cultivation had to be associated 
with processing plant that required a large cash outlay was equally un-
tenable, for coffee could, though not without some loss of quality, be 
prepared either by the growers with the aid of very simple appliances or in 
central factories run on the same lines as cotton ginneries. There could be 
no doubt that capital and European management made for higher yields 
and better quality. But the question was whether the value added by these 
factors exceeded their cost; and in 1922 the answer appeared to be that it 
fairly clearly did not. Thus if coffee production were to expand at all it 
would have to do so without their aid. 
By this time the opposition of the planters had begun to weaken. To 
some of them, indeed, who realised that it might be better to follow the 
precedent set by the cotton industry and to concentrate on the processing 
and marketing side, the expansion of native coffee-growing appeared no 
longer as a menace but rather as an opportunity. If they could buy, treat 
and sell it, the larger the native crop the better. This thesis was first set out 
by one of their number in a letter to the Press in 1922.1 At the time this 
attitude was still exceptional, but when the Planters' Association discussed 
the matter with the Government early in 1925 they could no longer present 
a solid front of opposition.2 Uganda was caught up in the backwash of the 
storm that raged fiercely in 1925-27 over native coffee-growing in Kenya 
and Tanganyika, but the issue was no longer really a live one here. 
The Government began to take the matter seriously in hand in 1923.'' 
Central nurseries were set out in all suitable districts, and seedlings of an 
improved type of robusta, having been given a proper start in life, were 
issued free to all comers. A specialist Coffee Officer joined the staff of the 
Department, and numbers of African instructors were recruited and trained. 
The apparatus of administrative "encouragement" was also set in motion. 
The Kabaka of Buganda was instructed to inform the chiefs and people 
of the county of Buddu, who had complained that cotton did not flourish 
for them, that they must grow coffee instead. The early progress of the 
industry in that particular area undoubtedly owed much to the energetic 
persuasions of the district officer, Mr. J. R. B. Postlethwaite, ably abetted, 
according to local tradition, by Chief Joseph Kisenyi, who promised coffee-
growers exemption from the necessity of volunteering for work on the 
construction of the Jinja-Kampala railway. Again, however, besides those 
who planted coffee more or less under duress, there were individuals who, 
on their own showing, took to it of their own accord and planted much 
bigger areas than the minimum that was required of them. There were 
indeed ample economic reasons for their acting thus. Robusta coffee has 
been described, not unfairly, as the "perfect crop for the lazy farmer";4 
and in the middle and later 1920s market conditions were exceptionally 
favourable. Not only was the price fairly high, but the ratio between it 
and the price of cotton was much better than hitherto. In the period 1921-23 
the export price of cotton, weight for weight, was nearly two-and-a-half 
times that of coffee, but in the years 1926-29 this differential practically 
disappeared, and in one of these years a ton of clean coffee actually fetched 
a higher price than a ton of lint cotton. Since it takes more than three tons 
of seed-cotton to make a ton of lint but only about tyo tons of dried "cherry" 
to make a ton of clean coffee, and since a ton of cherry coffee is produced 
with far less labour than a ton of seed-cotton, Jhe relative attraction of 
coffee-growing is obvious enough. 
The extension of African coffee-growing was nevertheless steady rather 
than spectacular. The crop became of some importance only in three limited 
1. Uganda Herald, 27.X.22. 
2. Ibid., 22.1.26. 
3. U . P . A n n . R p t . D / A , 1923. E.S.A. S . M . P . 7599. 
4 . Huxley, E. The Sorcerer's Apprentice, L o n d o n , 1949, p. 284. 
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areas. One, by far the largest, was the Masaka District of Buganda, of 
which the aforementioned county of Buddu formed much the biggest part. 
The second was Bugisu, where the experiments initiated in 1912 were prose-
cuted with greater vigour from 1922 onwards.1 Between then and 1934 
the planted area increased from a hundred to 4,000 acres and the output 
from thirty to 850 tons. The Gisu, who in the early 1920s went out in large 
numbers to work for wages in Buganda and in the Kenya Highlands, 
were thus enabled to make a good living in their native hills. The third and 
very minor coffee-growing area was the remote county of Bwamba, situated 
on the edge of the Congo forests in the west of the Toro District, where 
the climatic conditions were ideal, and whence no crop with a lower unit 
value could possibly have been exported.2 The gradual shift of the coffee 
industry from its original plantation basis to one of peasant production 
is indicated in the following table. 
TABLE 83 
ACRES PLANTED TO COFFEE 
1922 1925 1928 1931 1934 
Non-Native ,. 20,820 18,884 18,408 17,559 13,391 
Native : 
Buganda c.600 959 4,673 16,970 21,050 
Bugisu 400 475 1,134 2,114 4,023 
Western Province — 353 2,924 1,816 5,276 
Total 1,000 1,787 8,731 20,900 30,349 
Increase in output naturally lagged behind the increase in acreage. But 
African producers gradually filled in, and eventually did far more than fill 
in, the gap left by the reduced scale of operations in the plantation sector. 
Exports reached a peak of 2,565 tons, nearly all plantation produce, in 1922, 
declined to 1,495 tons in 1925 and did not show a definite increase until 
after 1930. But by 1934 they had risen to 7,715 tons, well over half of which 
was native-grown. 
After 1920, since the planters had ceased to be a major economic and 
political force, the controversies which had been agitating Government and 
people lost most of their urgency. In 1921-22, for the first time in many 
years, there were more people seeking employment than could find it. 
Thus, not only was there no further question of directing Africans into 
private European employment, but the Government could afford to bow 
to the mounting pressure of British public opinion and abolish the system 
of compulsory labour on public works and services, except for local tasks 
of such a nature as could be brought under the heading of customary 
communal labour. Since there was "practically no (European) demand for 
agricultural land,"4 the problem posed by the conflict between the rights 
and interests of the native population and the needs of capitalistic agriculture 
receded into the background. The problem did not cease to be discussed, 
but the debate, though prolonged for many years, became increasingly 
academic. No formal solution was ever found, for it proved impossible to 
achieve, by any legal formula, the double object of assuring the native 
population ample land for the future and of leaving the way open for the 
alienation of small areas as the occasion arose. In theory the Government 
retained the power to dispose of all land outside Buganda to non-native 
purchasers, and occasionally, as in Toro in 1926-28, it exercised that right 
in practice, where there was unquestionably land to spare without trespassing 
on native rights of occupation. But the onus of proof was now laid heavily 
1. U.P . Ann . Rpts . D /A . E.S.A. S .M.P. 6610. Ann. Rpts . P.C. E.P. 
2. Winter, E. H. Bwamba Economy, East African Studies, No. 5. The Development and Organisation of 
the Bwamba Robusta Coffee Industry. E.A.A.J. I l l , 1937. 
3. U.P. Ann . Rpts . D /A . 
4. U . K . Annual Repor t on Uganda , 1922. 
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upon those who wished land to be alienated. For, as the Secretary of State 
was informed in 1922, "the prosperity of Uganda now depends wholly on 
peasant production, for the continuance and expansion of which undis-
turbed occupation of the land by the peasants is essential."1 Thus, when in 
the following year the Colonial Olfice reaffirmed its earlier ban on the 
outright transfer either of Crown land or of native-owned land in Buganda 
to non-natives, it did so with the full concurrence of the Protectorate authori-
ties, which had been emphatically lacking in 1916. 
One of the reasons which led to this change of front was a hardening 
of opinion among the Ganda themselves. By this time the question of the 
alienation of estates had ceased to be merely a matter of the conflicting 
personal interest of chiefs, and was beginning to be influenced by a nascent 
patriotism which looked on the chiefly estates as being in a sense the national 
endowment of the Ganda people. In November, 1921, the Lukiiko had 
passed unanimously a resolution which condemned the transfer of freehold 
title to persons other than natives of Uganda. The resolution stands, and 
the maintenance of African proprietary rights in the soil, together with the 
maintenance of the position of the Kabaka, has ever since been the principal 
article of Ganda political faith. The position thus taken up by the Ganda 
authorities has been consistently endorsed by the Protectorate Government. 
For the latter soon began to make a virtue of its economic necessities. 
Peasant production, favoured in the first instance because it no longer had 
any serious competitor, was favoured also because it accorded well with the 
philosophy held during the 1920s by almost all those who were professionally 
or intellectually concerned with African affairs, namely, that capitalism and 
wage-labour were disruptive of the native social order, and that the 
maintenance of this social order was at least as important as material 
progress. The policies which were originally adopted as a matter of practical 
expediency hardened gradually into a political doctrine, which was upheld 
even when the expediency was no longer unquestioned. In 1946, indeed, 
the Governor pronounced it to be axiomatic that larger and quicker results 
could be achieved by placing agriculture under direct European management, 
but at the same time made it clear that this method of development could 
not and would not be adopted.2 It had become a basic principle of the 
unwritten constitution, not merely that, in the terms of the formal declara-
tion which the Government thought it necessary to issue in 1950, Uganda 
was "not to be developed as a country of non-native farming and settlement,"3 
but that no appreciable addition could be made to the 300-odd square miles 
of land which had passed into non-African hands at an earlier stage. 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P. 27/117. 
2. U.P. A Development Plan for C/gaw/n,[Entebbe, 1947, p. iii, 
3. Uganda Gazette, 11 .vii.50. 
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C H A P T E R I V 
THE RURAL ECONOMY BETWEEN THE WARS 
It has been shown that the early 1920s saw the eclipse of alien agricul-
tural enterprise in Uganda, and the consolidation of the system of native 
production, that is, of a system in which the production of crops, for 
export as well as for subsistence, was carried out within the existing frame-
work of African society, leaving only marketing and processing (though 
this is a very important qualification) to be conducted by external agencies. 
In other ways too this period was a decisive turning-point in the fortunes of 
the people. They had already gained much from their connexion with 
European civilisation and the international market; a larger quantity and 
wider range of goods and services, far greater liberty of movement and 
action, better security of life and property, as well as access to new worlds 
of spiritual and intellectual experience. But for all that, the last decade of 
the nineteenth and the first two decades of the twentieth centuries had been 
for most of them a time of stress and tribulation. The establishment of the 
new regime had been attended in Buganda and Bunyoro by warfare of 
unprecedented ferocity and destructiveness, bringing pestilence and famine in 
their train. The opening up of the country had exposed it to the ravages of 
epidemic diseases, some wholly new, others already familiar but greatly 
intensified in their incidence. Plague, cholera, small-pox and typhoid had 
succeeded one another, and worst of all was the terrible visitation 
of sleeping-sickness, which is reckoned to have carried off 300,000 
people between 1900 and 1908. Meanwhile the twin demons syphilis and 
gonorrhoea made ever-increasing inroads on the vitality of the race. Just as 
conditions were beginning to improve, there came the East African campaign 
of 1914-18, in which few men died from bullets but many thousands from 
disease. The war was followed by a new crop of epidemics, including the 
world-wide lethal influenza, and also, in the Eastern and Northern Provinces, 
by a severe famine. Contemporaries were agreed that the population of 
Buganda had suffered a serious, some said a catastrophic decline since the 
mid-nineteenth century; and vital statistics, unreliable though they were, 
suggested that the decline had not yet been stayed. Not least among the 
factors adverse to economic progress in Buganda during this period was 
the fall in the numbers of the people and the probable decay of vital energy 
among the survivors. In most of the remainder of the Protectorate the 
demographic situation was less alarming, but among the conquered and 
demoralised Nyoro it was almost certainly worse. 
So far, moreover, the common people of Uganda had borne the main 
burden of development as well as reaping some of its fruits. They had been 
subjected to compulsory or near-compulsory labour in a variety of arduous 
and unfamiliar forms. For, apart from the great initial investment in railway 
construction, little capital had been injected into the Uganda economy, and 
progress had been achieved mainly by the utilisation of the crude manpower 
that was the country's principal existing asset. Such capital as had been 
invested had been applied largely to payment of this labour during the period 
of production rather than to increasing the efficiency of the productive 
process. Roads and buildings were the products of virtually unassisted human 
toil. So were the crops produced for export, whether on plantations or on 
African holdings, and their transport to the Lake ports had likewise depended 
mainly on the legs and neck muscles of human carriers. 
From 1920 onwards the general conditions of life rapidly improved. 
After this there were no more actual famines in Uganda, and no 
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more war or other serious disturbance until 1939. Medical science obtained a 
decisive mastery over the epidemic diseases and began to tackle the 
endemic scourges with slower but gradually increasing success. In 1924 
recorded births at last exceeded recorded deaths in Buganda. Improved 
roads and the general use of the motor lorry soon did away with the head 
porterage that had been hitherto the most burdensome feature of economic 
life. Thus the worst impediments to growth were being removed, and the way 
was made clear for a forward surge of production, such as did actually take 
place between 1922 and 1925. 
But there is another side to this. The victory of peasant production 
was not necessarily a victory for the peasant, nor did the great 
increase in cotton production necessarily imply a corresponding increase 
in the real welfare of the producers. On the contrary, it may have been, and 
probably was in part, a symptom of constricted opportunity and diminished 
economic freedom. 
During the first two decades of the century there had been a large, 
various, and steadily increasing demand for labour, and it was impossible 
that this should not have been in some degree to the advantage of the 
labourers. Government officials wanted them to grow cotton, to make roads 
and to carry stores; chiefs wanted them to grow cotton and also to perform 
the menial services that had been customary in the traditionally authoritarian 
societies; merchants wanted them to carry cotton to the ports; planters 
wanted them to dig the soil, to pick coffee and tap rubber. All these employers 
made their wishes known in somewhat pressing terms, so that the common 
people were obliged to put forth a greater total effort than they might have 
offered of their own accord. But at the same time a wide choice of activities 
was open to them, and they could not be prevented from sharing largely 
in the proceeds of development, or even from taking an increasing proportion 
of their new wealth in the form of leisure. 
This paradox was well illustrated by the contrast between the fortunes 
of the cotton industry in Buganda and in the Eastern Province. Even before 
the war it had been evident that the rate of growth was lagging badly in 
Buganda. In 1912, indeed, a French firm, owners of a ginnery in Kampala, 
had complained that output in their catchment area was actually declining, 
and had suggested that the position might be remedied by the Government's 
"using perhaps a little pression."1 Investigation had not revealed any con-
clusive evidence of a decline, but neither had it been possible to point to 
any marked expansion, such as had obviously been taking place throughout 
the Eastern Province. That the newer area should have shown a higher rate 
of increase was natural enough, but the figures (for what they were worth) 
indicated that Buganda was being actually outstripped. In 1910, twenty-eight 
acres of cotton had been planted in Buganda for every thousand of the popu-
lation, and only fourteen in the Eastern Province—thirty-nine in Busoga, 
seventeen in Teso and three in Bukedi and Lango. By 1914 plantings had 
increased to thirty-eight acres per thousand in Buganda, but to eighty-one in 
the Eastern Province, with no less than 131 acres in the Teso District. During 
and immediately after the war Buganda seems to have made up a little of 
the lost ground, but the Eastern Province's lead was still a long one. In the 
1919-20 season it produced 31,735 bales of cotton against a mere 13,550 from 
Buganda. (The output of the northern and western districts of the Protec-
torate, mainly because of the difficulties of transport, was still negligible.) 
Around this time, indeed, the economic pferformance of the Ganda 
was a great disappointment to the authorities. The large hopes which had 
been placed in this highly intelligent and docile people, and in its progressive 
and co-operative governing class, seemed to be failing of fulfilment. The 
Governor told a London audience in 1920 that the Ganda for all "their 
dominant intelligence and capacity," appeared to be content to live quietly 
amongst their banana trees without making much effort to contribute to the 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2622/1. ' 
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progress of the country. The Eastern Province, he thought, was "altogether 
more virile and industrious and alive."1 His interpretation of the reasons 
for this contrast were implicit in the epithets which he applied to Buganda: 
"forested and plutocratic." The first of these epithets contains the belief, 
which was neither new nor without validity, that this lush, green country, 
with its equable climate and unfailing food supply, was not one in which 
the more active virtues would naturally flourish. That they had so conspicu-
ously flourished at an earlier stage was due to countervailing forces of a 
political character, and these forces had lost much of their former power. 
It was here that the plutocratic character of Ganda society became relevant. 
The belief that the existence of a wealthy upper-class was an adverse 
factor was a new judgment, and one which would have surprised an 
earlier generation of policy-makers. For it had been widely assumed that 
the conversion of the Ganda chiefs into landed proprietors, besides being a 
political necessity, would be conducive to economic progress, that the chiefs, 
being granted security of tenure, would set to work to develop their estates. 
But in practice most of them had adopted easier methods of enrichment, 
converting their title deeds directly into cash or levying money tribute from 
the peasants in lieu of the customary labour services. The dynamic young 
revolutionaries of 1890, the chiefly entrepreneurs who had helped to launch 
the cotton industry in 1904, had gradually become a satisfied, conservative 
class. By 1916 the Director of Agriculture was already attributing the 
relatively poor output of cotton in Buganda to the "remarkable apathy" 
of the chiefs, and this in turn to the tenurial system peculiar to that Province.2 
Yet it may be doubted whether this interpretation was altogether 
correct. The Ganda chiefs were by no means the only plutocrats in Uganda: 
one of the county chiefs of Busoga was estimated in 1924 to enjoy an annual 
income of £4,000 per annum, derived from various forms of tax and tribute.3 
And the legal status of the Ganda landowner-chiefs in no way prevented 
them from using customary labour services, like their colleagues in the 
Eastern Province, for the production of cotton. Even if they did not do this, 
they still had a direct interest in the expansion of cultivation, for it had 
become the practice to levy tithes on the cotton produced by the peasants.4 
The real reason for the slackening of the economic impetus in Buganda lay, 
it may be suggested, not in the growing "apathy" of the chiefs, but in the 
diminution of their power. We come back again to this point, that the 
Ganda, living as they did at the centre of European government and of 
European missionary, commercial and agricultural enterprise, had too 
many income-earning opportunities open to them to be amenable to the 
kind of economic discipline under which the remoter peoples laboured. The 
demands made upon them tended to cancel one another out. Thus the 
planters constantly complained that masses of Ganda escaped the obligations 
of wage-labour by claiming to be in the service of the chiefs, while, conversely, 
Government officials alleged that there were "hundreds of lazy natives 
sheltering under the wing of the planters"5 and thereby escaping the obliga-
tions of cotton-growing and customary labour. The Ganda, in short, grew 
less cotton than other tribes because they were freer and fundamentally 
better off. 
Now it is apparent that the partial eclipse of the planters led to a sensible 
weakening of the economic position of the common people of Uganda, to 
a strengthening of the influence of the officials and the chiefs. If the output 
of cotton rose rapidly between 1922 and 1925, it was partly no doubt because 
standards were rising, wants increasing, but it was also because the range 
of alternative opportunities had narrowed and because the pressures that were 
exerted from above were now concentrated on this sector. In 1923-24 an 
1. Coryndon, R . Uganda, United Empire, n.s . XI , 1920. 
2. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2622/21, 2198/83. 
3. Ibid,, S .M.P. 6025, report of committee on dues and tributes. 
4. See below, p. 49. 
5. E.S.A. Ann. Rpt. , P.C. Buganda, 1912/13. 
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intensive propaganda for the extension of cotton planting was directed 
against the peasants, especially in Buganda, where the young Kabaka took 
the lead in impressing the wishes of Government upon his people. 
Before long, however, the balance of economic and political forces 
operating on agriculture was altered by a new turn of the wheel. The furore 
which had been aroused in Britain by evidence of "forced labour" in Kenya 
had rendered the Colonial Office and the Colonial Service exceedingly 
wary of the use of compulsion in any form; and the authorities soon became 
aware that encouragement and propaganda could be and often were construed 
by African chiefs in ways that would not stand Parliamentary examination. 
As a later Governor drily explained, "in October, 1924, just before the 
arrival of the Ormsby-Gore Commission, it became necessary to issue to 
all Provincial Commissioners a circular deprecating the excessive zeal shown 
by chiefs in fining and imprisoning natives for failing to show sufficient 
activity in planting."1 Even in the following year punishments for this 
offence were still being recorded in native court returns. As a matter of fact, 
the Commission, while setting its face against improper forms of pressure, 
endorsed the official view that Africans could not be allowed to remain idle. 
The people continued to be left in no doubt that authority required them 
to grow cotton; and to this day there persists among the Ganda a residual 
feeling that production in general and cotton production in particular are 
obligations which they owe to Government—some even believe them to 
be obligations which are written into that sacred compact, the Agreement 
of 1900. But from the middle 1920s onwards the cruder sanctions fell into 
disuse, and the activities of the peasants began to reflect, much more straight-
forwardly than hitherto, their own economic needs and desires. 
In relaxing its economic pressure at this time the Government was 
moved in part by the belief that coercive measures, besides being undesirable 
had ceased to be necessary. In the first place, the expansion of exports, and 
of cotton exports in particular, was no longer a matter of such pressing 
urgency as it had been hitherto. The Protectorate was comfortably solvent 
and free from Treasury control; and at the same time shortage of raw 
material had ceased to be Lancashire's principal anxiety—indeed, it was 
taking a steadily diminishing proportion of Uganda's crop. In the second 
place, it was believed that the people of Uganda could now be trusted to 
grow large quantities of cotton without being subjected to the kind of 
pressure that had hitherto been applied to them. 
Up to a point, this confidence was not misplaced. The output of cotton 
was on the whole maintained at its former level during the later 1920s, even 
though the trend of prices was not such as to inspire renewed enthusiasm 
among the growers. But on the other hand the rapid expansion of the previous 
years was not sustained. 
It will be observed that, while the size of the crop in any one year was, 
of course, at the mercy of the weather, the extent of cultivation fluctuated 
TABLE 9a 
COTTON PRODUCTION IN THE 1920s 
Season Area Planted (acres '000) Exports Average Price 
Buganda E. Prov. N. Prov. W. Prov. Total Bales i'000 (Shs. per 100 
lb., f.o.b. 
Mombasa) 
1919/20 47 90 23 2 162 •47,695 3,779 399 
1924/25 192 301 81 10 584 196,038 4,686 119 
1925/26 190 322 76 19 607 180,860 3,052 84 
1926/27 173 323 79 16 591 •131,728 1,691 64 
1927/28 200 250 71 12 533 138,486 2,475 89 
1928/29 200 376 103 20 699 204,057 3,313 81 
1929/30 199 363 81 20 663 129,122 1,555 60 
1. U.P. Leg. Co. , 8th session, 5.ix.29. 
2. U.P. Ann. Rpts . D /A . 
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in sympathy with changes in the price level, an indication that production 
was now governed largely by strictly economic considerations. (Oddly 
enough, the correspondence was least marked in Buganda, where the 
growers were undoubtedly more sophisticated and economically responsive 
than elsewhere. The acreage figures, however, were not nearly accurate 
enough for any refinement of inference to be possible.) The producers' 
response cannot properly be called a rational one, since they had not learned 
that this year's price was no guide at all to next year's. But at least it was 
technically correct and not "perverse": they appear to have proportioned 
their effort according to the expected reward. Caution is however needed in 
the interpretation of these figures, for there were other factors at work as 
well. The marked increase in the cotton acreage of the Eastern and Northern 
Provinces in the 1928-29 season was attributed at the time, not to enthusiasm 
engendered by the relatively high prices received for the previous crop, but 
to the fact that the people were under an obligation to earn additional income 
in order to repay the Government for famine relief earlier in the year.1 
A very important corollary to the abandonment of coercive or quasi-
coercive measures for the promotion of agricultural production was a 
drastic revision of the economic functions of the chiefs, who had been the 
principal instruments of coercion. The middle 1920s, indeed, witnessed 
changes in the organisation of native agriculture that were in some ways 
of greater significance than the earlier shift of emphasis from plantation to 
peasant agriculture. 
At the very beginning, as we have seen, cotton production was organised 
communally and carried out under the control of the chief like any other 
collective task such as the building of his enclosure or the repair of a road. 
How the proceeds were shared, or even whether they were shared at all, is 
not very clear, but it can be taken for granted that the major part went to 
the chief, as the major part of all forms of wealth, in such societies as 
Buganda and Busoga, had always gone. That the chief, in Buganda, was 
now also the landowner had nothing to do with the form of agricultural 
organisation. The chief could command his people's services, not because 
he had title deeds but because he had authority. The distribution of land 
titles merely determined which individuals would wield authority in each 
locality. The organisation was the same in Busoga, where the chiefs had 
not become proprietors. It was the same, too, in Bukedi, Teso and Lango, 
where customary labour services had amounted at most to a rudimentary 
form of boon-work and where the individuals now in power owed their 
authority mainly to British nomination and support. 
This communal system, unavoidable in the first stages of the introduction 
of an unfamiliar crop, began to seem unduly cumbersome as soon as the 
industry had become established. It was irksome to the peasants to work in 
central fields rather than on their own homestead plots. It was also irksome 
for the chiefs to have to direct their labours. After a very few seasons, 
therefore, the communal system began to be replaced by a pattern which may 
be called seigneurial. The peasants continued to grow some cotton under 
the chief's orders and for his benefit, but they also began to grow it on their 
own holdings and to sell it on their own account. Now a seigneurial pattern 
of this type is inherently unstable. Where a money economy exists, but 
capital, enterprise and managerial skill are scarce, it is to be expected that 
the demesne farm will lose ground to the peasant holding, that week-working 
serfs will steadily be transformed into dues-paying tenants. This process un-
doubtedly took place in Uganda, but at a markedly different pace in different 
parts of the country. The transformation appears to have been swiftest 
and most far-reaching in Buganda, where economic and social life were 
soonest and most thoroughly permeated by the use of money. The terms of 
the law drafted for enactment by the Lukiiko in 1916, when it was intended 
1. U.P. Leg. Co., 8th session, II.x.28. 
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to make cotton-growing a legal obligation, can probably be taken as reflec-
ting the standard practice of that time. Every county chief, it was to be decreed, 
shall cultivate at least acres of cotton, every sub-county chief one acre, 
every parish chief three-quarters, every village headman half and every 
peasant a quarter of an acre.1 It seems therefore that there were at this time 
both independent peasant cotton plots and larger chiefs' cotton fields 
cultivated by tribute-labour. But it does not sound as though the demesne 
fields were at all extensive or the labour obligations at all onerous. The 
proceeds of demesne agriculture, however, did not exhaust the profits 
drawn by the chiefs from cotton production, nor did labour on the demesne 
fields exhaust the obligations of the peasants. Ganda custom provided not 
only for the rendering of labour services, which since 1902 had been partially 
commuted by the payment of a money tribute called busulu, but also for 
the rendering of gifts of produce such as barkcloth, beer and eggs. On the 
analogy of this custom, it had become the practice for the landowner-chief 
to exact a share (a tenth part seems to have been the norm) of the cotton 
produced by the peasants on their own account. By the 1920s we hear very 
little of tribute-labour or demesne agriculture in Buganda but a great deal 
of the cotton tithe, or nvujjo.2 It is clear that production was passing steadily 
into the hands of peasant cultivators, each with his little cotton patch 
contiguous with his wife's food garden, and that the landowner-chiefs 
were steadily being transformed into a rentier class, living off tribute and 
tithe and playing no longer even a supervisory role in the process of 
production. 
In the Eastern Province, on the other hand, where money was less 
widely diffused and where the peasants were less prone to undertake produc-
tion of their own accord, there was no equivalent to the Ganda system of 
tithe payments. Here a large part, perhaps a major part, of the total crop 
long continued to be grown by unpaid labour for the profit of the chiefs.3 
Throughout the Province, even though they had no real customary basis 
outside Busoga, the chiefs' claims to labour services had been supported by 
the administration, though a month, or in some areas fifty-two days, a year 
was generally recognised to be the legitimate maximum. This practice, 
originally intended to be merely for the maintenance of the chiefs' dignity 
and authority, gave them the opportunity to embark on large-scale cotton 
production, an opportunity which they were the more likely to take in that 
they enjoyed neither salaries nor marketable rights in land. Some of the 
Teso chiefs were reckoned to have made up to £700 out of cotton in 1924, 
a figure which implies the existence of fields of 300 or 400 acres. In this 
district, and to a lesser extent in Bukedi there was a special factor 
at work. The introduction of the ox-drawn plough had produced a distinct 
advantage of scale, such as did not exist elsewhere, and a concentration of 
production in the hands of the few who could afford the outlay on this 
relatively expensive item of equipment. Ploughing did not greatly reduce 
the labour requirement for each acre of cultivation, since the weeding and 
picking had still to be carried out by hand, but it did make for larger units 
of production. 
So there emerged the paradox, that it was not the landed proprietors of 
Buganda but the chiefs of the Eastern Province who were most actively 
engaging in production and in the development of their "estates," even though 
they held no legal title to the land. Observation of this paradox led to a 
drastic change in land policy, and in particular to # reappraisal of the virtues 
of individual proprietorship, at any rate of the kind which had taken shape 
in Buganda. When Mr. Spire, in 1913, attacked tfie Land Settlement Com-
mittee's proposals for Busoga, he did so on two grounds. He rejected, as 
we have seen, the thesis that the largest possible amount of land should be 
1. E.S.A. S .M.P . 2622/22. 
2. Ibid., U .P . Leg. Co . , 6(h session, 22.X.25, 15.xii.26. 
3. E.S.A. S .M.P . 6025. 
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earmarked for European enterprise, but he also criticised the proposal 
that such land as was to be reserved for native use should take the form 
of estates granted on the Buganda model to individual chiefs. The ideas 
behind his protest, which soon became the orthodoxy of the provincial 
administrators, were essentially conservative ideas, inspired less by egalitarian 
concern for the interests of the peasantry than by the desire to preserve the 
existing social and economic order. Since it was assumed, and at the time 
probably correctly assumed, that if the chiefs did not take the lead in growing 
cotton, very little cotton would be grown, and since the Soga and other 
Eastern Province chiefs appeared to be taking the lead more effectively than 
the landlords of Buganda, there seemed to be no justification for extension 
of the Ganda system to other areas of the Protectorate. And in other ways 
too the granting of individual estates was thought to be undesirably subver-
sive. From the administrators' point of view the private ownership of 
land as a saleable asset made the chiefs too independent of Government 
and weakened the bonds of feudal authority. As time went on, as estates 
changed hands through inheritance and sale, landownership in Buganda was 
tending to be divorced from political office and hereditary rank; already by 
1915 there were fears of the emergence of "a discontented class of disinherited 
sons of chiefs."1 It seemed much better to continue the existing system whereby 
the chiefs drew, in the form of dues and services, an income which was 
sufficient to maintain their dignity and position but which was strictly 
contingent on their tenure of office. Nor did the administrators look with 
favour on a system of peasant proprietorship, for this too would be conducive 
to indiscipline. Their emancipation, it was recognised, would some day 
become inevitable, but for the present, Spire wrote in 1913, "the natives are 
quite unfitted for individualism. The feudal and communal system must be 
supported in every way."2 
As we have seen, no action was taken on any of the several reports 
compiled by the Land Settlement Committee between 1913 and 1920. The 
chiefs of the Soga and the other aristocratic tribes were not granted titles 
to land, but neither was the granting of such titles definitely excluded for 
the future. But in the meantime further changes were taking place in 
official thinking. By 1918 certain administrators were beginning to question 
the desirability of tribute-labour and chiefly cotton fields.3 The grounds of 
their disquiet were not yet either ethical or economic but political. Direct 
involvement in economic processes was not consonant with the dignity of a 
governing class; it distracted the chiefs from their proper administrative 
tasks; it corrupted their characters (one young Soga chief was denounced 
for being "immersed in trade and bad habits").4 Another point on which 
stress was laid was that chiefs who were allowed to profit from their people's 
labour could not be expected to be zealous in encouraging them to seek 
outside employment. Official thinking was beginning to move towards the 
concept of a salaried native administration, functionally divorced from 
landownership and from production. Opinion, however, was by no means 
unanimous on this point; some officials continued to urge that it was essential 
to the maintenance of social discipline, as well as to the production of a 
satisfactory volume of cotton, that the chiefs should continue to have control 
over the labour of the common people. 
During the early 1920s, however, a more revolutionary change of policy 
took place, which derived from a thorough-going transference of the Govern-
ment's interest and esteem from the landowners to the peasants, from the 
ruling aristocracies to the masses of the people. For this change there was 
a wide variety of reasons, some moral or sentimental, others economic, 
others again political, some stemming from a reappraisal of local problems, 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P/2198/83. 
2. E.S.A. S.M.P. P.C. E.P., 1912/13. 
3. Ibid., S.M.P.s 1371/77, 6025/5. 
4. Ibid., Ann. Rpt . P.C. E.P., 1917/18. 
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others from an alteration in the climate of opinion in Britain and in the 
orientations of colonial policy. 
One reason was the negative one that the political support of the 
leaders of African society had become much more dispensable now that 
British rule was based on unchallengeable foundations; their co-operation 
could be bought at a lower price; their resentment was less feared. The 
existing chiefs, indeed, were very much out of favour with the Protectorate 
authorities. Forceful personalities, whose aid had been invaluable in the 
turbulent period when administration was being established, had now become 
a nuisance and a stumbling-block. Their arbitrary methods were not appro-
priate to the more orderly form of government that was now possible; their 
quest for personal power and wealth was out of harmony with current 
social policies. And in the economic sphere it was beginning to be suspected 
that, so far from being the indispensable agents of progress, their role was a 
parasitical one. It was the peasant cultivator, after all, who did the work, and 
it was no longer believed that he would do it only under duress. Might he 
not even produce more if he were assured of a larger share of the fruits of 
his toil? The merchants, who were perhaps the best judges, now thought 
that he would. They also believed (though their reasons are not entirely 
clear) that a more equitable distribution of incomes would lead to larger 
sales of British goods.1 Certainly the peasants of Uganda had no heartier 
champions in this period than the spokesmen of the European commercial 
community, who lost no opportunity of drawing attention to the exactions 
of landowners and chiefs and of pressing for a reform of the economic 
system.2 
Quite apart from political and economic considerations there were 
obvious moral questions to be posed. If it were unethical to constrain 
Africans to work for European employers, could it be right that they should 
be constrained to labour for the profit of their own chiefs? If gross inequali-
ties of fortune were deplorable in Europe, could they be desirable in Africa ? 
In principle, the answers were clearly "No," and justification of the existing 
system on the ground of its conformity with native custom was increasingly 
held to be unwarrantable. For the current exactions of money and labour 
were in part not based on custom at all, and, in so far as they were so based, 
practices which had been reasonable and acceptable in the old economy 
had become onerous and oppressive in the new. 
The policy which gradually emerged during the early 1920s was, in 
outline, as follows. Outside Buganda, the chiefs would not be granted 
freehold titles, nor would they be allowed to retain indefinitely a feudal 
dominion over their people. Instead, those of them whose political services 
were still required would be converted into salaried officials. The peasants 
were to be given effective security of tenure immediately and formal rights 
of ownership when they were ready to receive them. Within Buganda, the 
transfer of land into peasant ownership was to receive every encouragement, 
and in the meantime the tenants were to be given all possible protection 
against exploitation. These policies, however, were not adopted without 
much controversy, some resistance from the more conservative of the pro-
vincial administrators and a number of temporary deviations. Nor were they 
fully implemented in every respect. Outside Buganda some elements of the 
feudal structure managed to survive the impact of the reforming impulse. 
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 now came in for severe criticism, not 
for the old reason that it had left too much lancf in the hands of the natives 
in general, but for the new reason that it had given too much land to the 
chiefs, had "conferred immense and largely unintended benefits"3 upon a 
small section of the community to the detriment of the laborious peasant 
1. One of them argued that the peasants, if given the chance, would buy Manchester fabrics, Birmingham 
hardware, Coventry cycles, whereas the wealthy chiefs spent their money on American cars. (E.S.A. 
S.M.P. 6025A/82.) 
2. Uganda Herald, 17.vi.21. U.P . Leg. Co. , 2nd session, 9.vi.21; 6th session, 22.x.25. 
3. E.S.A. S.M.P. 5063/101. 
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masses. Poor Sir Harry Johnston became the target for universal obloquy 
or at best was patronisingly forgiven for a blunder committed in ignorance 
of the true nature of indigenous land tenure.1 The possibility that a system 
which had been evolved within the framework of a subsistence economy 
might not be well suited to the situation created by the railway and the 
export trade, was either disregarded or met with a plea for evolutionary and 
gradual change, as much as possible unlike the "crude innovation" that 
Johnston had made in Buganda. It was, however, quite true that individual 
proprietorship of the kind that had been introduced here was not proving 
itself particularly appropriate to current forms of production. Very few of 
the Ganda landowners had the means or the ability to manage their estates, 
which ranged from a quarter to eight square miles, as agricultural units. 
The actual unit of cultivation, in the great majority of cases, was the simple 
peasant holding of four to six acres, so it was natural to assume that the 
superimposed landlords were at best otiose and at worst an intolerable 
incubus. "The ultimate desideratum," according to the Acting Governor in 
1922, was "the division of the land among a large number of peasant pro-
prietors."2 And again in 1924 the Governor, Sir Geoffrey Archer, told the 
Secretary of State that the policy of his Government was to "do everything 
possible to encourage the appearance and multiplication of the peasant 
proprietor."3 
As a matter of fact, the peasant proprietor was beginning to emerge 
of his own accord in Buganda.4 The mere operation of inheritance, in a 
society which did not clearly recognise the rights of primogeniture, was 
tending to the disintegration of the original great estates, and this tendency 
was being reinforced to an increasing extent by purchase. The supreme 
object of every ambitious peasant was to acquire rights of ownership in 
land—not because the "landless" man was in any danger of destitution (for 
with thousands of fertile square miles still covered by elephant-grass and 
bush the use of land could be obtained easily enough) but partly for the sake of 
greater independence5 and partly to secure entry into the higher ranks of 
society, to which title deeds were up to a point an automatic passport. As 
a result, considerable numbers of smaller property units, ten to a hundred 
acres in extent, more consonant with the actual scale of agricultural opera-
tions, were beginning to appear side by side with the surviving great estates. 
But, although this development was welcomed by the Government, it clearly 
did not provide a complete or early solution of the problem. If the natural 
processes of inheritance and sale were left to work unassisted, the emancipa-
tion of the peasantry would take several generations; and the authorities 
therefore decided that positive action would have to be taken. 
They were assisted to this conclusion by the agitation which broke out 
in Buganda in 1922 under the name of the "Bataka" movement. The causes 
of this movement were complex. In part it was what it professed to be, the 
protest of the hereditary clan leaders, whose rights, it was asserted, had 
been overriden in the land settlement of 1900 by the revolutionary oligarchy. 
In part it was the product of personal dissensions within the governing group, 
and in part it expressed the grievances of the smaller landowners, arising out 
of the land tax of 1921, which bore much more hardly on the petty squire 
than on the owner of great estates. The one thing that it almost certainly 
was not was a peasants' revolt. But it nevertheless served to focus the atten-
tion of the Protectorate authorities on agrarian discontents and especially 
1. F o r example, the Governor , Sir Wil l iam Gowers , told Legislative Counci l in 1929: "Mis takes have 
been m a d e in the ra ther remote past in mat ters of land tenure, due to an imperfect knowledge of Afr ican 
ideals and customs, as opposed to ideals, cus toms and laws impor ted f r o m overseas ." (U.P . Leg. Co . , 
9th session, 31.X.29.) 
2. E.S.A. S .M.P . 27/117. 
3. E.S.A. S . M . P . 8386/4. 
4. See M u k w a y a , A. B. Land Tenure in Buganda, East Af r i can Studies, N o . t , K a m p a l a , 1953. 
5. See letter f r o m M r . David Bassude in the Uganda Herald, 17.vi.2l, in which it is explained that people 
bough t small pieces of land in o rder to " f r e e themselves f r o m the chiefs ' pernicious outs ide influences 
they adop ted and b rough t to bear on the men w h o a re living on their l a n d . " 
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on the exactions, said to be increasingly onerous, of the landowner-chiefs, 
both great and small. 
It is always very difficult, when one reads denunciations of social and 
economic abuses, to decide whether oppression and extortion have really 
become more severe, or whether public and official opinion has merely 
become more sensitive to their existence. There are indeed, as has been 
suggested above, reasons for believing that economic change after 1920 
tended to strengthen the power of the chiefly and landowning classes. On 
the other hand there are good a priori grounds for supposing that the land-
owners' exactions cannot have been very onerous. Even in the old days, 
although a Ganda commoner would not have dreamt of denying in principle 
that his lord had a right to his labour or his produce or both, he was quick 
to withdraw his service from any unduly oppressive master. And under 
British rule his mobility and his independence had undoubtedly increased. 
Moreover since land was not at this time a scarce factor it seems impossible 
that people could have been made to pay very dearly for its use. How dearly 
they did pay it is not easy to discover. In theory, nvujjo was supposed to 
represent a tithe. The standard practice, however, appears to have been that 
the peasant was allowed to grow one quarter-acre plot free of charge but 
had to hand over 25 lbs. of cotton, or its money equivalent, for each additional 
plot.1 This would have represented between a quarter and a fifth of the normal 
yield, and probably did constitute a substantial deterrent to increased pro-
duction. In comparison with the rates prevalent under the metayage system 
in many other countries, the levy was a light one. On the other hand, it had 
less warrant than the true metayage payments, since the landowner here 
provided neither seed nor equipment. Moreover, in addition to the nvujjo 
on cotton the peasant had to pay a tribute or busulu, normally five shillings 
a year or the equivalent of some 30-40 lbs. of cotton, which was levied on 
all residents on an estate, regardless of the extent or quality of their holdings 
or the money value of their crops. These standard figures for nvujjo and 
busulu, however, were subject to large variations according to the sophistica-
tion of the peasants and the character of the landlords; and if on some 
estates they may have been exceeded there were others on which the rate 
was lighter. 
The "Bataka" agitation gave the Protectorate Government a powerful 
political lever for the enforcement of reform. In 1927, after important 
changes of personnel in the Buganda Government, the Lukiiko was persuaded 
to enact the "Busulu and Nvujjo Law," which reflected the current concern 
of higher authority for the interests of the peasants.2 Considering the 
disfavour into which the system of large estates, and their owners, had now 
fallen, and the strictures which officials had recently passed on "the abomi-
nable system of landowners' tithes,"3 the reforms were of a very moderate 
character. The collection of busulu and nvujjo was not forbidden; on the 
contrary it now received statutory recognition. But henceforward the 
exactions were limited to what the authorities regarded as reasonable figures, 
busulu to Shs. 10 per annum for each holding (of which the landowner was 
to receive Shs. 8/50 and the Government Shs. 1/50) and nvujjo to Shs. 4 per 
annum in respect of each acre or part of an acre under cotton or coffee. 
At the time these were quite substantial figures (busulu was calculated as 
representing a month's wages and nvujjo as a tenth part of the value of the 
crops), and with the fall in prices which took place shortly afterwards the 
burden of the peasants became heavier than ha^ been intended or than it 
would have been in the absence of legislation. In the longer run, however, 
the increasing wealth of the country and the fall in the value of money were 
to render the peasants' payments almost nugatory. More important than 
the limitation of exactions was the essential corollary, the prohibition of 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2622/86. 
2. Mukwaya, op. cil. The text is in the Laws of Uganda, 1951, VII , 1238. 
3. E.S.A. Ann. Rp t . P.C. Buganda, 1925. 
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eviction for any cause other than the non-payment of the statutory dues. 
In this way a long stride was made towards the official ideal of peasant 
proprietorship. For henceforward every cultivator in Buganda would be 
possessed of an interminable, heritable tenancy, subject only to quit-rent 
and tithe, the real value of which was eventually to dwindle into insignifi-
cance. Such holdings were generally only roughly demarcated, but it was 
understood that they should include enough land for the subsistence of the 
peasant's family and for the standard family cotton-field, normally with 
some small reserve of waste. But owing to the sparseness of population an 
energetic tenant was often allowed to put much larger areas under crops, 
and land that he had once planted could not thereafter be withdrawn from 
his use. The rights of the landowner were restricted to the collection of 
fixed and moderate dues and to the exploitation of such land as was not 
included in any peasant holding. 
Outside Buganda, where the land rights of the governing class had not 
received any legal recognition, it seemed possible to go further and eliminate 
them altogether. By 1922 the authorities had reached a firm decision that 
freehold estates would not be granted to the chiefs of Busoga and Bunyoro.1 
Subsequent petitions from the Soga chiefs, requesting that they be placed 
on an equal footing with their counterparts in Buganda were almost angrily 
rejected.2 The authorities now had scant sympathy with those who, it was 
suggested, were merely anxious to be allowed to live in affluence at the 
expense of the peasantry. They did indeed relent in 1930 to the extent of 
offering estates totalling eighty-five square miles to members of the "old 
families" of Busoga. This offer, however, was spurned by the Soga and was 
not renewed.3 
In Bunyoro, although freehold titles had not been granted, the aristo-
cracy, with the acquiescence of the administration, had been quietly 
consolidating its quasi-feudal domains into private estates, the peasant 
occupiers being constrained to pay busulu at the rate of Shs. 7 per annum. 
But this process was brought to a halt as a result of a commission of enquiry 
in 1931,4 which recommended that busulu should be converted into a native 
authority tax, from which salaries would be paid to chiefs holding recognised 
administrative posts, and that terminable compensation should be paid to 
existing "landowners" for the loss of tribute-income. "If, as the outcome," 
commented the commissioners, "there is evolved a nation of small farmers, we 
shall be well content." As an additional means to that end they recommended 
the adoption of the procedure already introduced in Toro and Ankole, 
whereby the peasants could obtain certificates of occupancy giving them 
legal security of tenure of defined holdings. Very little use was made of this 
provision, however; it appeared that the Nyoro, Toro and Nkole peasants 
were content with the security afforded them by customary law. 
In the Eastern Province the rights of the peasantry have never been 
defined by any legal enactment or provided with documentary support. 
Nevertheless, as an administrator remarked in 1940, "the peasant has 
quietly consolidated his position as an individual occupier."5 The ideal 
of a free peasantry, however, required that the cultivator should have 
control not only over his land but also over his labour. It was necessary, in 
other words, to eliminate the system of tribute-labour and servile cotton 
cultivation that had been allowed to grow up throughout the Eastern and 
parts of the Northern Provinces. A first step was taken in 1922, when it 
was made optional for the Soga peasants to commute their labour obligation 
for a money tribute. A more radical change was brought about in 1926, 
though like the almost contemporary reforms in Buganda, it was still quite 
1. E.S.A. S.M.P. 2198/291. 
2. Ibid., S .M.P. 2125. 
3 . Fallers, L . A. Bantu Bureaucracy, op. cit. 
4. U.P . Land Tenure and the Kibanja System in Bunyoro, 1931. 
5. Rober tson, D . W. The Historical Considerations Contributing to the Soga System of Land Tenure, 
Entebbe, 1940, p. 36. 
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moderate in character. The chiefs were not altogether deprived of their 
right to unpaid labour, but the maximum was reduced from a month to 
twelve days per annum, commutable for a money payment of Shs. 4. A 
further Shs. 6, representing the balance of eighteen days' labour, was paid 
into a central fund, from which, with the addition of poll-tax rebates, salaries 
were disbursed to the more important chiefs. Thus, while in money terms 
the peasant's contribution was no lighter than before, he became increasingly 
master of his time. The final step was taken ten years later, when all personal 
tribute, whether in labour or in cash, was done away with.1 
So during the inter-war period there took shape a new pattern of 
agrarian society. At the bottom was an undifferentiated mass of free peasant 
cultivators, the de facto proprietors of small holdings which yielded them 
both food and a modest money income. Above them was an administrative 
hierarchy of salaried chiefs, who, apart from the residual busulu and 
nvujjo in Buganda, no longer derived any direct profit from the land or its 
products. They were still expected to stimulate and in some degree supervise 
the cultivation of cotton, but this was now simply part of their function as 
Government officials, and no longer a function of landownership or feudal 
dominion. 
This at least was the theory. But the reforms of the 1920s left the land-
owners and chiefs in possession of one very important asset—their control 
over the uncultivated and unallocated land. The waste was at their disposal 
whether, as in Buganda, they were its legal owners or, as in the other tradi-
tionally aristocratic societies, they merely had the customary function of 
allotting it to new claimants. So long as there was land to spare for all, this 
power of allocation remained purely formal, the chief receiving no more 
than a nominal payment, such as a chicken, in recognition of his authority. 
But as population grew and cultivation encroached upon the waste, the 
remaining vacant land began to command a steadily increasing price, and 
after the Second World War its disposal was to become a lucrative source 
of income for the landowners of Buganda and the village chiefs of Busoga.2 
There was another way in which landowners and chiefs could make use 
of their rights over the uncultivated land: they could develop it themselves. 
As we have seen, the general trend during the 1920s was towards small-scale 
peasant farming. Neither economic circumstances nor Government policy 
was favourable to the existence of large units of production, whether they 
took the form of European plantations or of African chiefs' demesnes. 
But at the same time a new factor was beginning to reverse this trend. 
Landowners had lost control of the labour of their own tenants and depen-
dants, but cheap labour of another kind now presented itself. 
Only a part of Uganda had so far really come under the influence of 
commercial agriculture. Cotton cultivation was well established in Buganda 
and the Eastern Province and in the Lango and Acholi districts of the 
Northern Province, but the whole of the west of the Protectorate, with the 
possible exception of Bunyoro, lay so far from railway stations or Lake 
ports that cotton-growing was not really a remunerative occupation. It 
paid the Alur and Lugbara, the Kiga and Nkole, better to send their young 
men to earn wages in the more favoured central districts of the Protectorate, 
especially Buganda. For some time the economic forces which drove these i 
people eastward were reinforced by Governmental policies; they were not 
encouraged to take up cotton-growing at home because their labour was 
required by the Public Works Department and the planters. After 1920, when 
the need for wage-labourers began to carry less weight than the administra-
tors' desire for stable and settled societies, this policy was reversed. Everything 
possible was now done to foster local agriculture and so to keep the young 
men at home, in the bosom of their families and under the authority of their 
1. Falters, loc. cit. E.S.A. S.M.P. 6025. 
2. Fallers, op. cit. p. 165. Richards, A. I. (ed.), Economic Development and Tribal Change, Cambr idge , 
1954, pp. 128-29. 
E 55 
chiefs. But there was not a great deal that could be done. Cotton-growing 
remained as unprofitable as ever, partly because of the cost of transport and 
partly because of unfavourable climatic conditions. Experiments were made 
with various crops of higher value, but except in Bunyoro, where tobacco 
provided an important supplement to cotton, and in the county of Bwamba 
in Toro, where colfee flourished, they had very little success. Buganda 
continued to attract steadily increasing numbers of migratory workers, not 
only from the western districts of Uganda but also from the far more popu-
lous countries of Ruanda and Urundi and to a lesser extent from the Lake 
Province of Tanganyika. At first they came mainly to work for European 
employers, both public and private. But it soon became a common practice 
for them to earn their food by working in the evenings for neighbouring 
Ganda farmers. From this it was a short step to full-time paid employment; 
and in due course, as plantation employment declined, the Ganda could 
reckon on a regular and ever-increasing supply of wage-labour. During the 
1920s a vast, unobtrusive tide of migration set in towards Buganda, a vast 
recombination of the factors of production.1 On all the roads that led towards 
Kampala came a raggle-taggle army of producers, moving from lands where 
labour was nearly valueless to the region where fertile soil, abundant space 
and ready markets made it relatively dear. Some of them, the independent-
minded Alur and Lugbara in particular, chose to grow cotton on their own 
account, renting land for a season from its Ganda proprietors. Others, 
especially the Ruanda, many of whom were eager to escape permanently 
from their own poor and strictly governed land, sought and obtained 
permanent holdings, on which they settled down to live in the same terms 
and in the same manner as the Ganda peasantry. The majority of them, 
however, offered their services for hire; and since, as migrants temporarily 
bereft of the means of subsistence, they could not afford to put a high value 
on their labour, their presence gave the Ganda an excellent opportunity to 
expand production beyond the limits of the ordinary family holding. Thus, 
after all, the demesne farm made a new appearance on the scene; many 
landowners began to cultivate cotton on a relatively imposing scale. And 
not only landowners. There was nothing that debarred the ordinary Ganda 
cultivator from taking Ruanda and Nkole labourers into his employ and 
pushing the frontiers of his holding further back into the surrounding waste. 
The statistics of acreage, however, do not allow us to suppose that this 
process was carried very far during the 1920s. We may suspect that most 
Ganda used foreign labour, as many of them still do, as a substitute rather 
than as a supplement to their own. And the employment of hired labour, 
though increasingly common, was not by any means a universal feature of 
Ganda rural economy. The normal unit of agriculture even in Buganda, and 
the all but universal unit everywhere else, was still the little family homestead, 
with its two or three acres of food crops and its acre or two of cotton, 
tilled entirely or mainly by the members of the family. 
By 1930 the people of Uganda had settled down to the new way of life 
that had been mapped out for them by British rule and the railway.2 It was 
a quiet, on the whole an unexciting and unexacting life. There was no more 
war and no more politics except in a very muted form. Person and property 
were as secure as laws and magistrates could make them. The impact of 
external trade had been absorbed and the economy reconstituted on a new 
basis, of which the essential element was the production of cotton, supple-
mented by the production of colfee in Bugisu and parts of Buganda, of 
tobacco in Bunyoro and of groundnuts in the Eastern and Northern Provinces. 
The ettect of economic change on the lives of the people had, on the whole, 
been surprisingly small, wheilier it is the pattern of activity or the pattern of 
consumption tnat is brought under review. They had not to any considerable 
extent been either driven or drawn into systems of production that were 
1. See Powesland, P. G „ in Richards, op. cil., pp. 27 ff. 
2 . See, fo r instance, Mair , L. P. An African People in the Twentieth Century, London , 1934. 
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fundamentally novel in organisation or technique. They did not figure at all 
in the higher echelons of enterprise, which were manned exclusively by 
members of the immigrant communities. They took no part in the export-
import trade, or, except as labourers, in the processing of crops; even in 
retail commerce they were eclipsed by Asian traders; they had produced no 
members of the liberal professions, other than teachers and clergy, and very 
few highly skilled workers. It was only in agricultural production that 
Africans could really be said to contribute largely to the functioning of the 
exchange economy. In this sphere the change had indeed been a thorough-
going one. It was now accepted that the cultivation of the soil, that is, the 
production of seed-cotton, was the normal and proper occupation for the 
great majority of men; and this implied a revolutionary change in the mode 
of life of men belonging to the "planting" tribes, though less so for the 
seed-farmers. The cotton plot had become almost as integral, by now almost 
as traditional-seeming, a part of the standard peasant holding as the banana 
grove or the millet field. Production for the overseas market had been grafted 
on to subsistence farming, and with very little disturbance of the parent 
stock. In Buganda and Busoga the cotton field took its place beside the 
banana grove, along with the beans and sweet potatoes and other seasonal 
crops which had always figured in the agricultural system. In the drier areas 
further north and east cotton was woven into the customary rough-and-ready 
crop rotation, being normally planted after the harvesting of the main crop 
of finger-millet. An acre or two was thus added to the cultivated area of 
each homestead, but, except on a few estates in Buganda, the general scale 
of farming operations had not been sensibly altered. Nor—and here the 
big cotton-farmers of Buganda were no exception—had the techniques. 
Virtually the only technical innovation had been the substitution of imported 
steel hoes for the local iron product. Ploughing had made a certain headway, 
but only in limited areas of the Eastern Province. 
The increment of wealth that had accrued to the people through pro-
duction for export was hardly spectacular. A rough calculation shows that 
1928-29, a season of high yields and good prices, the cotton crop yielded 
approximately £7 to every tax-payer (that is, to every more or less able-
bodied adult male) in Busoga, and approximately £6 to every tax-payer in 
other parts of the Eastern Province and in Buganda. Not every tax-payer was 
a cotton-grower, so that the income per farm would be a little higher than 
this. Moreover, cotton was not the only source of farm income, but it is 
fairly clear that other sources—the minor export crops, the foodstuffs 
purchased by the small urban population, hides and skins—did not make a 
really substantial contribution at this stage. Taxation, too, was heavy. In 
1929 the Uganda Government's revenue, at £1,682,990, amounted almost 
to 40 per cent, of the national export income. The cultivator of the Eastern 
Province was mulcted of Shs. 21 in direct taxation alone; and his counterpart 
in Buganda paid Shs. 15 to the central Government and, unless he chose to do 
a month's unpaid labour on the roads, a further Shs. 10 to the native authority. 
It is clear that the sums which could be spent on imported goods by the 
average peasant were not large. A few wealthy chiefs and landowners could 
now live in brick houses, wear smart European suits and ride in motor-cars, 
but as far as the mass of the people were concerned the improvement in the 
standards of living had not been particularly impressive. Cotton clothing— 
shirt and shorts or long Arab gowns for the men, voluminous and usually 
gay dresses for the women—had become general, representing a net addition 
to the property of some tribes, a superior substitute for skins or barkcloth 
in others. Bicycles were very common. For the (pst there were a very few 
household goods, needles, matches, soap, lamps and lamp oil, here and there 
a luxury article such as a watch, a fountain pen or a gramophone. The whole 
of the farmers' earnings, of course, was not spent on imported goods, 
and we must not overlook the fact that the circulation of the income derived 
from exports generated further incomes, which accrued to the purveyors of 
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meat and fish and beer, to tailors and potters and cycle mechanics, to car-
penters and builders. (One of the most important changes in Buganda and 
Busoga was the almost universal replacement of the old, ill-ventilated hut 
by a more substantial and durable dwelling, built on a rectilinear frame and 
equipped with joinery doors and windows.) Occasionally, these internal 
exchanges had more than a local character. Although statistics are entirely 
lacking, it seems likely that the Ganda cotton-growers had already begun to 
buy slaughter cattle not only from the pastoral areas in the west of their 
own country but also from the cattle-rich districts of Ankole and Teso, so 
that the wealth derived from cotton-growing was to some extent diffused 
beyond the main areas of production. It remains true, however, that the 
prosperity of Buganda and the Eastern Province was not matched in the 
remainder of the country. The output of cotton in Lango and Acholi did 
/little more than provide the people with the means of paying poll-tax. 
The remoter north-western and south-western districts contributed hardly 
anything to the export trade; their incomes derived mainly from migratory 
wage-labour, and did scarcely more than cover the recurrent expenditure 
on taxes and the capital outlay on bride-wealth cattle. In arid Karamoja 
the life of the people had hardly been touched at all by economic change. 
Like other pastoral tribes in East Africa, they were still in that very rudi-
mentary stage of money economy in which it was not commodities but 
shillings that were bought, and those only in the tax-collecting season. They 
still went naked about their customary avocations, the men herding their 
cattle and the women tending their meagre crops of millet as of old; the 
occasional sale of a hide or a bullock constituted their only contact with 
the world of commerce. 
Even in the more advanced areas, however, the people cannot be said 
to have been raised on to a wholly new material plane. To the Ganda at 
least, cotton cloth and most of the other imported goods had already been 
familiar before the arrival of the railway and the growth of the cotton 
industry, though their use was of course more widespread now and the volume 
of consumption had increased. The really striking improvement in the 
condition of the people derived from that part of their expenditure which 
was channelled through the public authorities—first and foremost the inesti-
mable blessing of peace and justice, but also the roads which made travel 
easy and the increments of knowledge and of health which had begun to 
accrue to them through Governmental as well as missionary efforts. These 
increments, however, were not yet large. Public expenditure on education 
in 1929 amounted to 32 cents of a shilling per head of the population, and 
expenditure on medical services to 90 cents. 
If the people of Uganda were still poor in material goods, it was largely 
because they did not choose to be richer. There could be no doubt—indeed 
the fact was shortly to be demonstrated—that the surplus produced for the 
market could have been very much greater than it was if the average culti-
vator had been willing to exert himself more. The term "peasants," which 
has been used to describe the rural masses of Uganda, did not possess the 
connotation of laboriousness that belongs to it in Europe or in Asia. 
Agriculture was the normal occupation of the majority of men, but for very 
few was it more than a part-time occupation. Their labours in the cotton-
fields left most people ample time for beer and talk, for family ceremonies 
and family quarrels, for village politics and the other activities which made 
up the normal stuff of rural life. 
That the mass of the people should not have strained very hard after 
further increments of wealth, though reprehensible in the eyes of many 
Europeans, is readily understandable. In the first place, whatever the 
statistics might appear to show, the poverty of Uganda was not of a distress-
ful kind. Indeed, the more fertile areas, where the productivity of subsistence 
agriculture was high, rather noticeably exuded an atmosphere of ease and 
fatness. This had very little to do with the developments of the previous 
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quarter of a century; it had always been so. There was no destitution in 
Uganda and little real hardship, unless it was that which was suffered by 
the migrants on their arduous journeys to and from Kigezi or Ruanda. 
Except for the prevalence of disease, there was nothing in the condition of 
the people that cried urgently for cure, and in their easy-going way of life 
there was much that was positively gracious and attractive. There was also, 
it is true, a certain ennui, but for this malady greater assiduity in the tedious 
processes of cotton cultivation did not appear to be a very obvious remedy. 
In the second place, the opportunities for enrichment, though considerable, 
were not brilliant. Greater assiduity would have raised the standard of living 
but it would not have opened the door on a new world. To work eight hours 
a day instead of four in order to be able to buy two shirts a year instead of 
one was a course of action which, comprehensibly, the average man was not 
tempted to adopt. 
It was, moreover, now the average man who set the pace of development. 
The impetus from above which had acted so strongly on the peasant masses 
in the early years of the century had now very markedly slackened. The 
Ganda aristocracy, which had taken the lead in introducing the peasants of 
Buganda and elsewhere, to the exchange economy, had been largely deprived 
of the power to force progress on the people, and the keenness of its own 
desire for progress had been blunted with the passage of time. The dynamic 
oligarchs of the earlier period had for the most part become, or been suc-
ceeded by, a race of comfortable country squires and routine administrators. 
The determination of the volume of output was left in the main to the free 
choice of the peasantry; and "a nation of small farmers," though it may earn 
high marks for stability and social harmony, is not likely to be a nation of 
innovators or, when it is not under the pressure of need, to be conspicuous for 
its dynamism. For the time being there was equilibrium between the incomes 
of the people and their wants and, failing the intrusion of some drastically 
disturbing factor, it seemed likely that economic progress would in the future 
be slow. This prospect accorded well with the current wishes of the European 
rulers of Uganda, who now valued stability and order more highly than 
progress. Rapid economic change was indeed generally regarded, by adminis-
trators and intellectuals alike, as an evil to be averted rather than as a 
desirable objective. Nothing could be more striking than the contrast 
between the enthusiasm of missionary and of some secular writings on 
Uganda in the 1890s and the early 1900s, with their confident assumption 
that a new province had been added to Christian civilisation, their confident 
prediction of rapid cultural and economic growth, and the somewhat com-
placent reference in a semi-official description of the Protectorate, published in 
1935, to "the complex task of building a civilisation which, in its spiritual 
and material aspects alike, is beyond the present range of native imagination 
or aspirations."1 
T A B L E 10 
C O T T O N P R O D U C T I O N , 1 9 2 8 / 3 7 
Output ('000 bales)1 i Exports' Average Price 
Buganda E. Prov. N. Prov. W. Prov. Total Bales '000 £'000 (Shs. per 100 
lb., f.o.b. 
Mombasa) 
1928/9 82.2 94.3 22.4 3.7 202.6 204.1 3,312 81 
1929/30 69.1 44.1 12.5 4.3 130.0 129.1 1,555 60 
1930/1 62.4 93.7 30.6 3.1 189.8 U58.9 1,503 40 
1931/2 82.3 104.7 14.3 2.1 203.3 207.3 1,584 38 
1932/3 120.6 133.7 29.9 7.1 291.3 294.8 2,682 45 
1933/4 112.2 132.6 26.8 5.7 278.2 *85.6 2,928 51 
1934/5 130.5 81.1 31.1 6.2 249.0 253.2 2,823 56 
1935/6 144.0 138.5 32.4 7.4 322.2 321.4 3,327 52 
1936/7 148.7 148.7 27.5 6.4 331.4 338.4 4,269 63 
1937/8 179.1 191.9 44.5 8.6 424.2 402.2 3,428 42 
1. Thomas and Scott, op. cit. p. 43. 
2. U.P. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Cotton Industry, 1938. 
3. U.P. Ann. Rpts. D/A. 
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So the Uganda economy was to all appearance drifting very slowly 
forward on very quiet waters, when the shock of the great depression fell 
upon it. The effect of this impact was surprising. The economy shuddered 
briefly, then went forward rather faster than before. Unfortunately, the most 
sensitive index to the reactions of the producers, the number of acres planted 
with cotton, becomes unavailable at this point, for it is known that the 
acreage statistics, which had never been more than approximations, were 
wholly unreliable during the 1930s, owing to a muddle over the methods of 
estimation. We have therefore to rely solely on the figures of output, which, 
being subject to the vagaries of rainfall, cannot indicate more than the 
general trend. The direction of the trend, however, is quite unmistakeable. 
At first sight, these figures provide a perfect illustration of the so-called 
perverse response of peasant producers who, instead of reducing output when 
prices fall, increase their efforts in order to maintain their expenditure at its 
customary level. For here, although the price received in 1932 was less than 
half the price received in 1929, the output from the crop planted that year 
was more than double the output from the crop planted in 1929, and more 
than 40 per cent, greater than any previous harvest. On closer examination, 
however, this conclusion becomes less secure. First of all, the apparent 
increase in 1930/31, the first year of the depression, must be discounted 
altogether, for the previous year's harvest had been reduced by exceptionally 
unfavourable weather. Secondly, the inferences which might be drawn from 
the figures for the early 1930s are apparently contradicted by those for the 
latter part of the decade, for output continues to increase although prices 
are now moving slowly upwards. Thirdly, low export prices for cotton were 
at least partly offset by low import values for manufactured goods. The 
following table shows the approximate relationship between changes in the 
price paid to growers for cotton, in the prices of selected imports entering 
largely into African consumption and in the volume of production. 
T A B L E I I 
P R I C E S A N D P R O D U C T I O N ( 1 9 2 9 = 100) 
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
Price of Seed-cotton1 84 60 60 49 56 65 53 73 
Prices of Imports:2 
Corrugated iron 92 81 76 78 80 80 73 115 
Grey cloth 82 65 55 51 55 52 51 58 
Dyed cloth 85 72 58 58 56 52 51 58 
Coloured cloth 84 64 57 52 49 51 50 58 
Lamp oil 72 63 40 43 35 42 36 49 
Bicycles 93 79 63 46 54 55 61 63 
Output of raw cotton 94 100 143 137 123 159 163 209 
Thus it appears that in the early years of the depression the real value 
of a given quantity of cotton was only slightly less than it had been in 1929, 
and that from 1935 onwards it was actually greater. Against this, however, 
must be set the fact that the retail prices of imported goods did not fall 
as far as their landed values at Mombasa, since import duties (on cloth), 
railway rates and traders' margins were not proportionately reduced. Taking 
this into account, there is little room for doubt that the growers' reactions 
in the early 1930s were in some measure perverse. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the sharp upward trend in the production of coffee, both in Bu-
ganda and in Bugisu, notwithstanding that the decline in the value of this 
commodity was more severe and more prolonged than the decline in the 
value of cotton. 
Once more, however, care is required in the interpretation of these figures. 
The volume of output, of course, reflects the response of producers, not to 
the current trend of prices but to the trend that was visible three to five 
1. Derived from Commission of Enquiry. Inc. cil. 
2. Derived from Kenya Blue Books. 
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years previously. It is only the acreage figures, therefore, that can provide 
us with an indication for the year-by-year impact of market fluctuations. 
Among these, only the figures for non-native coffee estates are quite unam-
biguous; in this sector of the economy diminishing profits, or increasing 
losses, were having their natural consequence in the total or partial aban-
donment of plantations. The statistics given for native coffee-growing in the 
Western Province must be regarded with a good deal of suspicion, for it is 
known that little real progress was being made anywhere in this Province 
except in the little county of Bwamba. In that county coffee-growing was not 
properly inaugurated until the late 1920s, so that its subsequent expansion 
must be taken to reflect the response of the Amba, not to current market 
trends but to their first introduction to the exchange economy as such. 
The figures for the principal producing areas, Buganda (mainly the Masaka 
district) and Bugisu, convey a somewhat confusing impression. In Buganda, 
although expansion did continue during the depression, the period of most 
rapid progress appears to have been the years of high prices at the end of the 
1920s, whereas in Bugisu progress seems to have been maintained at an 
almost constant rate throughout the decade under review. In both cases, 
however, market forces were not the only ones that were operative. It was 
in 1929 and 1930 that the peasants of the Masaka district were being presented 
with the choice between planting coffee at home and being sent off to shovel 
earth on the track of the Kampala railway; and the disappearance of this 
incentive in 1931 may well have had as much to do with the subsequent 
slackening of expansion as had the fall in the market price of coffee. On 
the other hand, the expansion in Bugisu during the early 1930s can be attri-
buted at least in part to the inauguration of the "Bugisu Coffee Scheme" in 
1930 and the much larger measure of official encouragement and guidance 
which was thereafter extended to the cultivators.1 
TABLE 12 
COFFEE PRODUCTION, 1928/372 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
Acres Cultivated 
Non-
Native 
18,400 
19,900 
19,300 
17,600 
17,600 
15,300 
13,400 
13,700 
13,500 
13,600 
Buganda 
4,700 
11,300 
16,200 
17,000 
18,800 
20,100 
21,000 
22,500 
27,500 
30,800 
Native 
W. Prov. 
2,900 
3,400 
3,800 
1,800 
3,800 
3,400 
5,300 
7,400 
9,800 
11,100 
Bugisa 
1,100 
1,400 
2,000 
2,100 
2,800 
3,500 
4,000 
5,000 
6,100 
7,000 
Total 
8,700 
16,100 
21,900 
20,900 
25,400 
27,100 
30,300 
34,900 
43,400 
48,900 
Average Price 
(Shs. per cwt. 
Exports f.o.b. 
Cwt. '000 £'000 Mombasa) 
40'0 
41-2 
48-9 
7 0 0 
871 
100-4 
154-3 
125-7 
228-7 
257-9 
164 
177 
155 
161 
223 
210 
293 
231 
381 
420 
81 
86 
63 
46 
51 
42 
38 
37 
34 
32 
In the later 1930s the picture becomes considerably clearer: everywhere, 
in spite of continually falling prices, African cultivators were steadily adding 
to the number and size of their coffee gardens. It is, however, possible to 
regard this behaviour, not as "perverse," but as "correct." For it may well 
have indicated a realisation on the part of an increasing number of farmers 
that even at the worst of times coffee was the most remunerative crop that it 
was in their power to grow. 
From this tortuous and inconclusive distussion certain tentative 
inferences may perhaps be drawn. It seems incontestable that in the first and 
worst years of the slump African cultivators, tajjen as a whole, countered 
fallingjKices by increased effort, thereby maintaining their real incomes at 
approximately theliTormer level. This is a response that could reasonably 
have been predicted of them. Since for the great majority of them the money 
1. U.P. Ann. Rpts . D /A . Anon. History of the Bugisu Coft'ee Scheme, n.d. (in Mbale District Office). 
2 . U.P. Ann. Rpts . D / A . 
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costs of production were virtually nil there could be no question of "profits" 
being converted into "losses" by deteriorations in the market situation. 
Falling prices could not possibly drive the cotton-growers and coffee-growers 
out of business. They could, and presumably did, make effort seem less 
attractive, but on the other hand a very large part of the real income require-
ments of the peasantry was irreducible. Tax payments, and in Buganda 
busulu payments, had still to be made, and their real burden was increased 
by the falling values of exports. Over and above this, much of the pre-
slump consumption of the peasants consisted of goods which had become 
conventional necessities and which would not readily be foregone even though 
the cost of their acquisition, in terms of effort, had increased. 
Yet the desire for a constant real income, though it was certainly opera-
tive, does not seem entirely adequate as an explanation of the very rapid 
expansion of output, especially of cotton, in the early 1930s, and it is clearly 
quite incapable of explaining the further expansion which took place in 
the latter part of the decade. It appears that the effects of price fluctuations 
were superimposed on a groundswell of genuine economic growth, which 
was strong enough to survive the discouragement of the slump and which 
gained additional momentum from the stimulus afforded by the subsequent 
partial revival of the market. The stability, even stagnation, which had been 
evident in the later 1920s was beginning to be disturbed. The wants of the 
people were gradually widening in range and deepening in intensity. This 
can be attributed in large part to the almost inevitable effects of education 
and mimesis, but it may also be conceded that the theory which lay behind 
the reforms of the 1920s was proving in some degree correct: the common 
people of Uganda, having been emancipated from servile labour and assured 
of the enjoyment of at least the greater part of the fruits of their toil, were 
beginning to display a little more of the industriousness that was expected 
of a free peasantry. 
In the last years of the inter-war period, then, the agricultural economy 
of Uganda was markedly expanding. But the expansion was still of a purely 
quantitative kind. It can be said that there are two distinct types of economic 
''development: the type which is the consequence of an extension of the 
market, of improvements in the techniques and organisation of trade and 
transport, and the type which results from improvements in the methods of 
production. In the one case people grow richer because the productivity of 
their land and labour has increased, in the other because the value of their 
produce has been raised. Now it is evident that the development which had 
taken place in Uganda had been almost entirely of the latter kind. The 
efficiency of the factors of production had not been significantly improved, 
but larger quantities of land and labour had been brought into employment, 
and the additional produce had been of kinds which, thanks to the construc-
tion of a modern communications system, to the security afforded by 
British rule and to the enterprise of European and Asian merchants, had 
far higher exchange values than any commodity (ivory excepted) which had 
figured in the old economic system. 
That this process had been beneficial it was scarcely possible to doubt, 
but at the same time the limitations of its beneficence were becoming ever 
more apparent. It was estimated, for example, that, on the basis of normal 
yields and the relatively favourable prices of 1937, the cotton-grower of 
Busoga could expect to receive Shs. 151 for his crop.1 Acreages, yields and 
prices were all substantially lower in most other districts; in Teso for example 
the average grower was reckoned to receive only Shs. 62, in Bunyoro Shs. 59, 
in West Acholi Shs. 57. In the Mengo district of Buganda the return was 
put as high as Shs. 249, but this calculation was based on estimates of 
acreage that were almost certainly inflated and ignored the share of the 
proceeds that went to the hired migrant workers. It was clear at all events 
I, U.P. Commission of Enquiry, loc. cil. 
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that nowhere in Uganda was the ordinary peasant in receipt of incomes that 
could be taken, even by the most modest standards, to connote prosperity. 
Nor did it appear that he had much prospect of receiving such incomes in 
the future through a simple continuance of the existing processes of expan-
sion. It is true that nearly everywhere there was to all appearance an ample 
reserve of waste land of similar quality to that which had already been 
brought under the hoe, and that there was still plenty of room for increased 
effort on the part of the cultivators. But these reserves of land and labour 
were not limitless, nor was it to be expected that their employment would 
yield increments equal to those obtained in the first stages of the commerciali-
sation of agriculture. The prospect seemed to be that the rate of progress 
would slow down and would ultimately stop, leaving the people still a long 
way short of real wealth. 
A few years earlier, policy-makers might have accepted this prospect 
with equanimity. But during the 1930s a silent revolution, discernible both 
in London and in Entebbe, in intellectual as well as in political and admini-
strative circles, was taking place in the values of Colonial Government. The 
intellectual revolution can perhaps be pin-pointed to 1936, when the Inter-
national African Institute turned aside from the study of tribal institutions 
and how to preserve them and devoted a whole issue of its journal to the 
problem of nutrition.1 In and around the Colonial Office, thought and study 
were moving along the road that led to the great Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act of 1940. It was no longer considered to be enough that 
African governments should be solvent and that African peoples should 
be secured against exploitation and against the disruption of their social 
systems. Philanthropy, the good repute of the British Empire, and perhaps 
also the interests of British industry, required that they should as soon as 
possible cease to be poor. More was now being demanded of the Uganda 
economy, and more fundamental changes in its character began to seem 
necessary. It was not questioned at this stage that the economy would 
continue to be overwhelmingly agricultural, that the principal crops would 
continue to be those whose utility was already proven, or that production 
would continue to be carried on mainly in small-scale peasant farming units. 
But whereas the attention of Government had hitherto been concentrated 
on the relatively simple task of getting the people to till the soil, efforts were 
now made to ensure that they should till it to rather better effect. 
Two main lines of attack were developed during the 1930s. fn the 
first place, attempts were made to improve the organisation of marketing 
and processing in such a way that the producer would receive a larger share 
of the export price of cotton and other crops. These matters are excluded 
from the scope of this essay. It may be sufficient to say that the Government 
acted on the premise, which was at least superficially a very odd one, that the 
producers would be likely to benefit from a reduction in the competition for 
their produce. Few people would now claim that the reforms introduced in this 
period were of decisive advantage either to the peasants or to the economy as 
a whole, and some would argue that they were positively hurtful.2 
The second line of attack was more direct.3 The attention of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, and of other branches of the Government, was 
increasingly focused upon the objective of raising the productivity of 
African agriculture, rather than upon mere additions to the size and number 
of the cotton fields. This was possible, partly because the actual planting of 
cotton had become a well-established habit, but also because the resources of 
the Department, though still very meagre in relation to the magnitude of its 
responsibilities, had been considerably increased^n 1921 its superior grades 
comprised a Director, a Deputy Director, nine field agricultural officers 
1. Africa, IX, 1936. 
2. See Ehrlich, C. The Marketing of Cotton in Uganda, 1903-1939 (unpublished Ph .D. thesis, London . 1958). 
3. The following paragraphs are derived mainly f rom the Depar tment ' s annual reports and f rom Tothi l i , 
J. D. (ed.). Agriculture in Uganda, Oxford , 1940. 
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of various ranks and three scientific specialists. By 1932 the number of field 
officers had risen to eighteen and the number of specalists to nine. Perhaps 
more important than the growth in its numbers was the improvement in 
the quality of the staff. Of the first generation, apart from the scientists, 
only Mr. Simpson himself had been able to put letters after his name, but 
almost all the newer recruits were qualified men. This remark is not intended 
to put exaggerated stress on the value of formal training for the operators 
of agricultural extension services, nor to belittle the yeomen services rendered 
by less qualified men in the formative period of Uganda's agricultural 
development. It remains true, however, that the men of the second generation 
were on the whole of higher calibre. For so small a dependency, indeed, 
Uganda was very fortunate during the 1930s in its agricultural officers, 
whose thin ranks included two future Agricultural Advisers to the Secretary 
of State. The Department also won considerable repute by its scientific 
research, of which W. S. Martin's work on soil structure was perhaps the 
outstanding example. 
In its early days the Department had two main functions. The first, in 
which it was on the whole merely an auxiliary of the Administration, was to 
ensure that the areas planted with exportable crops, principally cotton, 
should be as large as possible. The second was the maintenance and improve-
ment of the quality of the exportable products. In both a very considerable 
measure of success had been attained. The acreage figures speak for them-
selves; and although Uganda's cotton was descended from standard American 
strains, it consistently excelled its ancestors in length of staple and fineness 
of count. 
On the other hand virtually nothing had been done to improve the 
efficiency of African agriculture. There was no evidence that the yield of 
cotton had increased, and the subsistence side of the economy had not 
been touched at all, save for the introduction or wider dissemination of 
that unpalatable and unnutritious but drought-resistant root, cassava. It 
was not that the defects of native methods had been ignored. Indeed, faith 
in the possibilities of improvement was stronger in the early days than it 
afterwards became. It seemed obvious (more so, perhaps, to lay officials 
than to agronomists) that productivity could be increased by bringing 
native practices into line with those of Europe, that is to say, by substituting 
the plough for the hoe and permanent rotations for the existing system of 
long-term bush fallow. 
On both these lines advance had been attempted. The plough, as we 
have seen, was introduced into Teso almost concurrently with cotton seed, 
and with considerable success; by 1915 there were fifty-eight ploughs in use, by 
1920 210, by 1926 more than 3,000. Attempts to extend this innovation to other 
districts, however, ended in failure, with a partial exception in Bukedi. 
Some experiments were carried out in Buganda in 1923-24, but the heavy 
vegetation and broken terrain made them unrewarding, and they were 
abandoned after most of the oxen had succumbed. A more ambitious 
venture in the mechanical cultivation of the lower valleys of Bugisu, with 
tractors provided by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, came to an 
equally rapid end, the returns being found to be in no way commensurate 
with the costs. Moreover, as time went on, the desirability as well as the 
feasibility of ploughing began to be doubted. Its assumed advantages had 
been, first, the cultivation of more extensive areas and, secondly, the more 
thorough turning of the soil. But it was of little avail to till larger areas if 
the subsequent weeding and picking had still to be carried out by hand; 
and it was gradually recognised that deep cultivation, so far from being an 
improvement, might have positively harmful effects on the soil, that the 
traditional "scratching of the surface" might be well adapted to local 
conditions. 
A similar disillusionment was in store for those who confidently believed 
that shifting cultivation could readily be superseded by a rotatory system 
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of European type. During the 1920s experiments were carried out at the 
Department's main research station at Serere in the Teso district, where 
cotton was grown in continuous rotation with leguminous and other fertility-
restoring crops. But after a few years the experimenters were confronted 
with an unexpected result: their cotton yields were not only diminishing 
rapidly but were actually lower than those which were being achieved by 
native cultivators in the same neighbourhood. This gave the Department 
furiously to think; and further research disclosed that losses of fertility 
were caused here by deterioration in the physical structure rather than in 
the chemical composition of the soil. This was a disturbing conclusion, for 
it implied that no form of crop rotation and no kind of manuring could 
provide a complete answer to the problem, that there could be no escape 
from the necessity of leaving the land to recuperate under uneconomic 
vegetation, fndigenous practice could be improved upon by sowing suitable 
grasses on the abandoned arable instead of leaving regeneration entirely 
to the slower processes of nature, but at the best only about half the total 
land area could be brought under cultivation at any one time without 
disastrous consequences. 
On the face of it, this still left plenty of room for the expansion of 
cultivation, since in 1935 only one-tenth of the land area of Uganda was 
actually under crops, and even in the most densely populated district 4.4 
acres were theoretically available for every man, woman and child of the 
population that had been recorded in 1931. But when account was taken 
of swamps and other uncultivable land, of areas of low natural potential 
such as Karamoja and much of Ankole, of the requirements of grazing, of 
the necessary minimum of forest and woodland, the margin began to seem 
much narrower than had previously been supposed. Intensive surveys of a 
number of individual villages, carried out in 1937, revealed that in some 
localities saturation point was being approached or had even been exceeded.1 
There were two further considerations which gave cause for uneasiness 
and even for alarm. First, comparison of the census figures for 1921 and 
1931, imprecise though both these enumerations had undoubtedly been, 
left no room for doubt that in almost every part of Uganda the population 
had begun to grow, not yet very rapidly but with an ominously gathering 
momentum. This was in answer to the prayers of earlier administrators, who 
had believed that the emptiness of Uganda was one of the most serious 
obstacles to its development. But in the light of the agronomic knowledge 
that had recently been acquired the filling up of the land began to seem 
more menacing than welcome. 
The second cause of anxiety was the spectre of accelerated erosion, 
which had now begun to disturb the sleep of agronomists everywhere in the 
tropics and subtropics, and of which there were horrid examples close at 
hand in Kenya and Tanganyika. In Uganda there was little evidence of an 
imminent major catastrophe, but as soon as people began to look they had 
no difficulty in finding signs that the processes of erosion were already at 
work in many parts of Uganda, or in predicting that increased pressure on 
the soil, due to a growing population and a growing desire for cash, could 
easily lead to a disaster in the not very distant future. The problem of erosion 
was to a large extent bound up with the more general problem of soil 
exhaustion, for it was when the physical structure of the soil had been 
broken down by prolonged cultivation that it was most vulnerable to erosive 
forces. Part of the answer therefore lay in the'evolution of a system of 
cropping which would prevent the deterioration of the soil. But this line 
of attack was neither sufficient nor sufficiently»immediate in its remedial 
action. It was judged necessary that more direct measures should be taken 
to hold the soil in place. And not only the soil but the water also. The loss 
of rainfall through surface run-off was a serious matter in itself, quite apart 
I. Tothill, J. D. A Report on Nineteen Surveys done in Small Agricultural Areas in Uganda, Entebbe , 1937. 
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from the loss of the precious particles of earth that were likely to be carried 
with it, for it was becoming clear that even in the wetter parts of Uganda 
water was the crucial limiting factor in the growth of crops. The first and 
most elementary measure of soil conservation was to ensure that crops were 
planted along and not across the contour of the field, so that the slight 
ridges produced by the hoe would act as an impediment to the waters 
instead of providing them with ready-made channels. In addition, it was 
recommended that strips of grass be left at intervals between the cultivated 
fields. On more steeply sloping land, such as the greater part of Buganda, 
it would be necessary to go further, to encircle the hillsides with a series 
of bunds, held in place by tough paspalum grasses; and on the very steep 
hills of Kigezi actual terraces would have to be constructed. In Bugisu, 
despite the mountainous character of the country, the danger of erosion 
was fortunately less serious, partly because of the properties of the soil, 
partly because most of the land was under permanent crops. 
By the beginning of the Second World War, or at any rate by its ending, 
it may be said that the authorities knew most of the answers to the problem 
of soil conservation. But the application of these answers was a very different 
matter. To persuade people to grow economic crops had been a compara-
tively simple undertaking. In this the authorities were working with the 
grain, for the peasants did after all have a desire for cash, even though the 
desire was generally not as keen as might be wished. But it was far more 
difficult to persuade them to grow economic or other crops in an efficient 
manner. Only by long-sustained badgering had it been possible to secure 
general, but by no means universal, conformity with such simple rules as 
the planting of cotton on the contour, and the more or less correct spacing 
of the seeds. And now it was proposed to invite the peasants to make more 
fundamental changes in their farming methods, to carry out laborious 
engineering works as a prophylaxis against dangers that were not yet visibly 
imminent. Clearly this was going to be a long and arduous undertaking. 
The campaign for better husbandry had been in progress since the middle 
1920s. There had been courses for selected smallholders, who, it was hoped, 
would return home and set an example to their neighbours; there had been 
courses for chiefs; and all the time there had been teaching and preaching 
aimed directly at the cultivators by administrative and agricultural officers, 
aided by a growing corps of trained African instructors. But an officer of 
the Department felt bound to confess in 1946 that the results of all this 
effort had been "frankly disappointing."1 
I. Masefield, G. B. Agricultural Extension Methods Among African Peasant Farmers. E.A.A.J., April , 
1946. 
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C H A P T E R V 
THE LATEST PHASE 
By the end of the Second World War the tendencies which had been 
apparent in official thinking during the late 1930s had been sharply 
accentuated. Humanitarian considerations, the exigencies of international 
politics, the desperate plight of the sterling area, the prospect of an advance 
towards self-government immeasurably more rapid than had hitherto been 
envisaged—all these combined to make the growth of production and 
wealth in Uganda seem a matter of pressing urgency. A further factor which 
weighed heavily with policy-makers was the now obvious increase in 
population, which, if it continued unchecked and if other things remained 
equal, would inevitably lead within two or three generations to an actual 
reduction in average incomes. This disaster could be averted, so the argument 
ran,1 only if Africans very soon adopted the attitudes towards procreation 
that had become normal in advanced western societies; such attitudes were 
associated with very high standards of living; therefore a very high standard 
of living must be attained here, and without delay. 
At the same time a gloomy view was taken of the prospects of obtaining 
the kind of progress now desired by the kind of method which had hitherto 
been applied. By now, indeed, agronomists were much less concerned with 
wresting further increments of income from the soil than with the prevention 
of a disastrous depreciation of the original capital. But even if this danger 
could be averted, the now traditional cotton patch, which had served well 
enough during the first stages of development, hardly seemed an adequate 
basis for the creation of a really prosperous society. An official committee 
came to the conclusion in 1944 that even if the current high prices held, even 
if yields could be improved, cotton would never make the producer rich.2 
The situation was clearly summed up in the remarks of an official quoted by 
Mrs. Huxley.3 "The ordinary peasant," he said, "can't cultivate more than 
about three acres of cotton on a family basis. Now at present prices, three 
acres (in Teso) can't normally bring in more than about about ten pounds 
a year." Having shown that the cost of employing hired labour was greater 
than the return, he went on: "So you see, the peasant comes to a full stop. 
He can't increase his production and so he can't improve his standard of 
living. And a standard of living isn't going to be very grand on ten pounds 
a year." "These," Mrs. Huxley commented, "are the limits of peasant 
agriculture, sharp and clear." Nor was it believed that any other crop would 
take the place of cotton. Coffee was admittedly a good deal more remunera-
tive, but it was necessarily restricted to certain areas. Among these, Bugisu 
was already more or less saturated, and though there was some scope for 
increased production of robusta in Buganda it was thought that here too 
the economic limit was not far off. 
The course of events during and immediately after the war seemed to 
justify the gloomy view that was being taken of the possibilities for further 
expansion in peasant agriculture. The war, naturally, disrupted the economy 
in a variety of ways. Large numbers of young men were diverted from 
production to military service. In the first years of the war the prices of 
Uganda's staple products remained low, and though they rose considerably 
after 1942 there was, in the prevailing shortage of consumer goods, little 
incentive to increase production. Since regional self-sufficiency was imperative 
in war conditions, and food crops failed Jepeatedly in Kenya and 
Tanganyika, the authorities were forced to foster the production of maize 
at the expense of cotton, the export of which w»s lower in 1943 than in any 
year since 1921. But even when the war was over cotton production showed 
no sign of regaining its pre-war level. 
1. U.P. A Development Plan for Uganda, by E. B. Worthington, Entebbe, 1947, p. 8. 
2. U.P. Joint Report of the Standing Finance Committee and the Development and Welfare Committee on 
Post-War Development, 1944, 
3. E. Huxley, The Sorcerer's Apprentice, London, 1949, p. 251. 
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TABLE 131 
COTTON PRODUCTION, 1939/48 
Output of Seed-Cotton (tons '000) Exports 
BUganda E. Prov. N. Prov. IV. Prov. Total Bales '000 £'000 
1939/40 81.2 82.7 12.0 3.1 179.0 
1940/41 83.5 112.4 18.5 5.7 220.1 
1941/42 61.3 61.6 13.7 3.3 139.9 
1942/43 33.4 31.8 1.6 0.6 67.4 
1943/44 46.7 47.5 8.3 1.8 104.3 
1944/45 75.1 69.7 13.4 2.6 160.8 
1945/46 77.5 42.2 12.5 3.3 135.5 
1946/47 66.6 52.2 16.8 2.8 138.4 
1947/48 45.1 41.7 11.4 2.8 101.0 
304 3,760 
366 4,262 
236 2,862 
123 3,238 
190 5,043 
264 7,026 
219 5,620 
253 7,119 
174 7,458 
The Government decided to attack the problem of Uganda's poverty 
on a number of separate fronts. To begin with, African agriculture was to 
be taken firmly in hand. Exclusive reliance on the slow processes of exhorta-
tion and demonstration was to be abandoned; and by virtue of the Buganda 
Agricultural Law2 passed by a still compliant Lukiiko in 1946, and of similar 
enactments in other districts, the authorities acquired far-reaching powers 
of direction, which enabled them to enforce soil conservation and other 
measures of agricultural improvement and even in some instances to dictate 
the choice of crops. In addition, it was hoped that peasant agriculture could 
be transformed by the introduction, on the initiative and at the expense of 
the State, of tractor-drawn implements, which would make it possible for 
African farmers, or groups of farmers, to undertake cultivation on a far 
larger scale. There was also envisaged, however, a much more radical 
departure from the tradition of small-scale peasant farming. As we have 
seen, the idea of enlarging the narrow sector occupied by private European 
agriculture was rather reluctantly set aside for political and social reasons, 
but similar objections did not apply to the development of large-scale 
agricultural enterprises planned and managed by the State. Two major 
undertakings of this kind were now to be started, with the dual object of 
bringing large areas of unused land under cultivation more rapidly than 
could be accomplished by peasant colonists (the areas in question were in 
south Busoga, which had been denuded of population early in the century 
by sleeping-sickness, and in tsetse-infested country in northern Bunyoro) and 
of establishing a system of guided agriculture more efficient than ordinary 
peasant farming. 
The really significant new departure at the close of the Second World 
War, however, was the decision that agriculture alone would not suffice. 
Though it was agreed that the bulk of the population would continue, 
within the foreseeable future, to be cultivators and herdsmen, the hope for 
rapid economic progress now rested largely on the development of mining 
and secondary industry, which would both provide for the employment of 
the surplus population, the people whom the land would shortly be unable 
to sustain, and would also generate incomes larger than anything that could 
ever be got from even the most efficient husbandry. 
In the event, these plans and prognostications have so far not been 
fulfilled at all. During the past decade wealth on a scale hitherto undreamt 
of has flowed into Uganda, not from the new forms of large-scale agri-
culture, which have been an almost total failure, nor yet from mining and 
manufacturing, which have made but slow headway, but from the old-
established export industries and in the main from the efforts of the African 
peasant, with his smallholding and his hoe. 
The main reason for the new lease of life enjoyed by peasant agriculture 
has of course been the tremendous rise in the unit value of its output. In 
the immediate post-war period this development was quite unforeseeable. 
1. U.P. Repor t of the Agricultural Productivity Committee, 1954. Ann. Rpts . D /A . 
2. U.P. Lam of Uganda (1951) VII 1285. 
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The prices of cotton and coffee had indeed moved sharply upward—cotton 
from an average of Shs. 49 per central, f.o.b. Mombasa, in the period 
1936-39 to Shs. 176 in the period 1946-49, coffee from Shs. 31 to Shs. 87 per 
cwt. But the impression of increased prosperity which these figures might 
have connoted was extremely misleading, for the prices of the counter-
balancing imports had risen even further. By 1948 the official export price 
index (1935-38=100) stood at 344, but the import price index at 390.1 The 
latter figure related to all imports, of which a large proportion were capital 
goods and producers' materials; and the prices of consumer imports, 
especially of those which entered largely into African consumption, had 
almost certainly risen more than this, owing to the elimination of cheap 
Japanese cloth. And since, as we shall see, the peasant producers were 
receiving very much less than the export value of their crops, there can be 
no doubt that the rural population was markedly less well off than it had 
been before the war—a fact which goes far to explain both the unrest and 
general malaise which characterised Uganda in these years and the obvious 
lack of enthusiasm for the production of cotton. 
In 1950, however, the terms of trade turned very sharply in Uganda's 
favour. In this and the subsequent years export prices not only rose rapidly 
in absolute terms but far outstripped the increase in the prices of imported 
goods. This was true of cotton, but it was more spectacularly true of coffee, 
for here the general trend in favour of primary products was accentuated 
by special factors operative since the war: a rapid rise in consumption 
together with a reduction in exports from Brazil and Indonesia, the countries 
which, as producers of low-grade coffee, were Uganda's most direct com-
petitors. In the immediate post-war years Uganda had not reaped the full 
benefit of this change, owing to the long-term contract with the Ministry 
of Food, which, though very favourable at the time of its signature in 1943, 
proved as things turned out to have been a bad bargain. Now, however, 
coffee receipts leaped upwards, giving the Uganda economy perhaps the 
greatest single boost which it had ever experienced. The following com-
parison between the prices of the main exports and those of a selection 
of imported consumer goods gives some idea of the changing relationship 
between the two. 
TABLE 142 
IMPORT AND EXPORT PRICES (1936/38 = 100) 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Import Prices 
Corrugated Iron 402 425 393 609 595 487 454 458 
Grey Cloth . . 768 598 557 739 800 568 518 480 
Dyed Cloth . . 567 416 567 799 837 692 690 712 
Coloured Cloth 678 502 468 652 654 509 447 433 
Lamp Oil 187 188 129 237 267 271 242 235 
Bicycles 240 246 246 266 286 300 294 294 
Export Prices 
Cotton 412 427 460 798 754 486 510 513 
Coffee . . 297 448 900 1,004 1,079 1,114 1,341 931 
Throughout the period, however, the full benefit of higher world 
prices has been withheld from the producers by the operation of Govern-
ment policy. During the latter part of the war, and for some years afterwards, 
the coffee crop was bought in bulk by the United Kingdom Ministry of 
Food, the cotton crop by the Ministry of Supply and the Government of 
India. To make this procedure possible the Government had to take control 
of marketing, and in so doing, of course, it secured control over the prices 
paid to the growers. Now the export prices obtajped from 1943 onwards 
under these contracts were considerably above the levels prevailing during 
the 1930s and in the first years of the war. The authorities calculated, rightly, 
1. East Africa High Commission. Economic and Statistical Bulletin, No . 4. 
2. Calculated f rom Annual Trade Reports of Kenya and Uganda, 1936-38 and 1948, Annua l Trade Repor ts 
of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, 1949-55. 
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that if the full increase were passed on to the producers the result, given the 
almost total inelasticity in the supply of imported consumer goods under 
wartime conditions, could only be inflation. It was therefore decided to set 
aside a large proportion of the proceeds as a kind of post-war credit for the 
growers. To this simple motive for restricting farmers' incomes, however, 
others were soon added. Control over the prices paid to producers gave the 
Government the opportunity to put into practice the much canvassed 
proposal for stabilising the incomes paid to primary producers by the 
creation of price assistance funds, money being withheld in good years and 
disbursed again in times of depression. Thus what was conceived as a 
temporary wartime expedient became a permanent feature of official policy. 
Nor was this all. In the profits of State-controlled marketing the 
Government saw a ready-made source of funds for the large programmes of 
public capital expenditure which it now had in mind. The temptation to 
divert these profits from their originally stated purpose was not successfully 
resisted. It was made known that while part of the money withheld from 
farmers would eventually be paid back to them, another part would be 
used to finance "projects of benefit to the cotton- and coffee-growing areas." 
The last words were meaningless and have meant nothing; the money has 
simply been an addition to the Government's financial resources. 
An additional, though related, argument for holding down the price of 
cotton and coffee arose from the Government's desire for a great increase 
in manufacturing and construction. Supply conditions were such that a 
larger demand for wage-labour would not in itself bring about any great 
increase in its price; but, since the level of wages was closely linked to the 
cost of subsistence, an expansion of the non-agricultural sector would 
nevertheless entail a rise in unit costs, unless food production could be 
correspondingly expanded. For a time, therefore, the authorities were 
anxious that the output of export crops should not be increased at the 
expense of the food supply, and even that farmers' energies should be 
diverted away from cotton and coffee towards the crops required for local 
consumption. The low prices offered for exportable products were deliber-
ately intended to have a disincentive effect. 
The upshot was that by the end of 1953 the farmers of Uganda had 
involuntarily contributed nearly £30 million to price assistance funds and 
about £22 million to development projects of various kinds, in addition 
to about £30 million paid in export duties, which contributed to ordinary 
revenue. Rarely during this period did they receive as much as three-quarters 
of the price which would have been warranted by the state of the export 
market. In 1950 they obtained only 50 per cent, of the actual value of their 
cotton and a mere 27 per cent, of the value of their coffee. In 1951 the figures 
were 39 and 31 per cent.; in 1952 they were 45 and 43 per cent.1 Since then 
the levies have been greatly reduced and there have actually been some 
disbursements from the price assistance funds. But for more than a decade 
the growers, qua growers, were consistent losers, and losers on a very 
substantial scale. 
The policies here outlined, which have also and more notoriously been 
applied in Ghana and Nigeria, have attracted much controversy among 
economists and others.2 The question cannot be discussed at length here, 
but one or two comments may perhaps be made. To begin with, a clear 
distinction must be drawn between the case for centralised marketing as 
such and the case for the manipulation of farm prices to the permanent or 
temporary detriment of the farmer. Though advocacy and criticism of the 
system of controlled marketing often turn on the fact that they make price 
manipulation possible, the system also raises the quite independent problem 
1. Derived f rom East African Statistical Depar tment , Background to the Budget, Nairobi , 1955. 
2. See, e.g., Royal Commission on Land and Populat ion in East Africa, Cd. 9475 (1955), pp. 80-83. 
P. T. Bauer, West African Trade, Cambridge, 1954, pp. 283-343. Articles by P. T. Bauer and F. W. 
Paish, P. Hill, P. Ady and M. Friedman in Economic Journal LXII 750, LXII I 468 and 594, LXIV 698 
and 704. 
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of whether on balance it reduces or increases total marketing costs, the 
difference between the price paid by the overseas purchaser and the price 
which could be paid to the producer. This question we shall leave aside. On 
the question of price manipulation, it is clear that the price assistance 
funds and the development funds raise entirely distinct issues. Even though 
the real complaint against pre-war prices of primary products was not 
that they were unstable but that they were usually low, it remains true that 
violent fluctuations of prices and incomes are, to say the least, a serious incon-
venience, especially perhaps to governments and to the building industry. In 
practice,however, Government policy in Uganda has not merely not mitigated 
but has actually aggravated the effects of market fluctuations. Like everyone 
else, the Uganda authorities assumed at first that the prices of cotton and 
coffee would return to "normal" (that is, pre-war) levels shortly after the 
end of the war. Hence the object of the planners during the middle 1940s 
was to build up reserves against the coming slump. But in fact, as we have 
seen, the moderately high prices of this period were followed, not by a 
slump, but by still higher prices. By this time, however, the authorities were 
under strong pressure to relax the austerity of their policies, so that in 
the early 1950s local price policy and world market trends, instead of 
counteracting one another, were moving in unison. Growers of coffee 
especially began to receive an increased proportion of increased market 
values, with the result that the producers' price trebled between 1952 and 
1954—and was halved again within the next two years. Fluctuations in the 
producers' price for cotton were less marked, but even so it was allowed to 
increase by nearly two and a half times between 1948 and 1952. Since then 
it has remained approximately stable, but taken as a whole it cannot be 
said that price policy has had anything like complete success in ironing 
out variations in farmers' incomes. 
The main force of criticism, however, has been directed against the 
use of marketing-board surpluses to finance development. It is clear that 
these surpluses, when diverted to general development funds, are in effect 
taxation and must be considered as such. (In Uganda, indeed, straight-
forward export taxes have progressively replaced marketing profits as the 
instrument of extraction.) The argument is, first, that the tax is unfair, in 
as much as it falls only on one section of the population, and, secondly, 
that it is excessive. It is argued that the levies on export crops have a 
directly deterrent effect on production, thus reducing the wealth of the 
country. It is also argued that they have a harmful effect on personal savings 
and investment, and that the money diverted to public purposes would have 
borne larger fruit if it had been left in the possession of the farmer, to be 
spent on the improvement of his farm. Alternatively, it may be asserted 
that the aggregate rate of capital formation is too high for so poor a country 
to sustain, and must result in undue hardship for the rural population. 
It may be that these contentions have less validity than is commonly 
supposed. The argument of inequity, even if it is not sufficiently countered 
by the plea of simplicity of collection, does not seem to carry very great 
weight, since the growers of cotton and coffee are in fact the great majority 
of the population. Export taxes or their equivalent are plainly more 
equitable, in the sense of being more proportional, than the flat-rate direct 
taxes and the import duties on articles of common use which were formerly 
the mainstay of the Protectorate's finances. It is^ven possible that they are 
less unfair than income tax, which in Uganda would very probably fall with 
disproportionate weight on the few whose incomes were readily accessible 
to inspection. There is a further point which may be worth consideration. 
It seems clear that the incomes which have been received, or which might 
have been received, by West African producers of cocoa and by East 
African producers of coffee during the past decade are in large measure to 
be regarded as rent. They bear no relation to the incomes which their 
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recipients could have earned by applying their labour and capital in any 
other way, but represent the payment which the world market has had to 
make to the owners of special, globally scarce, varieties of land. It is argu-
able that coffee land should be looked on as a national asset, and that its 
proceeds could therefore quite properly, and without injustice to the 
farmers, be diverted to national expenditure. 
The argument of hardship is, I think, not easy to sustain. It may be 
possible to show statistically that Uganda, which has been investing about 
20 per cent, of its geographical income, is as poor a country as India, 
which cannot manage a rate of capital formation of as much as 10 per cent. 
But there are very different kinds of poverty; and a rate of saving which 
would inflict distress on the people of India may be quite tolerable to the 
people of Uganda, who are in all circumstances assured of a reasonable 
subsistence. Except in the war and immediate post-war years, the levies on 
the farmers have not entailed an actual reduction in their real purchasing 
power, but only a sacrifice of part of the increase which would otherwise 
have accrued to them. Since the rural population is in fact much better off 
than it was before the levy system was introduced, it is difficult to maintain 
that hardship has been inflicted on them. 
This does not mean, however, that the sacrifice was not regarded 
as a bitter grievance. It was emphatically so regarded, at any rate in the 
more sophisticated areas, and here we come to a point of warrantable 
criticism. An attempt to achieve rapid economic growth by means of a high 
rate of public capital formation is a peculiarly difficult line of action for a 
government which, like the Government of Uganda, is neither sufficiently 
democratic to base its policies on popular consent nor sufficiently powerful 
to have its policies acquiesced in without popular questioning. The situation 
demanded a strenuous effort on the part of the authorities to make their 
plans comprehensible, even if not fully acceptable, to the people who paid 
for them; but such an effort, so far as I can discover, was not made, at any 
rate in the early post-war years. As a result, discontent over the price of 
cotton acted as a lighted match to the smouldering pile of general political 
dissatisfaction, which broke into flame in the disorders of 1949. Among the 
several grievances then brought forward by the insurgents, this was the only 
one which was admitted by the subsequent commission of enquiry to have 
had real substance.1 Thus the Government was obliged to beat a gradual 
and partial retreat on the price front, with the result that, as has been 
shown, income fluctuations since the war have actually been greater than 
fluctuations in the world market. 
With the argument of disincentive we move on to very speculative 
ground. If the farmers had been allowed higher prices for their crops they 
would of course have had more money available for investment in farm 
improvements, transport equipment and the like, and it may well be that 
some additional investment of this kind would in fact have been carried 
out. It is also true that governments in general are prone to misinvestment, 
and that not all the development expenditure of the Uganda Government 
has in fact been wisely conceived. But the opinion of some critics, that the 
volume of fruitful investment would have been higher if market forces had 
been allowed to operate undisturbed, seems to me to be based on parti pris 
rather than on empirical analysis. My own view is that, if a high rate of 
capital formation was judged to be desirable, then a measure of forced 
saving was indispensable. Moreover, it would be generally agreed that 
the need for investment was particularly urgent in fields such as education 
and communications, which almost necessarily lay within the sector of 
public expenditure. As for the effect of price limitation on the willingness of 
farmers to produce crops for the market, it will be shown that production 
has in fact increased very considerably during the period in question. It is 
1. U.P . Report of the Commission of inquiry into the disturbances in Uganda during April, 1949, Entebbe* 
1950. 
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of course open to the critics to maintain that the increase would have been 
greater if the full possible incentive had been granted to the growers. Others, 
taking their stand on the allegedly perverse responses of peasant farmers, 
may assert a diametrically opposite opinion, holding that if a given level of 
income could have been attained with a lower volume of output the actual 
output would indeed have been lower. It is hardly possible to prove the 
matter one way or the other. It is easy enough to show that if the price of a 
particular crop is raised the output of that crop will at once go up, not down. 
This was strikingly illustrated by the sudden and spectacular increase in the 
production of maize in 1953, following a season of unusually high prices. 
The post-war history of a number of minor crops, such as castor seeds, 
soya beans and chillies, also shows a close positive correlation between price 
and output, proving, if proof were needed, that the farmers of Uganda are 
rational beings, who do their best to apply their energies in the most 
profitable ways open to them. None of this, however, allows us to arrive at a 
firm conclusion as to the relationship between agricultural prices and 
agricultural output as a whole, or to determine the point at which the 
average farmer balances his desire for goods and his desire for leisure. 
The uncertainty applies only to short-term reactions; in the longer run it 
can be assumed that high incomes do have a stimulating effect, in that they 
bring about a general rise in the conventional standards of consumption. 
It may well be that the real ground of complaint against the Govern-
ment's policy is not that it has invested too much but that its saving has been 
excessive, that its insistence on the building up of large liquid reserves has 
had a deflationary and debilitating effect on the economy. Certainly it is 
worthy of note that, despite the emphasis on capital formation, actual 
physical investment, to judge by the volume of imported producer goods, 
has been very much slighter in Uganda than in Kenya. It has recently been 
pointed out that this is nothing new: a very conservative approach to public 
finance, and its corollary, a huge export surplus, have long been charac-
teristic of Uganda.1 However, this is not an essay on fiscal policy; and 
it is time that we returned to agriculture. 
By 1948 the authorities had come to the conclusion that the continuing 
low level of cotton output was no longer acceptable. The cotton industry 
was after all the mainstay of the economic system, whatever other develop-
ments might be planned; and now that the particular needs and pressures of 
the war period had ceased to operate it could not be allowed to languish. 
In the 1948-49 season, therefore, an intensive propaganda campaign was 
directed against the growers; the co-operation of the local African 
authorities was enlisted by the promise of a share in marketing profits; and 
the producers were even offered a rather higher price, which was promulgated 
before the beginning of the planting season. Other favourable factors were 
probably present, in as much as the young men had now returned from the 
war and had mostly spent their gratuities and settled back into rural life. 
Nevertheless the results seemed to indicate that, even though nothing in the 
nature of coercion was now permissible, official exhortations still had a lot 
to do with the intensity and the nature of economic activity. For the change 
in the situation between the 1947-48 and the 1948-49 seasons was truly 
impressive: the acreage was increased by about 50 per cent., and the output 
was more than doubled. The pre-war level of production had been practically 
regained, and with some fluctuations, due mainly to the weather, has been 
sustained ever since. * 
By itself, this table suggests that, after climbing out of the war-time 
trough, Uganda agriculture has been, at best, jnarking time, and that any 
improvement which has occurred in the country's economic situation since 
the 1930s has been due solely to the fortuitous rise in export values. It 
suggests also that Buganda has been losing ground in relation to the 
1. Hazlewood, A. Trade Balances and Statutory Marketing in Primary Exporting Countries, Economic 
Journal, LXVII , 1957. 
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remainder of the Protectorate. Cotton, however, is no longer anything like 
the whole of the story; and the recent history of coffee production flatly 
contradicts both of these suggestions. 
TABLE 15' 
COTTON PRODUCTION, 1937/38 and 1947/48-1955/56 
Output of Seed Cotton (tons '000) Exports 
Buganda E. Prov. N. Prov. W. Prov. Total Bales '000 £'000 
1937/38 106.7 110.9 27.0 5.0 249.6 402 3,428 
1947/48 45.1 41.7 11.4 2.8 101.0 174 7,458 
1948/49 106.6 88.5 30.7 5.6 231.4 390 17,343 
1949/50 96.4 70.2 31.5 7.5 204.6 349 16,698 
1950/51 86.0 86.8 26.4 7.0 206.2 346 28,742 
1951/52 76.3 98.9 42.0 6.7 223.9 378 29,954 
1952/53 60.0 98.2 25.9 6.5 190.6 333 16,793 
1953/54 79.9 112.1 32.8 8.9 233.6 393 20,877 
1954/55 58.0 81.6 29.6 6.7 175.9 308 16,386 
1955/56 62.4 105.4 39.6 8.2 215.6 376 19,285 
A sharp upward trend in coffee planting was already visible in 
Buganda during the later 1930s, notwithstanding that the price was then 
very low not only absolutely but also in relation to the price of cotton. 
(A number of those who are now among the largest African coffee planters 
have told me that they began operations in 1937 or thereabouts.) The trend 
gained momentum about the end of the war and again with the forward 
surge of prices in 1950. The cumulative effects of this activity, masked by 
poor seasons in 1953 and 1954, were spectacularly manifested in 1955, when 
the value of the coffee grown by Africans in Buganda actually exceeded the 
TABLE 161 
COFFEE PRODUCTION, 1938 and 1947/56 
Output (tons '000)a Exports 
Buganda Bugisu Other African Non-African Cwt. '000 £'000 
(robusta) (arabica) robusta arabica robusta arabica 
1938 20.1 2.1 ? ? ? ? 280 328 
1947 32.6 3.1 0 .3 0 .2 4.9 414 1,536 
1948 68.9 3.0 0 .4 0 .2 3.6 756 3,247 
1949 33.9 2.9 0 .3 0.1 2.6 478 2,891 
1950 52.5 2.9 0 .5 0 .2 3.1 638 8,332 
1951 69.3 3.9 0.7 0 .4 3.8 873 13,654 
1952 59.1 2.2 0 .6 0 .3 4.9 0 .3 788 12,345 
1953 54.1 2.3 0 .6 0.1 5.9 0 .4 714 11,544 
1954 50.4 3.1 1.5 0 .3 5.3 0 .6 693 13,477 
1955 120.3 6.2 2.6 0 .5 7.7 0 .8 1,490 20,152 
1956 92.7 4 .2 2 .3 0 .2 8.9 1.3 1,381 15,720 
value of the entire ' Protectorate's cotton crop. The expansion of coffee 
production, which has been achieved partly in addition to and partly in 
substitution for cotton-growing, has been viewed with some misgiving, not 
only by the cotton-ginners, but also by the authorities, who have repeatedly 
urged the farmers not to abandon cotton for a crop whose future economic 
prospects are very uncertain. It is true that the good fortune which has 
attended coffee producers, and especially the producers of low-grade coffee 
such as Buganda robusta, can already be seen to have been temporary. Yet 
there can be little doubt that the change has brought tremendous and lasting 
gains both to the Ganda and to the Protectorate at large, for at any fore-
seeable price ratio coffee yields larger returns, both in terms of land and in 
terms of labour, than either cotton or any other crop which peasant farmers 
are in a position to grow. 
1. Sources as for Table 13. 
2. The figures in each column are not directly comparable. Those for Buganda and other African relate 
to dried cherry, those for Bugisu to parchment , coffee and those for Non-Afr ican to hulled coffee. 
Very roughly, 1 ton of hulled coffee 1 j tons parchment coffee = 2 tons dried cherry. 
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In other ways, too, the agricultural economy is considerably more 
diversified than before the Second World War. Cotton and coffee still over-
whelmingly dominated the export sector: together they represented 89 per 
cent, of the value of agricultural exports in 1955, and 77 per cent, of all 
exports. But tobacco is of some importance in Bunyoro and is beginning to 
be important in the West Nile and Acholi districts of the Northern Province; 
and a number of other products, such as castor seed and soya beans, have 
from time to time made appreciable contributions. The most significant new 
development, however, has been the growth of a local market. With the 
expansion of the towns, and the increase in the numbers of people who do 
not control the means of subsistence, foodstuffs which were formerly grown 
almost exclusively for household consumption have become marketable; and 
many Ganda farmers have begun to make large incomes from the sale of 
surplus bananas and other staple foods. Maize, hitherto a minor subsistence 
crop, first entered the market on a large scale during the war, the area under 
cultivation rising from 120,000 acres in 1938 to 316,000 in 1944. It was 
sustained at about this level until 1953, when, after a crop failure in Kenya, 
it leapt suddenly to 660,000 acres—a striking illustration both of the 
responsiveness of African farmers and of the margins still remaining in 
the agricultural system. This was a peak figure, which has not been attained 
since. But there is no doubt that maize has obtained a permanent place of 
some importance in the economy, though the protectionist policy of the 
Kenya Maize Control prevents it from achieving its full potential develop-
ment. 
One of the principal developments since the war has been the con-
centration of agricultural wealth in certain areas of the Protectorate and 
especially in Buganda. The slow expansion of marketable output in the 
north and west, which may be accelerated in the latter area by the recently 
completed extension of the railway, has been eclipsed by the immense 
enrichment which coffee has brought about in Buganda. 
TABLE 171 
CROP SALES BY AREA, 1952 and 1956 (£'000) 
Cotton Coffee Tobacco Other Crops2 Total Per Capufl (£) 
1952 1956 1952 1956 1952 1956 1952 1956 1952 1956 1952 1956 
Buganda 4,135 3,761 3,893 7,785 17 28 919 n.a. 8,966 11,574 6 .89 8 .89 
E. Prov. 
Bugisu \ 
Bukedi / 1,718 
277 
1,269 
376 1,350 — =} 57 n.a. 2,153 1,627 1,269 } 3 .59 6 .31 3 .71 
Busoga .. . 2,445 3,188 3 27 — 354 n.a. 2,801 3,216 5 .54 6 .35 
Teso 1,246 1,274 — — — 57 n.a . 1,303 1,274 3 .23 3 .16 
N . Prov. 
Lango 1,012 984 — — — — — n.a. 1,012 985 3 .80 3 .70 
Acholi . . . 652 788 — — 4 9 — n.a. 655 797 3 .03 3 .69 
Karamoja — 5 — — — — — n.a. — 5 0 .04 
W. Nile .. . 354 547 — 1 15 57 6 n.a . 375 603 1 .12 1.79 
W. Prov. 
Bunyoro ... 223 310 1 7 52 84 1 n.a . 276 401 2. 55 3 .71 
Toro 146 173 36 131 13 n.a. 196 305 0. 76 1.16 
Ankole ... — — 19 37 1 — 71 n.a. 91 38 0 23 0 .09 
Kigezi — — 1 1 4 7 19 n.a. 24 8 0. 06 0 . 0 2 
Total 11,929 12,576 3,925 9,341 93 185 1,497 n.a. 
m
 
00 22,100 3. .63 4 . 4 8 
Thus it would appear that production for the market is far more highly 
developed in Buganda, Busoga and Bugisu than in the remainder of the 
country, and that agriculture still yields scarcely any money incomes to 
the peoples of Karamoja or to those of any part of the Western Province 
except Bunyoro and the coffee-producing county of Bwamba in the Toro 
District. Taken by itself, however, the above^ table would be seriously 
misleading, for the wealth generated in the intensively agricultural districts 
is to some extent diffused through the country as a whole. In the first place, 
a large proportion (it is impossible to say h o # large, but perhaps nearly 
as much as a half) of the incomes received by Ganda farmers are in fact 
1. Ann . Rpts . D / A , 1952 and 1956. 
2. Castor seed, maize, groundnuts , chillies, peas, beans, grass, sunflower, onions, soya beans, wattle, 
simsim, millet, potatoes, shea but ter nut, flax, wheat (but not including bananas) . N o figures are 
available for these commodities af ter 1952, when marketing was decontrolled, 
3. 1948 populat ion. 
7 5 
paid out to hired labourers, and much of this wage-income flows out to 
the poorer districts of Uganda as well as to Ruanda-Urundi and other 
neighbouring territories. In the second place, farmers enriched by the 
production of coffee and cotton allot a high priority in their expenditure to 
the more regular consumption of meat, so that the trade in slaughter cattle 
has become a major feature of the Protectorate's economic life. This develop-
ment has been encouraged by the authorities, not only for nutritional 
reasons but also as a means of counteracting the pastoralists' tendency to 
overload the grazing-grounds with unprofitable beasts. In 1954 it was 
estimated that Buganda was annually importing the equivalent of 65,000 
adult cattle, and Busoga a further 10,000, representing a disbursement of 
not less than £600,000. The principal exporting districts were Teso (36,000 
units), Karamoja (17,000) and Lango (15,000).* In Teso and Lango the 
idea of cattle as a potential source of money income had been very generally 
accepted, but the same could not yet be said of Karamoja, where the "cattle 
complex" remained in full vigour and a demand for shillings, over and 
above the annual tax, still hardly existed; here the export of cattle was due 
mainly to official pressures. 
In general, the trend which was visible in the 1950s, and which could 
be expected to become more pronounced in the future, was a trend towards 
regional specialisation within Uganda, towards an allocation to each area 
of the functions which it was best fitted to perform. Fuller use was being 
made of the most fertile areas by the concentration of their resources upon 
the production of coffee, which only they could grow, and of bulky food-
stuffs for the towns in their vicinity. Crops such as cotton, which were less 
exacting in their requirements, were being relegated to lands of rather lower 
quality. And the relatively arid areas of Uganda were beginning to contribute 
to the economic system as suppliers of badly needed meat. Even within 
Buganda there was some local specialisation. The densely populated country-
side in the immediate vicinity of Kampala was being increasingly devoted to 
sweet potatoes, the plant which gives the heaviest yield of bulk carbohydrate, 
and to the raw materials of beer—sweet bananas and latterly also pineapples. 
A little further out came the great coffee-and-banana belt. The remoter inland 
parts of the province were in part almost deserted owing to the presence of 
the tsetse fly and the scarcity of surface water and in part devoted to livestock 
production. 
Since specialisation is the essence of economic development all this 
was clearly very much to the good. There was one further step in this direction, 
however, which the farmers of Uganda had not yet taken. Not only did 
the country as a whole remain self-sufficient in respect of its basic food 
supply, but each household still endeavoured to grow its own food in 
addition to whatever crops it produced for sale. In the existing state of 
communications and distributive machinery, and considering that coffee 
and bananas, cotton and millet fit very well together in the farming systems, 
this policy, though in theory questionable, was in practice almost certainly 
sound. At the margin, however, there had been some change, at any rate in 
Buganda. There, little attention was paid to the legal regulation according 
to which every landholder was supposed to maintain a quarter of an acre 
under cassava, as a reserve against the failure of his ordinary food supply. 
Many farmers now planted only such quantities of food crops as would be 
sufficient for their requirements in a normal year, covering the deficit in 
unfavourable seasons with maize flour which they bought from the shops. 
By this procedure, of course, a distinct economy of resources was secured. 
Meanwhile, on the technical side, great and to some extent successful 
endeavours had been made to improve the efficiency of African agriculture. 
Scientific research had of course continued; and in this context Uganda had 
been very fortunate in being chosen as the site of the principal field station 
of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation. The scientific work of the 
I. U.P. Repor t of the Agricultural Productivity Committee, 1954. 
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Department of Agriculture had also continued to be directed primarily 
towards cotton. Its principal achievements in this field were the breeding of 
markedly improved strains of the plant and the dusting of the seed with a 
chemical preparation called perenox, which did much to reduce the incidence 
of pests. The campaign against erosion had made considerable headway, to 
the extent that the danger of real disaster could be said to have been averted. 
The show-piece of soil conservation was undoubtedly the terracing of the 
steep hill-sides of Kigezi, which was one of the most spectacular pieces of 
agricultural engineering in Africa. In Teso, another badly threatened district, 
the general adoption of the practice of strip-cropping had done much to 
relieve the situation. Slow but steady progress was also being made with the 
protection of the hill slopes of Buganda by contour bands planted with 
paspalum grass. This was being effected neither by outright coercion nor yet 
by pure persuasion, but by an intermediate process which might be described 
as badgering, and which has made "paspalum" a familiar and detested word 
in the Ganda language. Though inevitable, it was unfortunate that the 
Department of Agriculture should for many years have been associated in the 
minds of the farmers primarily with pressure to engage in arduous labours 
of which neither the necessity nor the advantage were immediately apparent. 
The work of the Department did, however, include propaganda and 
instruction of a more directly constructive kind. Here and there, for 
instance, farmers had been persuaded to make a beginning with scientifically 
planned rotations of annual crops and with the integration of cattle-
keeping and cultivation, the adoption of pasture improvement, stall-feeding 
and the dunging of the coffee and banana groves. But the most ambitious 
innovation was the attempt to substitute tractor-drawn implements for the 
peasant's hoe. In the immediate post-war period—in the period of the 
Groundnut Scheme—the tractor was widely regarded as a deus ex machina 
(or in machina), which would rapidly transform the whole character of 
farming operations. This has not come to pass, but mechanisation has 
nevertheless had a certain impact. A number of small "machine tractor 
stations" have been set up under the aegis of the Department, from which 
tractors and their drivers are hired out to African farmers on request.1 The 
main effort was at first concentrated on Buganda, where the broken terrain, 
the rank vegetation and the dense occupation of the land by irregularly 
disposed smallholdings combined to make mechanical cultivation exceedingly 
costly, and where in any case the increasing emphasis on permanent crops 
was making it less useful. Recently the focus of interest has moved towards 
the more open country in the Northern and Western Provinces. The scale 
of operations has remained small. In 1956, 4,478 acres were ploughed on 
contract, of which 1,708 were in Lango and Acholi, 1,333 in Bunyoro and 
Toro and only 989 in Buganda.2 Nor could it be said that the process had 
yet been proved to be fully economic. A development which seemed to show 
more long-run promise, but the success of which depended on a wider 
diffusion of mechanical skills and general savoir-faire among the rural 
population, was the purchase of tractors by individual farmers. 
It was clear at any rate that mechanisation was for the few, not for the 
many, and this brings us to a subtle and gradual change that was taking 
place in the pattern of the Department's work. In lieu of the handing down 
of rules, instructions and exhortations to an ignorant and, in theory, sub-
servient peasantry there was emerging something more like an agricultural 
extension service as the term is understood in a^ivilised state. The Depart-
ment's officers were moving away from the heart-breaking task of raising 
the general level of African agriculture a nojph or two up the scale of 
efficiency, and were turning to the more rewarding process of providing 
expert guidance to the minority of farmers who were both willing and able 
1. U.P. White Paper on Mechanisat ion of African Farming in Uganda, 1954. Ann . Rpts . D / A f rom 
1948 onwards. 
2. U.P. Ann. Rpt . D / A for 1956. 
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to profit from it. In 1953 the Agricultural Productivity Committee noted and 
welcomed the appearance on the scene of the professional farmer. In 1956 
work was started on the construction of two Farm Institutes, which were 
intended to provide training, not only for Departmental staff and school-
teachers but also for Africans wishing to make a career in agriculture; and 
in the same year there was set up a Farm Planning Unit—not to impose new 
methods of operation on all and sundry, but to provide guidance "at the 
request of individual farmers or groups of farmers."1 
In the early and middle 1950s new winds were blowing through the 
Uganda countryside. Increased prosperity was evident on every hand— 
most notably in Buganda but to some extent throughout the country—in the 
housing and clothing of the rural population, in the multiplication of 
bicycles and motor-cars, gramophones and wireless sets, in the country 
shops stocked with tinned milk and wheat loaves and bottled beer. But 
along with this progress there was also visible the beginning of a profound 
structural transformation. Hitherto, the peasants of Uganda had conformed 
to a more or less standard type. They were hardly farmers, as the term is 
understood in Europe, but only part-time "cultivators," whose participation 
in the exchange economy did not extend much beyond the raising, by 
primitive methods, of an acre or so of cotton or other marketable crops. 
Agriculture was rarely either a dominant interest or a full-time occupation. 
It was merely a chore, which had to be engaged in so that a limited number 
of money requirements might be met. (The food supply was primarily the 
business of the women.) There were indeed, among the landowners of 
Buganda, some who farmed their land on a much larger scale, enjoyed much 
larger incomes and had altogether higher standards than the ordinary 
peasant. But even these differed from the peasants only in having labour 
under their control. The methods of work were the same, the whole approach 
equally unprofessional. 
Now, however, men of a new type were emerging out of the homogeneous 
mass of cultivators—men who definitely looked on agriculture as a means 
of growing rich. Specimens might be found almost everywhere, but it was 
only in Buganda that they were at all common. They had begun to make 
their presence felt just before the war, but it was only in the post-war decades 
that they really came to the fore. They were of diverse origins. Some were 
landowning squires, who had discovered that direct exploitation of the soil 
could be far more profitable than the mere receipt of rent and tithe. A few 
were simple peasants, who were climbing out of the ruck by virtue of more 
than ordinary intelligence and character. Many, probably the majority, 
were traders, clerks, artisans, even schoolteachers, who had retired to the 
country in middle life and were endeavouring to sustain by agriculture the 
kind of incomes to which they had become accustomed elsewhere. What 
they had in common was quite simply a dissatisfaction with the merely 
normal standard of living, a determination to grow rich. To farm on a more 
ambitious scale meant, first and foremost, to cultivate more land, and to 
cultivate more land meant first and foremost to employ more labour. By 
no means all the "new men" were any better farmers from a technical 
point of view than the simplest of the semi-subsistence cultivators. There 
was, however, a slowly increasing number of men who not only willingly 
took but actually sought the advice of Agricultural Officers, whose attitudes 
and practices were beginning to assume a truly professional character. 
Since large and successful farmers were much commoner in Buganda 
than elsewhere, it might be tempting to see the explanation of their emergence 
in the tenurial conditions peculiar to that province—in the existence of legal 
rights in land and of units of ownership much larger than the standard 
peasant holding. But although it is true that successful farmers usually 
owned land to begin with or bought land as soon as they began to be success-
ful, it does not appear that documentary title was an essential condition of 
1. U.P . Ann. Rp t . D / A for 1956. " 
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their success. Many of them founded their fortunes on ordinary tenant 
holdings, which were not always at all strictly delimited in area. Moreover, 
large agricultural undertakings did occur sporadically in other provinces. 
In Acholi, for example, there was at least one 70-acre African farm, which 
had been created with no apparent difficulty within the framework of 
customary tribal law. The main reasons for the prevalence of large farmers 
in Buganda appeared to be rather the existence, until recently, of large 
reserves of eminently fertile land, the availability of cheap immigrant labour, 
the exceptionally high profits which could be extracted from the soil, and a 
form of society which stimulated competition and set no barriers to 
ambition. 
It would be wrong, however, to draw too sharp a distinction between 
the "professional" farmers and the remainder of the rural population. At 
one end of the scale there was the lethargic and usually drunken peasant, 
who produced in the year just enough cotton or coffee to pay his rent and 
taxes and to provide clothing for his back. At the other was the farmer 
who had fifty or even a hundred acres under coffee, whose labour force 
ran into scores, who perhaps also owned a shop and a share in a curing-
works, whose approach to the whole undertaking was thoroughly business-
like and who was by any standard a wealthy man. But between these 
extremes there was not a gulf but a continuum, containing all sorts and 
conditions of persons engaged with greater or less energy and success in 
the practice of agriculture. In spite of the very wide divergences of fortune 
which had taken place, the fundamental structure of agrarian society re-
mained unaltered, in as much as it was still assumed that every member of 
the community was or could be a cultivator, that every family had or could 
obtain, somewhere, a piece of land sufficient for its maintenance. 
There were, however, signs of a more radical change looming on the 
horizon. In the first place, the growth of population was beginning to 
challenge the assumption that there was or could be land for everyone. So 
far, there was acute pressure on the land only in the mountainous districts 
of Kigezi, where it had been partly relieved by resettlement, and Bugisu. 
In the Protectorate as a whole there certainly remained ample space for the 
present generation of cultivators and probably the next; in Bunyoro, for 
example, where the birth-rate remained obstinately low, the local authorities 
were actually inviting African colonists from Kenya to help fill up the vacant 
territories. But in many areas the end of this particular road was already in 
sight. In much of Buganda and Busoga land had already ceased to be a 
free good, in that new settlers were being obliged to make initial payments 
of as much as £10 an acre, or even more, not for title deeds but for 
occupancy rights. Though there was as yet very little actual landlessness 
among the native populations of these areas, there was emerging a class of 
people who might be described as cotters, who possessed little more than a 
banana grove and were dependent on wage employment for almost the 
whole of their money income. Moreover, some landowners in Buganda 
were applying all possible pressure to get their small tenants to vacate their 
holdings, in order to make room for the expansion of their own farms. It 
was clear that universal landholding would before very long become im-
possible, or at any rate would cease to be compatible with the existence of 
some farms of very much more than average size. Nor could there be much 
doubt that it would not be the large farms that yould give way. 
One factor which had hitherto prevented still further differentiation 
was the continued use, on farms of all types and sizes, of very simple 
techniques and very cheap equipment. The furtffer spread of mechanisation 
would alter this, and so would the wider adoption of mixed farming, with the 
necessity of expenditure on cattle, fencing and the transport of manure. 
In these ways a decisive advantage would be conferred on farmers with 
fairly large areas at their disposal and some capital behind them. 
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So far, the African farmer's responsibilities and opportunities had 
virtually ended with the harvesting of his crops. He had no part in their 
processing and marketing. All he had to do with his cotton was to separate 
the stained bolls from the sound ones; all he had to do with his coffee was 
to lay it out in the sun to dry. Processing was carried out in central factories. 
Marketing presented him with no problems, for he could, and had to, 
dispose of the whole of his crop at the nearest trading centre or ginnery at a 
price laid down by the Government. In such circumstances no premium could 
be paid for superior quality. But by 1957 the urgency of raising the quality 
of Buganda robusta was so great that the Government was considering 
means of encouraging the partial preparation of coffee on or near the farm, 
so that higher prices could be paid, not only for well-prepared coffee but 
also for coffee which had been picked at the proper time and thoroughly 
dried. (Under the existing system, differences in quality are apparent only 
after the coffee has left the central factory.) If any such measure went through, 
a clear line would be drawn between the farmers who had the capital and the 
enterprise to acquire processing equipment and those who had not. 
- On several counts, therefore, it was plain that differentiation was 
going to become more pronounced, that class distinctions in rural society 
were going to be more and more sharply drawn. Before long, Uganda would 
be leaving behind "that early and rude state of society which precedes 
both the accumulation of stock (i.e. capital) and the appropriation of 
land."1 Notwithstanding the growth of exchange, its economy had so far 
remained in that "rude" form. Nor had the acquisition of proprietary 
rights by the Ganda chiefs in 1900 amounted to appropriation in the 
operative sense of the term, for the use of land had remained open to all. 
The change would be profound and its social consequences were un-
predictable. The upheaval had long been foreboded, and those who wished 
to avoid it had seen in the co-operative society an expedient whereby the 
advantages of specialisation might be obtained without the resultant in-
equality and social stress. Now the co-operative movement had made great 
headway in Uganda since the Second World War, and had come to play a 
considerable part in the marketing and processing of crops. But on agriculture 
it had made scarcely any impact. The Ganda at least appear to have the 
strongest aversion to anything in the nature of collective labour. They would 
rather till their own land or even, if need be, work independently for hire. 
And even on the commercial side the co-operatives had owed most of their 
success to the special privileges accorded them by the Government. It was 
not difficult to prophesy that here too the future lay rather with the individual 
entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs. 
If the trend continued towards differentiation of the rural population, 
towards a sharper distinction between large farmers and cottagers, between 
employers and workers, between economic leaders and economic followers, 
Uganda would be following the road which had been travelled by all the 
advanced countries of the world-—certainly not excluding the Soviet Union. 
The process could hardly fail to produce economic gains, in as much as 
larger scope would be allowed for differences in human talent and ambition. 
It might even produce gains for almost everyone, for many smallholders 
could certainly have earned far more by working for others than they 
actually did earn on their own holdings. But on the other hand there would 
be disturbance. If the change were gradual—and there was no reason to 
suppose that it would be other than gradual—the disturbance would not 
have to be severe. But the dread of disturbance, the awareness of a threat 
to the old easy-going, fundamentally egalitarian way of life, was very much 
present among large sections of the rural population, especially but not 
solely in Buganda. It lay behind the obsessive fears of expropriation by 
European settlers or by the Government—the latter wholly baseless, the 
former having a basis only in the occasional acquisition of land for railways, 
T Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London : Routledge, 1905), p . 36. 
8 0 
agricultural research stations and the like. It lay behind the growing 
antagonism between the Ganda and the African immigrants whose presence 
was helping to make land scarce. It was one of the root causes of the 
prevailing political unrest, and of an atmosphere in which the Government 
was readily believed to be engaged in the systematic poisoning (or 
sterilisation) of its African subjects. Yet the unrest was not all dread. For 
the more vigorous members of society new opportunities were unfolding, 
and it was impossible to live in rural Uganda in the early 1950s without 
being conscious of stir and hope, of the opening up of new horizons. 
Finally, we must return for a brief glimpse of a sector of the agricultural 
economy which we have neglected since the 1920s. Non-African plantation 
enterprise had gone through hard times after 1930. It had survived, but not 
without considerable reconstruction. The individual planter-settler was 
almost extinct, though a few Asian business-men contrived to run small coffee 
plantations as a sideline. Most of the estates were now run as units of large, 
highly capitalised organisations, among which the Uganda Company was 
pre-eminent. The plantations had shared in the general expansion of the 
economy after 1950 and continued to make an important contribution to 
the wealth of the country. 
T A B L E 18 1 
N O N - A F R I C A N A G R I C U L T U R E , 1 9 3 8 - 5 6 
1938 1947 1950 1953 1956 
Acres Planted 
Coffee . . 13,313 17,600 21,067 22,825 24,129 
Rubber . . 10,813 7.000 7,000 7,000 — 
Sugar 15,312 28,000 26,662 26,547 30,503 
Sisal 7,200 8,600 9,800 9,000 7,000 
Tea 2,884 5,100 6,406 8,397 11,920 
49,522 66,300 70,935 73,969 73,522 
Production—Tons 
Coffee n.a. 4,900 2,581 6,340 10,200 
Rubber n.a. 200 44 45 — 
Sugar n.a. 56,900 46,108 47,973 69,037 
Sisal n.a. 800 964 900 630 
Tea n.a. 1,700 1,849 2,140 3,036 
Production— £'000 
Coffee n.a. 343 616 2,009 2,625 
Rubber n.a. 21 21 11 — 
Sugar n.a. 1,207 1,721 2,146 3,154 
Sisal n.a. 107 107 60 30 
Tea n.a. 380 414 599 1,122 
2,000 2,900 4,826 6,931 
Apart from the revival of coffee growing, the most significant post-
war development in the non-African sector was the expansion of the tea 
industry, which, freed from the restrictions hitherto imposed on it by inter-
national agreement, and soundly based on a rapidly growing domestic 
market, seemed to be assured of a prosperous future. Tea is pre-eminently 
a "plantation," that is to say a large-unit crop, in that it needs to be pro-
cessed by elaborate equipment immediately after picking. It is possible, 
however, to delegate the cultivation to small producers, provided that a 
factory is situated in their midst and that they are subjected to sufficient 
discipline to ensure a regular supply of leaf; and experiments in this direction 
were being conducted in the 1950s. It was to be looped that, in this way and 
in others, the old rigid distinction between "African" and "non-African" 
agriculture would begin to be broken down as Uganda grew more adult. 
One of the messages most insistently conveyed the report of the Royal 
Commission on Land and Population in East Africa was that the locking 
up of non-African capital and enterprise in a separate compartment of the 
economy, however expedient it may have been in the early stages of the 
T Ann. Rpts. D/A. 
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country's development, could not but have a constricting effect on the 
economic growth of the community as a whole. Now that the people of 
Uganda were ceasing to be unsophisticated and helpless peasants, now that 
some Africans were beginning to farm on an almost "European" scale, the 
old classification was losing much of its meaning. It was not to be expected 
that the ban on the further acquisition of land rights by non-Africans would 
be relaxed in the immediate future, but there were other ways in which 
African agriculture could be fertilised by the application of the capital and 
the managerial and technical skills possessed by European and Asian citizens. 
The proposed partnership of peasant farmers and factory-owners in the tea 
industry represented one line of advance. Others, which had already been 
adumbrated by the Uganda Company, included the formation of agricultural 
companies by African landowners and European entrepreneurs and the use 
of European firms as managing agents on African-owned estates. Altogether, 
it seemed possible to look forward to the gradual evolution of a more 
sensibly integrated and co-operative system. 
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